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At the core of this book is a seemingly simple question: What is Asia? Insearch of common historical roots, traditions and visions of political-cultural 
integration, first Japanese, then Chinese, Korean and Indian intellectuals, 
politicians and writers understood Asianisms as an umbrella for all conceptions, 
imaginations and processes which emphasized commonalities or common 
interests among different Asian regions and nations.
This book investigates the multifarious discursive and material constructions 
of Asia within the region and in the West. It reconstructs regional constellations, 
intersections and relations in their national, transnational and global contexts. 
Moving far beyond the more well-known Japanese Pan-Asianism of the first half 
of the twentieth century, the chapters investigate visions of Asia that have 
sought to provide common meanings and political projects in efforts to trace, 
and construct, Asia as a united and common space of interaction. By tracing the 
imagination of civil society actors throughout Asia, the volume leaves behind 
state-centered approaches to regional integration and uncovers the richness and 
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Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski
The history of Asia since the 19th century can be characterized as a 
process of parallel and contradictory trajectories of social, political, 
economic and cultural entanglements as well as differentiations of 
individual Asian societies. Until now, however, Asian history has been 
treated largely not as regional history but as the history of distinct 
national entities. This is true even for the history of international 
relations or for transnational history, which are concerned mainly with 
relations of individual countries with the “West”. This book is dif-
ferent. Its chapters look at Asia in its entirety; even better, the book 
traces constructions of Asia, be it in the form of Western concepts of 
Asia as a region or as a real historical space whose formation has been 
influenced by intra-regional interaction. It reconstructs regional con-
stellations, intersections and relations in their national, transnational 
and global contexts. Its focus is on “Asianisms”, which we define as 
discursive constructs of Asia and their related political, cultural and 
social practices. In doing so we appropriate a concept that was first 
promulgated by Japanese and then by Chinese, Korean and Indian 
intellectuals. In search of common historical roots, traditions and 
visions of political-cultural integration, they understood Asianisms as 
an umbrella for all conceptions, imaginations and processes that em-
phasized commonalities or common interests among different Asian 
regions and nations.1
 As the discursive construction of Asia is a highly contested field, 
we feel a need to somewhat broaden the historical meaning of Asian-
isms. We refer to Asianisms as a concept that encompasses processes 
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of entanglement as well as differentiation, and we apply it to integra-
tion and fragmentation. We use the term in the plural in order to cap-
ture the whole spectrum of discursive constructs as well as practices. 
These discourses and their related practices may have originated in 
Asia, but they can also be traced back to Europe or North America. 
As several of the chapters reveal, Asianist discourses and practices 
were also invented in the West, where they circulated as distinct 
forms of knowledge about Asia. At times, these Western-produced 
Asianisms were imported to Asia or constituted themselves as pro-
ducts of the interaction of non-Asian and Asian actors.2 Asianisms 
relate to pan-Asianism, but they go beyond the term and meaning, 
as they draw upon the plurality, diversity and inconsistency of intra-, 
trans- and extraregional conceptions of Asia. Asianisms can not only 
be detected in processes of integration; they can also relate to mo-
ments of rivalry, competition or exclusion within and between poli-
tical entities.
 The analysis of Asianisms is an evolving field of historical enquiry. 
Prasenjit Duara, for instance, not only sees a need to direct more 
attention to Asia as a region, but he also asserts that until now disci-
plinary boundaries within Asian Studies have inhibited transnational 
and transcultural research.3 Renewed interest in concepts of Asia has 
also enriched research on Asianisms.4 This interest in Asianisms has 
added to our understanding of pan-Asianism, which remains of pri-
mary concern to historians investigating forms of Asianisms. A case 
in point is the classical topic of Japanese pan-Asianism, whose roots 
have been located in a spectrum ranging from egalitarian to impe-
rialist notions.5 But as transnational and global themes have gained 
in importance in the humanities and social sciences, historians have 
begun to look beyond particular nations and nationally conceived 
ideas of Asia.6 Processes and structures transcending national bounda-
ries have received more interest from Asian scholars.7 In part, this 
research is conducted in transnational academic communities and 
institutionalized research associations.8 This trend is being promoted 
by a range of new forms of transnational interaction in the economy, 
politics and civil societies within Asia itself. Last but not least, re-
searchers have become more mobile and “embody in their persons 
these continuous flows, as they move freely from an Asian country to 
another, and between the United States and Asia”.9
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 Concepts of Asia and its regions belong to the field of meta-
geography and world history, both of which employ a decidedly 
transnational perspective. The term “Asia” itself goes back to ancient 
Greece, where the then known world was divided between Europe 
and Asia. Along with the widening spatial horizons of the Western 
world the territories defined as being part of Asia grew, and mental 
maps as well as real maps incorporated ever larger areas. As there are 
no natural geographic demarcations between Asia and Europe, defini-
tions of what constitutes Asia continue to vary.10
 While there is a long history of entanglements within Asia, a 
search for an explicit Asian identity began only in the late 19th cen-
tury. However, numerous economic, political, cultural and religious 
relations and interactions within Asia can be traced back to antiquity. 
These entanglements and flows intensified in the modern era. The 
Silk Road, for instance, is only one example of long-distance interac-
tion in the past.11 Maritime history has identified the Indian Ocean 
as a space of interaction and communication.12 Buddhism, Islam and 
Confucianism stretched over vast geographical areas and provided reli-
gious and cultural identification but oftentimes also conflicting spaces 
of belonging; they could thus not serve as a basis for an all-Asian 
cultural identity.13 In East Asia and in large parts of Southeast Asia, 
the Sino-centric world order and the Chinese tributary system pro-
vided norms and practices for entanglements and exchange.14 Since 
the late 19th century, anti-colonial, reform and revolutionary move-
ments became platforms for inter-Asian interaction. There was cross-
border support for political movements, political activists found 
asylum elsewhere, and in cities such as Tokyo and Paris political 
exiles and multicultural revolutionary circles met, though they did not 
necessarily promote explicit Asianist visions.15
 The vision of Asia as a historical-geographic entity resonated 
within Asia only with the expansion of the West and with European 
colonialism and imperialism. Five features of this Asian “discovery of 
Asia” can be identified. First, constructions of Asia were embedded in 
a complex system of East-West and inter-Asian interaction.16 “Asia” 
or “the Orient” or “the (Far) East” figured as relational concepts that 
were invented and employed by Europeans in order to demonstrate 
the perceived superiority of Europe (or “the West”) and to legitimize 
aspirations to power vis-à-vis Asians (Orientalism).17 As Pekka 
Korhonen in his discussion of the changing meanings of the term 
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“Asia” explains: “While the narratives of progress and conquest were 
thus attached to the name of Europe, Asia began to resemble every-
thing opposite, a place to be conquered and colonized.” 18 In most 
Asian languages the term “Asia” is imported, and its varied meanings, 
charged with notions of the self and the “other”, are subject to 
change.19 East-West interaction played an important role beyond 
matters of identity and identification. In many cases, Western “knowl-
edge” and Western concepts of modernization, the nation state and 
civilization served as points of departure for Asian emancipation and 
self-assertion in politics, the economy and culture.20
 Second, Asianisms have often been embedded in transnational 
movements or flows of ideas and ideologies. This volume breaks new 
ground in that the case studies trace Asianisms in a variety of dif-
ferent movements and circulations of ideas. Stefan Hübner locates 
the history of the Far Eastern Championship Games in the activities 
of the American Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). Maria 
Moritz sees the Theosophical Society, a transnational association in 
search of a vaguely defined Eastern spirituality, as an intermediate for 
the Buddhist Maha Bodhi Society. Tani Barlow looks at Asianisms in 
connection with mission and missiology and as a central component 
of contemporary feminist discourses. And Tessa Morris-Suzuki inves-
tigates civil society activities that are focused on Japan’s relations with 
Asia but take their inspiration from feminism, fair trade and similar 
progressive movements.
 Third, Asianisms had varying significance in different Asian 
societies. Concepts of Asia served diverse functions. Asianisms were 
employed for truly transnational projects intended to promote soli-
darity, but they were also invoked in order to foster nationalist and 
even hegemonic claims. The latter variant is closely associated with 
Japanese imperialism during the 1930s and the vision of a Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the early 1940s.21 However, at 
varying moments in time projects of domination legitimized by 
“Asianist” ideas can also be found in Sino-centric or India-centric 
visions of Asia or East Asia.22 It is equally important to note that 
nationalist or chauvinist projects were repudiated by anti-imperialist 
radical Asian intellectuals and politicians, who espoused ideas of a 
united Asia in order to fight against suppression, exploitation and 
paternalism.23
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 Fourth, Asianisms draw on a variety of elements of an assumed 
Asian community. These can be ethnic, cultural or religious; but 
geographic proximity and shared historical experiences can also foster 
Asianisms. Closely associated with imperialism and colonialism, the 
latter usually transcended the region and linked up to the notion 
of deprived peoples worldwide. Here, regional or continental schemes 
conflicted with global socio-economic categories such as the North 
versus the South, or the Cold War concept of the “three worlds” 
(First, Second and Third Worlds).24
 Fifth, as Torsten Weber and Tessa Morris-Suzuki show in this 
volume, Asianisms are not always based on postulations of an Asian 
unity. In the cases they discuss, intellectuals and grassroots activists 
acknowledge the deep divisions within Asia. They identify ruptures, 
hierarchies, traumata and social inequality located in various parts of 
Asia in order to invoke a future united Asia.25
 This volume contributes to the growing field of Asianist studies 
in four ways. Its geographical scope transcends Northeast Asia; its 
approach is decidedly transnational. It introduces a transcultural per-
spective in that it discusses a variety of Western Asianist discourses. 
It problematizes issues that transcend the usual approach to Asianisms 
(the political). Instead, it offers insight into Asianisms in religion, 
sports, academics, popular science and business. Finally, it covers a 
long period of time ranging from the late 19th century to the present.
 These themes are not static but have evolved over time. To trace 
their historicity is to explore the national, regional and global constel-
lations in which Asianist discourses and practices emerged. The dis-
cussion begins in the 19th century, when colonialism and imperialism 
subjected large parts of what was then called the Far East to an 
imperialist regional order.26 This order constrained opportunities for 
inter-Asian interaction. But it also promoted new political and cul-
tural dynamics in which new political and discursive alliances and 
enmities could flourish. Concepts of “Asia” certainly competed with 
much more popular and widespread nationalist aspirations, but they 
became important references for processes of transfer, contradistinc-
tion and identity formation. Discourses of emancipation and mod-
ernization, emerging mainly in response to Western colonialism and 
imperialism, drew primarily on invented or re-invoked “national” 
traditions, but they also incorporated Japanese, Chinese, Indian and 
Chap1 (1-18).indd   5 10/8/15   10:47:06 AM
6 Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski
Vietnamese visions of Asia. In this period, Western admirers of Asia, 
critical of European discourses on civilization, were quite often im-
portant mediators of regionally varied Asianist discourses in Asia.27 
Japan assumed a particularly important function in a double sense. 
On the one hand, through its stunning success as a modernizing na-
tion and as victor over a Western power (Russia, 1905) it served as a 
role model. On the other hand, its aggressive foreign policies and its 
claim to regional hegemony provoked widespread criticism. However, 
from the late 19th century, Japan turned into a mediator of Western 
knowledge in Asia and became an attractive destination for Asian 
students, intellectuals and exiles. As such, it emerged as a pioneer of 
pan-Asian ideas.28
 After World War I Asianist discourses flourished, as European and 
Asian intellectuals in search of alternatives to the global crisis Europe 
had created promoted concepts of a spiritual and peaceful Eastern 
civilization.29 But again, notions of a homogenous East fell apart. 
Chinese intellectuals emphasized fundamental differences between 
China and India, and the term “the East” frequently became synony-
mous with China.30 Japanese politicians and intellectuals considered 
their country a class of its own, not even belonging to an Asia per-
ceived as “backward”. In this climate, the efforts of the Indian author 
and philosopher Rabindranath Tagore to promote an all-Asian alliance 
on his visits to China and Japan fell on deaf ears. There is no doubt, 
though, that Asianist discourses provided fertile ground for a closer 
cooperation between Chinese and Japanese with the aim to rejuve-
nate manifestations of Asian culture such as traditional medicine, 
Buddhism and Confucianism.31 On a more general level, migrations 
within Asia increased sharply during the 1920s, as did people-to-
people contacts across territories and nations.32
 Almost a century after the collapse of the Chinese world order, 
the Japanese expansion in China and Southeast Asia was the first 
manifest effort from within Asia to restructure Asia in regional terms. 
The ideology and the politics of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere proclaimed in 1940 were intended, as Duara puts it, as 
“a commitment to creating a common space akin to the nation that 
would extend the benefits and pains of creating a globally competi-
tive region, but would extend them unevenly over the whole”.33 Very 
few people in the occupied countries were attracted by this version 
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of pan-Asianism.34 Rather, occupation, exploitation and mass starva-
tion promoted nationalisms in Korea, China and large parts of South-
east Asia.
 The wounds inflicted by Japan would not have healed easily any-
way. But they were exacerbated by Cold War tensions and the ideo-
logical and political split that manifested itself between and within 
Asian countries (China, Korea, Vietnam). Regional interaction and 
efforts at integration were not very high on anyone’s agenda. Regional 
sports events and conferences (such as the Asian Relations Conference 
of 1947 and the Bandung Conference of 1955) reinforced national 
sovereignties rather than regional integration. Only with the founding 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967) did regional 
integration become a slowly evolving reality, albeit on a very limited 
scale. However, it was mainly developments in the 1970s that opened 
up possibilities for future regionalist projects: the rapprochement 
between China and the United States (1972), the end of the war 
in Vietnam (1975), and the introduction of reform policies under 
Deng Xiaoping in China (1978). India, which had promoted regional 
designs in the 1950s, was so taken aback by the 1962 conflict with 
China in the Himalayas that it took its intellectuals and politicians 
decades to contemplate regional projects.35
 Asia in the post-Cold War is marked by parallel and quite con-
tradictory movements. On the one hand, there is much debate about 
a new regionalism. Because of its conceptual diversity, this regionalism 
needs to be conceived in the plural. The driving forces of current 
projects of regional integration are manifold. Increasing economic 
interdependence, labor migration, tourism and cultural flows that 
draw upon an “Asian” art, particularly the cross-border consumption 
of Asian popular culture, TV shows, films, food, etc., are indicative 
of this new regionalism. These factors open up spaces of interaction, 
communication and cooperation. It remains to be seen in which 
ways the various initiatives by states and civil societies draw on past 
Asianist discourses, and in which ways they produce new forms of 
Asianisms.36 At the political level, Asia has witnessed a number of 
new regionalist initiatives, such as the cooperation between ASEAN 
and the three East Asian nations of China, Japan and South Korea 
(ASEAN plus three), established in 1997, or the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization (SCO) between China, Russia and four states of 
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Central Asia founded in 2001.37 On the other hand, continuing 
territorial disputes thwart these efforts at integration and expose the 
strength of nationalisms and the persistence of ideas of national 
sovereignty and national interests. The ongoing dispute over the 
Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea shows how far Asia 
is from being an integrated political entity.38
 Maria Moritz and Stefan Hübner take us back to the early 20th 
century, when Western imperialism and colonialism were experienced 
by most Asian societies. They look at the fields of religion and 
sports in order to show how Asianisms evolved in the context of an 
imperialist regional order. Constructions of Asia offered a trajectory 
between imitation and emancipation, as well as between self-assertion 
and a global mission. In both fields, religion and sports, actors en-
gaged with the Western “civilizing mission” in order to disentangle 
themselves from foreign rule and cultural oppression. Instead, they 
appropriated and transformed features of this Western civilizing mis-
sion in order to become subjects, rather than objects, of the mission. 
Hübner discusses the Far Eastern Championship Games (a precursor 
to the Asian Games of today), which were initiated by the American 
YMCA. Between 1913 and 1934 they featured athletes from the 
Philippines, Japan and China. The Western-imported basic idea of 
the Games was that sports had a civilizing effect, individually and 
collectively, and would liberate “backward” Asians and correct their 
perceived cultural and social deficits. This aim was not questioned 
by Asian national elites. On the contrary, Western sport was seen 
as an important instrument of empowerment against colonialism, 
imperialism and paternalism, and it was promoted as such. The his-
tory of the Far Eastern Championship Games also presents itself as 
a history of rising American influence in the region and its decline 
in the 1920s, when the organization of the Games was taken over 
by Asians. The increasingly Asian character of the Games serves as 
an example of liberation from foreign tutelage. At the same time, 
the Games serve as a telling example of an anticolonial alliance that 
dissolved under the impact of internal tensions and the hegemonic 
aspirations of one member, Japan. The increasing conflict between 
Japan and China made peaceful contests in sports arenas impossible. 
Asianisms and nationalisms went hand in hand and evolved into 
contradictory forces of a movement of emancipation that was held 
together not by intrinsic commonalities but by an external foe. 
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Within the Far Eastern Championship Games Asians felt united by 
their nationalisms.
 The project of a Buddhist Asianism, promoted by the Ceylonese 
Anagarika Dharmapala since the 1890s both within and outside Asia, 
also evolved in the context of European colonialism and imperialism. 
As Maria Moritz shows, Dharmapala turned around the Western 
notion of a civilizing mission and substituted it with a mission that 
assigned Buddhism a global transformative role and would bring 
Asians equality vis-à-vis Europeans. Dharmapala connected well with 
European critics of the civilizing mission who were deeply sceptical 
of Western materialism and were eager to merge European culture 
with Eastern spirituality in order to create a new global civilization. 
The Theosophical Society, founded in 1875 in New York City, can 
best be understood as an institutionalization of this idea of a new 
global civilization. The society, which operated on a global scale, pro-
vided Dharmapala with inspiration and initial support. While staying 
in touch with the society, Dharmapala turned to his own project, 
the rejuvenation of Buddhism as a unifier of Asia and as a world 
religion with Asia as its centre and the Buddha as a global Messiah. 
He promoted Bodh Gaya, the supposed location of the Buddha’s 
epiphany, as a pilgrimage site and wanted to turn it into a “Buddhist 
Jerusalem”. As an endogenous civilizing mission, this rejuvenated 
Buddhism targeted India, a country that, according to Dharmapala, 
should have taken inspiration from a modern and Buddhist Japan 
to liberate itself from its backwardness. But Dharmapala’s civilizing 
mission was also addressed to the West, which had to be liberated 
from a pervasive materialism. His project, fascinating as it is, was 
ridden by internal tensions. His construction of a universal Buddhist 
dogma conflicted with the many local doctrines and practices of 
Buddhism, and it failed because of the disinclination of the various 
Buddhist groups in Asian countries to subordinate themselves to a 
transnational Buddhist alliance.
 Asianisms have often concerned themselves with geographical 
spaces and the proper location of Asia. For instance, the organizers of 
the Far Eastern Championship Games considered India to be part of 
West Asia—and thus excluded it from their Far Eastern Asian games. 
To Indian thinkers, this was not so clear. Mindful of the multicul-
tural and multireligious character of Indian society, they constructed 
their own versions of Asia. As Carolien Stolte shows, these Asias took 
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surprisingly diverse forms, as they were conceived as mental maps 
and then reproduced as geographical visualizations. Different carto-
graphies of Asia were based on different sets of assumptions about 
religion, culture or politics. At a time in which the Raj’s future was 
first contested, then resolved, and eventually substituted by visions 
of an independent India, these cartographies of Asia reveal differing 
paths to reinventing traditions and constructing identities. They also 
display a clear break with an earlier past of Asianisms in India that 
had drawn their inspiration from religion and the transcendental. 
Stolte’s chapter reminds us of the plurality of Asianisms.
 Morris-Suzuki and Weber focus attention on the important 
theme of reconciliation in East Asia and, by implication, on Japanese 
pan-Asianism as the historically most concrete form of Asianist 
thought. What is new here is that both chapters place activities 
of civil society actors and network formation squarely at the centre 
of the debate. Morris-Suzuki calls these activities manifestations of 
a “micro-Asianism” and Weber “micro East-Asian communities”. 
Asianisms by these civil society actors are based on critical thinking. 
They emphasize differences, tensions and distortions, and they oppose 
superficially defined proclamations of unity. They are critical of domi-
nant economic and political interests who exploit notions of an Asian 
community for profit or, worse, for hegemonic purposes and exploita-
tion. In this civil society perspective, Asia is “not one”.
 Morris-Suzuki looks at micro-Asianisms that have emerged from 
the post-war situation and the impulses of progressive global move-
ments such as feminism, alternative development, fair trade and 
humanitarianism. Theirs is not an Asian unity based on constructed 
cultural commonalities. Rather, a sense of Asian unity is an outgrowth 
of shared experiences with and/or concerns about exploitation and 
suffering. Micro-Asianisms’ roots may lie in the experiences of war, 
but the global progressive movements manifest themselves also in 
the present in different forms such as class, gender and North-South 
conflicts. In these conflicts, Japan is seen as an originator of new 
relations of exploitation. Asianisms assume a universal dimension, as 
civil society actors strive for solidarity with disadvantaged groups. At 
the same time, these micro-Asianisms have emerged in the context of 
relations between states and societies in which the politics of history 
and memory are highly important and contested. The term “Asian-
isms from below” points to the civil society component of these 
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transnational activities in Japan. Morris-Suzuki’s notion of “invisible 
Asianisms” refers to the typically Japanese character of grassroots 
involvement that is locally organized, rather small, fragile and ephem-
eral. Activities encompass Tsurumi Yoshiyuki’s public appeal to foster 
mutual understanding and empathy through people-to-people con-
tacts; Matsui Yayori’s solidarity project for women in Asia; the East 
Asia Collaborative Workshops, which are concerned with the fate of 
Korean and Chinese involuntary labourers in Japan and which pro-
mote the concept of “People’s history”; and Kim Sun-yeoul’s support 
for the rights of female textile workers in Thailand. This Asia of small-
scale solidarity movements is an Asia beyond Japan as well as an Asia 
within Japan.
 Torsten Weber investigates Asianist conceptions of contemporary 
Japanese and Chinese intellectuals. He places them in the context 
of well-established projects of reconciliation among Northeast Asian 
countries that are partly sponsored by governments and partly by 
semi-official networks. And he positions these Asianisms in an official 
regionalism aimed at establishing an East Asian Community in the 
future. Weber’s actors are dedicated to reconciliation. At the same 
time, they acknowledge the pitfalls of official policies of reconcilia-
tion, which remain rather nationalist. These intellectuals are decidedly 
against regionalist invocations of some kind of unity, they are critical 
of capitalism, and they warn of an “Asia for the rich”. Instead, they 
subscribe to the ideas of past Asianist thinkers such as Takeuchi 
Yoshimi, who in 1960 proposed the idea of “Asia as Method”, or to 
Asianist conceptions dating back to the Meiji period. In China, Wang 
Hui and Sun Ge historicize past Japanese ideas of leaving Asia and 
glorifying the West. They explain these notions as appropriations of 
negative Western discourses on Asia, and in part they even excuse 
them. Finally, they engage in the more recent Chinese debate about 
Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism and his call for a kingly way (wang dao) rather 
than a despotic way (ba dao) in the conduct of interstate relations.
 Morris-Suzuki and Weber show that Asianisms are on the agenda 
within East Asian societies. Their focus on non-state actors points to 
alternatives to the official politics of historical contestation, and they 
highlight the diversity of opportunities and activities that are possible 
within the framework of Asianist discourses and practices.
 Tani Barlow, Fabio Lanza and Nicola Spakowski turn their atten-
tion to Western Asianisms from the late 19th century to the present. 
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Regardless of changing world orders and specific global events, these 
Western Asianisms functionalize Asia for specific interests located on 
the national, subnational and supranational levels. They can be char-
acterized as Orientalisms, as they have little to do with the complex 
realities of Asian countries and much to do with Western projections 
and stereotypes.39 This knowledge of Asia, which circulates within 
Western societies, is in part deeply grounded in history. But it is also 
closely associated with ideologically charged conceptions of the world. 
Moreover, this kind of knowledge of Asia claims to be scientific. 
Academics are either producers of certain images of Asia, or certain 
Asianisms simply claim to be scientific in order to be credible.40
 Barlow’s treatment of American Asianisms ranges from late 19th 
century missionaries to the 2011 agenda of a Pacific Century. Diverse 
topics and actors are analyzed, but they all follow one common rule. 
They are informed by erudition, or rather, fake erudition. Barlow 
exemplifies this fake erudition in the context of three specific Asian-
isms: the pagan Asia of missionaries and of missiology of the late 
19th century; the capitalist projections of the hugely popular 1980s 
male interest fiction by James Clavell; and the patronizing attitude to-
ward Asian women displayed by Hillary Clinton at the 1995 Beijing 
World Conference on Women. Late 19th century missiology circu-
lated knowledge of Asia for the purpose of training missionaries. At 
the time, these constructions of Asia were quite powerful, as American 
missions had made “pagan” Asia their primary focus. Geographically 
and culturally, this Asia was rather amorphous and could even include 
Africa. It postulated the degradation of Asian women, and, as with 
Hübner’s sports officials, it rested on the assumption that deficits 
were the unifying element in Asia and its ultimate common denomi-
nator. Fast forwarding to the 1980s, Clavell’s novels, among them the 
global bestsellers Shogun, Taipan and Noble House, deeply informed 
Western perceptions of Asia, including among Western decision 
makers. In these novels, Asia is portrayed as the stage for and epi-
centre of global capitalism. Curiously, these novels assumed the status 
of textbooks; heavily footnoted companion books purported scientific 
authority, and while scholars of Asia were quick to criticize details of 
Clavell’s interpretation of Asia, they accepted his main arguments and 
overall picture. Finally, a third Asianism transpired in Clinton’s assess-
ment of Asian women as deprived of their rights and in dire need 
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of emancipation by human rights groups at the Beijing World Con-
ference on Women in 1995.
 Fabio Lanza is interested in the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars (CCAS), a group formed in 1968 to protest the American 
War in Vietnam. In the group’s first publication, titled America’s 
Asia, these younger American scholars analyzed US relations with 
Asian countries in a most critical way. They condemned American 
chauvinism and American violence, and they accused their better-
established colleagues in the field of Asian studies of collaboration 
in a hegemonic project. As with Suzuki-Morris’ protagonists, these 
concerned Americans were deeply influenced by the progressive move-
ments of the 1960s and 1970s. Members of the CCAS felt that 
Americans treated Asians as objects rather than subjects in their own 
right, they emphasized their humanity, and they considered Asia as a 
source of positive ideas. In light of the dominant theory of moderni-
zation, Asia appeared as “backward”. CCAS scholars, instead, regarded 
Asia as a “geographically located utopia” (Fabio Lanza). This turn 
towards the revolutionary Asia was accompanied by a debate about 
the function and self-conception of American Asian studies. However, 
while these younger scholars were able to criticize US foreign policy, 
it was more difficult for them to universalize the revolutionary expe-
riences of Asia and thus change the course of history. The failure of 
Asian revolutions and the integration of Asia into the capitalist world 
system eventually led to the demise of the CCAS, which dissolved 
in 1979.
 Finally, Nicola Spakowski explores the Western notion of an 
“Asian Century”, a notion prevalent in a dislocated ideology of econo-
mism and globalism. The Asia hype of the 1980s provided fertile 
ground for current notions of an Asian Century. On closer look, it 
becomes obvious that investment companies and investment funds, 
in particular, promote this idea. Spakowski shows how changes in 
terms —“East Asian miracle”, “Chindia”, “China’s rise”, etc.—mirror 
a shifting geography of growth that follows the economic cycles of 
global capitalism, whose driving force seems to have moved to Asia. 
As other chapters highlight as well, the interplay between academia 
and pseudo-science is important, particularly the cooperation be-
tween historians, business journalists and international institutions. 
Paradoxically, the future-oriented discourse of an Asian Century is 
informed by the writings of global historians and historians of Asia.
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Past economic potentials of Asia seem to demonstrate that once 
Western influence over the world comes to its final end, a global 
equilibrium is re-established. In light of this simplifying history of 
rise and decline, the rise of Asia turns into a “restoration”, a “renais-
sance”, a “re-emergence”. The future becomes a range of predictable 
and certain options. Economic measurements such as gross national 
product are levelling factors that standardize diverse Asian economies 
and societies. They allow for comparisons, but they divest Asian 
countries of their diversity.
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Chapter  Two
“The Empire of Righteousness”: 
Anagarika Dharmapala and His 
Vision of Buddhist Asianism 
(c. 1900)1
Maria Moritz
Like other pan-movements, Asianism was a significant force and a 
result of globalizing processes around 1900 as they imagined and 
created communities beyond national boundaries. Pan-movements 
such as pan-Africanism, pan-Asianism, pan-Islam and pan-Slavism 
claimed an inner unity based on certain characteristics and ideologies 
they claimed fundamental. These ideologies differed greatly—e.g., 
pan-Islam was based on a shared religious belief, while pan-Africanism 
referred to common origins. To a certain extent, however, most pan-
movements derived their unifying power from their inherent anti-
Westernism as they propagated the legitimacy of alternative civiliza-
tions and envisioned contrasting regional spaces to the existing world 
order dominated by the West.2 The global dominance of the West 
was due to an elaborate imperial system that held the majority of the 
globe subject. The British Empire was the largest colonizing state; 
it legitimated and rationalized its worldwide dominance through a 
“civilizing mission” ideology—the famous “white man’s burden”3—the 
justification for establishing overseas colonies by bringing the “bene-
fits” of European civilization such as capitalism or law and order.
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 Around the turn of the century, however, the global “West”, with 
the British empire at its heart, arrived at a legitimacy crisis whose cli-
max was the disaster of World War I.4 Debates in the colonies among 
Afro-Asian intellectuals illustrate an increasingly anti-imperialist atti-
tude that envisioned alternatives to the “European conceit that dis-
covery and invention were necessarily progressive and beneficial to 
humanity”.5 Pan-movements often functioned as germ cells for new 
civilizational concepts and incorporated older religious elements or 
transcendental ideals.6 The close relationship or near-equivalence of 
the concept of civilization to religion has not been acknowledged only 
by the historian Prasenjit Duara. The sociologist Johann Arnason, 
for example, argues that even a materialist historian such as Fernand 
Braudel suggests “that religion is the civilizational phenomenon par 
excellence”.7
 Consequently, influential thinkers who contributed to the dis-
course of Asianism around 1900 had identified Buddhism as the 
binding and inspirational force of an envisioned Asian civilization. In 
his Ideals of the East (1904), the Japanese art critic Okakura Tenshin 
(1862–1913) called Buddhism “that great ocean of idealism, in which 
merge all the river-systems of Eastern Asiatic thought” 8—a major 
source of a common identity in the past and future. The English 
poet Edwin Arnold’s widely circulated “The Light of Asia or the 
Great Renunciation. Being the Life and Teaching of Gautama, Prince 
of India and Founder of Buddhism as Told in Verse by an Indian 
Buddhist”(1879)9 inspired not only a personality cult around Prince 
Siddharta Gautama, the Buddha, but popularized Buddhism in the 
Western world.
 It was the Ceylonese Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), how-
ever, who not only explicitly addressed Buddhism as the means by 
which cultural exchange and common ethics had created a regional 
unity in Asia and had thus become the spiritual source of an alter-
native civilization ready to challenge the existing world order but 
devoted his life to the revival of Buddhism in the region and beyond. 
Buddhism, as the supposed glue between the various Asian countries, 
had a long precolonial history and, through the initiative of Buddhist 
monks and scholars, had long been the source of an identity beyond 
a national framework.10
 The new idea of belonging to Asia, however, was not confined 
to the religious realm but became associated with specific regional 
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traditions varying from the Asianisms of Japanese intellectuals such as 
Miyazaki Toten (1871–1922)11 to the rather philosophical Asianism 
of Indian thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941).12 This 
chapter focuses on how Buddhism was construed and exploited as a 
common feature of a pan-Asian identity on the Indian subcontinent 
and how this decidedly spiritual South Asian variant of Asianism fitted 
into a wider critique of Western cultural and political hegemony. 
It sheds a critical light on the example of Anagarika Dharmapala’s 
Asianist vision by demonstrating, first, the intellectual genesis of his 
Buddhism through his association with the Theosophical Society and 
close collaboration with intellectuals in Calcutta, India’s Buddhist hub. 
Second, it elaborates on the institutionalization and implementation 
of his Buddhist Asianism both in the West and within Asia. This 
article thereby emphasizes that the West was not the only—or pre-
dominant—point of reference for Dharmapala’s modern Buddhist 
Asianism, especially since Asian Buddhist networks predated political 
and cultural colonial hegemony and as such had already been success-
fully “missionized” in many Asian countries and thereby proven to 
be transnational. While research on the phenomenon of Asianism 
typically focuses on East Asian conceptions, this chapter analyzes a 
South Asian variety.13
 Dharmapala was not primarily a champion of Asianism, but his 
adoption of its widespread and flourishing rhetoric in order to pro-
mote Buddhist revival in the region and beyond contributed substan-
tially to the discourse on an alternative Asian civilization. Moreover, 
Dharmapala’s discursive construction of Buddhism as a common 
source of identity for all Asian peoples was not just a vague concept 
but a basis for concrete efforts to encourage intraregional cooperation 
underpinned by the shifting relations between Asia and the West, 
especially the crisis of European legitimacy after the catastrophe of 
World War I.
 British imperialism was the main reference point for Dharma-
pala’s adoption of a twofold civilizing mission ideology. On the one 
hand he built on and intensified the network of Buddhist pilgrimage 
and cultural exchange in the region. On the other hand, these inner-
Asian activities were always closely associated with Dharmapala’s 
external “civilizing mission” in Europe and America for which he 
extended the “classical heartland of Theravada Buddhism”—from 
Rangoon, Mandalay and Colombo to Calcutta and Madras, as well 
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as Siam, Singapore, China, Japan, Hawaii, the United States, Britain 
and Germany. He was the first Buddhist in modern times to dissemi-
nate Buddhist teachings on three continents: Asia, Europe and North 
America. He spent most of the years between 1891 and 1933 abroad, 
only periodically returning to Sri Lanka.14
 The same pattern has been detected within the transnational acti-
vity of the Salvation Army. Like the Salvation Army, Dharmapala 
followed a double strategy of targeting both an inner and an external 
audience—a Euro-American and an Asian audience. This led to 
various contradictions, tensions and frictions between the two inter-
twined directions of his conception. This chapter will engage with 
the relationship between Dharmapala’s internal and external civilizing 
missions—the two sides of Dharmapala’s concept of Asianism, which 
included much more than just conversion as they were an intrinsic 
part of a much larger project—forming an alternative civilization 
originating from Asia.
Theosophical Inspiration
Dharmapala’s self-fashioning as a Buddhist reformer and his vision 
of an alternative Asian Buddhist civilization was informed by his 
early membership, first in Ceylon, later in India and beyond, in the 
Theosophical Society,15 a globally operating esoteric organization.
 From the founding of its Indian branch in 1879, the Theoso-
phical Society functioned as a bridge between bilingual Asian elites 
and self-critical 16 Westerners who collaboratively shaped “the content 
of the discourse on the Asian civilization’s alternative nature to the 
West”.17 They did not generally reject “Western modernity” 18 but 
contrasted the West’s assumed material superiority with an appraisal 
of the East’s intrinsic spirituality. This oversimplified vision of an 
overly material West and its spiritual Eastern counterpart underlay 
many contemporary assumptions about the relationship between the 
two hemispheres.
 At the beginning of the 20th century, the Theosophical Society 
was by no means a marginal spiritual organization; its astonishing 
success was due largely to its claim that spiritual traditions from Asia 
would inspire a new civilization. The society was only the institu-
tionalized spearhead of a larger turn “eastward” 19 that affected critical 
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intellectuals, progressive thinkers and reformists in the West—a 
numerically small but influential elite group. These pro-Asian senti-
ments gained new momentum especially after the catastrophe of 
World War I, when it became increasingly accepted that “there were 
multiple civilizations and that civilization was ultimately a spiritual 
and moral concern”.20 Before that time, as Prasenjit Duara has argued 
for the long 19th century, Europeans conceptualized “civilization” 21 
as a singular entity that was based exclusively on material progress. 
Consequently, the imperial civilizing mission, which became the most 
important argument for colonial overseas engagements, focused on 
uplifting the subject countries materially.
 The Theosophical Society, on the contrary, reflected the new 
concept of “civilization” by stressing the spiritual dimension rather 
than material progress. Theosophists initiated numerous publications 
on Eastern spirituality, such as the flagship magazine The Theosophist, 
a monthly journal devoted to the study of “Eastern philosophy”. They 
explicitly encouraged their Western members to learn from these 
sources. Moreover, the society opened up libraries, schools and reading 
circles, monitored translations, and generally encouraged discursive 
activities among its members within the global network of branches. 
In all the new public spaces that the Theosophical Society opened 
up, we can discern the workings of an “affirmative orientalism” 22— a 
positive appraisal of the East exemplified by the eminent Orientalist 
scholar Friedrich Max Müller’s India: What Can It Teach Us? (1883). 
This creation of a “cosmopolitan thought zone” 23 was inspired by 18th 
century Enlightenment ideals in which the increase of knowledge was 
synonymous with the development of civilization.
 Dharmapala, whose original name was Don David Hewavitarane, 
was the son of an affluent Sinhalese furniture trader in Colombo. He 
was educated in both Catholic and Protestant missionary schools, 
while he described his parental home as entirely Buddhist. After 
finishing school he worked briefly in the educational department of 
the colonial administration, but in May 1880 he gave up his job to 
actively participate in the “the second awakening which the Buddhists 
had received” 24 through the two American founders of the Theoso-
phical Society, Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907) and Helena Petrovna 
Blavatsky (1831–91). The founders had declared themselves Buddhists 
in the United States long before and were among the first who took 
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pansil  25 when they visited Ceylon for the first time in 1880.26 The 
founders signalled that to them (and soon to many more around the 
globe) Buddhism was a philosophy rather than a creed,27 open to 
anyone independent of origin and easily accessible in English—the 
coming lingua franca. Young Dharmapala, 16 years of age at that 
time, consequently considered the Theosophical Society a tool for 
“Buddhist propaganda” in the West.28
 Despite ardent protests from his parents, Dharmapala joined the 
theosophical founders on their way back to the theosophical head-
quarters in Adyar, a district of South Indian Madras, in 1884 and 
stayed with the society for about 20 years, receiving both the struc-
tural and ideological foundations for his future work. Dharmapala 
accompanied and translated for Olcott not only in Ceylon but also 
on his first visit to Japan and Burma in 1889 and thus witnessed 
Olcott’s rise as the leading proponent of the Buddhist revival in 
Asia and of reformed Buddhism in the West, particularly the United 
States.29 For his redefinition of Buddhism, Olcott uncritically appro-
priated the work of pioneering Buddhologists such as the British 
William Rhys Davids (1843–1922), who had founded the Pali Text 
Society in 1881 in order to further the study of classical Buddhist 
texts or the Boden Professor of Sanskrit in Oxford, Monier Monier-
Williams (1819–99). Davids regularly corresponded with both Olcott 
and Dharmapala. Based on his involvement with Buddhist scholarship, 
Olcott eventually came to the conclusion that Ceylon’s Buddhists 
knew little, if anything, about what he called “‘real’ Buddhism”.30
 The “real” Buddhism of Buddhologists and theosophists alike was 
an interpretation of Buddhism 31 derived from textual sources and 
stripped of a belief in miracles and mysteries alive with the majority 
of Ceylonese peasantry “available only to European scholars who read 
the ancient texts”.32
 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the majority of Ceylonese 
Buddhists were unaware of this new interpretation of Buddhism 
primarily constructed by European Buddhologists 33 and flourishing in 
the cities with the aspiring, bilingual middle class. Its close connec-
tion with the increase of literacy and a seizure of religious leadership 
resembled core elements of the European Reformation. Moreover, 
it developed as a protest against Christianity but at the same time 
included elements of Protestantism such as religious individualism 
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and techniques of missionary work; 34 therefore, scholars tend to call 
it “Protestant Buddhism” 35 or variously “Buddhist modernism”.36 The 
interpretation of Protestant Buddhism as a revolutionary reform move-
ment against the dominant Hindu tradition in India by historical 
scholars such as Monier-Williams added to its aura as a non-national, 
universalistic religion independent from its original place of birth 37 
and according to leading European scholars a potential competitor to 
Christianity, the other universalistic religion. Like Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism, Buddhism formally qualified as a world religion by its 
textual tradition and founding figure. It was its interpretation as a 
non-national, universalistic religion, however, that eventually defined 
Buddhism’s status as a world religion ready to be communicated to 
the world.
 Dharmapala did not only substantially contribute to this redefi-
nition of Buddhism but became its most important spokesman and 
embodiment of its ideals. He therefore changed his name. While the 
name Dharmapala means “Protector of the Dhamma: Defender of 
the Faith”, the title Anagarika was an innovation meaning “homeless” 
in Pali.38 Dharmapala used the title to describe a new status “half 
way between monk and layman” making a “dramatic public com-
mitment to devoting his life to Buddhism” “without renouncing 
worldly” pursuits 39—the traditional requirement for Buddhist clerics. 
Dharmapala withdrew from withdrawal and thus established an ac-
tive monkhood mediating between European and Asian involvement 
with Buddhism, as well as between laymen and monkhood, tradition 
and reform.
 His rise in a context of Western enthusiasm for the East as a 
superior civilization based on a clear-cut polarity between Eastern 
spirituality and Western materialism, and the inspiration from his 
theosophical ally Henry Steel Olcott, helped him to preach his this-
worldly asceticism to an increasing lay community worldwide and 
thus to become “the most important figure in the modern history of 
Buddhism.” 40
Buddhist Asianism in Bengal
Calcutta, one of India’s most cosmopolitan port cities, was an espe-
cially lively centre for many religious reform movements in the 19th 
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century. It “became home and inspiration to some of the more defi-
nite expressions of pan-Asianism and an influential discourse of Asian 
civilisation”.41 Famous Hindu reformists of the 19th century such as 
Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), Keshub Chunder Sen (1838–84) 
and Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827–94) developed the Hindu-based 
idea that Asian civilization was historically the basis of superior spiri-
tuality and would redeem and supplement Euro-American mate-
rialism.42 They struggled for a reformed Hinduism ready to fulfill 
this task. When Dharmapala mingled with the intellectual elite of 
the Bengali bhadralok,43 he became acquainted with nationalist and 
cosmopolitan versions of Asianism through the Tagore and Hindu 
reformist circles.44 In the context of, and in competition with, Hindu 
religious revival movements such as the Brahmo Samaj 45 and the 
Ramakrishna Mission,46 Dharmapala created an interest in the cre-
dentials of Buddhism as the philosophical inspiration for an Asian 
civilization.
 Despite its historical roots in North India, Buddhism had prac-
tically vanished from Indian soil in the 19th century; and like the 
civilizations of Greece, Rome and Egypt (but unlike Hinduism), 
Buddhism was reconstructed by scholars such as Davids mainly from 
textual sources, which had extensive repercussions on the form and 
content of Buddhism.47 Thus, Dharmapala invoked the religion’s 
former glory by emphasizing that “the best historians and the most 
impartial writers of India have admitted that at no time was India 
more in her glory than when the Buddhistic system was prevailing”.48 
As early as 1892, Dharmapala’s theosophical godfather, Henry Steel 
Olcott, further deduced that a “subsequent degradation of the Hindus 
is due chiefly” to the disappearance of “the merciful religion of Bud-
dha” from India.49 Dharmapala’s and Olcott’s reference to India’s pre-
sumed glorious past suggested that a flourishing civilization had been 
a direct outcome of Buddhist prevalence in the past. This appraisal 
certainly exaggerated the dissemination and intensity of Buddhism, 
which had always been but one of many creeds in multireligious 
India. Nevertheless, not only theosophists but other reformers as well 
drew on the widespread discourse on India’s present-day degeneration, 
contrasted with a former “Golden Age” to arouse revivalist senti-
ments. Similar to the distinctly Bengali Hindu revival organization 
the Brahmo Samaj,50 which offered a rational interpretation of 
Hinduism, Dharmapala suggested that Buddhism was not only a 
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rational but a “scientific” religion.51 With their legendary openness 
and high literacy rate, the intellectual Bengali elite were considered 
by Dharmapala to be particularly equipped for pioneering a Buddhist 
revival in India since the “seed of Buddhism takes root only on 
the healthy soil of a freed intellect. Buddhism is for the thoughtful 
alone”,52 not only within Asia but in Europe and the United States 
as well.53
 The credibility of Buddhism as an intellectual endeavour was 
additionally furthered by Dharmapala’s reference to scholars such as 
Davids and the Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850–1935); the 
interpreter of Buddhism to the West, Dharmapala’s and Olcott’s close 
friend Sir Edwin Arnold (1832–1904);54 and famed local academics 
such as the scholar Sarat Chandra Das (1849–1917).55 Buddhology 
was a relatively recent offspring of Indology, Sinology and classical 
philology supplemented by discoveries made through the concerted 
efforts of archaeologists who explored historical Buddhist sites.56 
Through his intimate contact with scholars and his active support 
for this new academic discipline, Dharmapala helped to create a new 
academic tradition.
 In May 1891 Dharmapala institutionalized these efforts by 
founding the Maha Bodhi Society as an independent body, with the 
comprehensive support of his theosophical allies. Olcott acted as its 
director and chief adviser, while Norendranath Sen, the president of 
the local theosophical branch, became Dharmapala’s closest co-worker 
at the organizational headquarters in Calcutta. Moreover, most of the 
early members of the Maha Bodhi Society were theosophists.57
 Following the ideology of a Golden Age present in Bengali reviv-
alist as well as theosophical circles, Dharmapala presented the idea 
that Asia had been united and civilized under Buddhism during King 
Asoka’s reign (268–232 BC).58 His internal civilizing mission assumed 
a Buddhist revival in India in order to rescue the country. But even 
more, he said Asia should be united again under the banner of Bud-
dhism in order to redeem the West in an external civilizing mission, 
which, from the “standpoint of Buddhist morality”, Dharmapala 
argued, was an “unmoral civilization without spiritual advancement”.59 
Though not identified specifically with Buddhism but rather with 
Asia in general, this trope echoes Rabindranath Tagore’s and Swami 
Vivekananda’s claim that Asia should spiritualize the overly material-
istic West.60
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A Global Platform for Asianism
The fact that Dharmapala and other Buddhist representatives from 
Asia such as Shaku Sōen (1860–1919) 61 from Japan claimed global 
significance for Buddhism as an ethical and spiritual resource for an 
alternative civilization was in no small part due to its construction 
as a world religion around the turn of the century.62
 The refashioning of Buddhism as a world religion 63 that resembled 
ordinary practised cults less than it did an abstract and rationalized 
body of teachings was publicly presented and produced for the 
first time at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago.64 
Dharmapala’s distribution of 20,000 copies of the Five Precepts of 
Buddhism—the condensed fundamentals of Buddhist morality—on 
his way to and from Chicago as well as at other locations, is illustra-
tive of how the abstraction and distillation of doctrinal Buddhism 
allowed for global circulation and Buddhism’s construction in the 
category of world religions in the 19th century.65 Like no other single 
event, the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago is praised 
by scholars as having successfully promoted the idea of religious 
tolerance.66 It gained wide publicity and newspaper coverage since it 
accompanied the Chicago World Fair in the same year.
 To Dharmapala the World Parliament provided the invaluable 
possibility of promulgating his interpretation of a Buddhist Asia on 
an internationally recognizable platform. It also gave him the oppor-
tunity to strengthen personal bonds with other Asian Buddhists such 
as the Japanese Buddhist monk Shaku Sōen, who had previously 
visited Ceylon in order to study Southern Buddhism, as Theravada 
Buddhism was popularly called. Dharmapala also managed to win 
over influential non-Asians such as Paul Carus (1852–1919) of The 
Open Court magazine and publishing house or the originally Swiss 
New York businessman C.T. Strauss (1852–1937), whom Dharmapala 
“baptized” in a public ceremony.67
 In his brief speech to the congress, Dharmapala claimed to repre-
sent “four hundred and seventy-five million of Buddhists” and a 
“system which has prevailed so many centuries in Asia, which had 
made Asia mild, and which is today, in its twenty-fourth century 
of existence, the prevailing religion of those countries”.68 As a self-
appointed spokesperson for Buddhist Asia, Dharmapala claimed that 
the World Parliament of Religions “was simply the re-echo of a great 
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consummation which the Indian Buddhists accomplished twenty-four 
centuries ago” in the Golden Age of Buddhism in India led by the 
mythical Buddhist king Asoka.69
 From 1837 onwards, the year when the English scholar James 
Prinsep (1799–1840) first deciphered his edicts and proclamations—the 
“cult of Asoka” 70—the legendary Buddhist king (304–232 BC) had 
become a highly popular integrative figure in 20th century India. 
Dharmapala emphasized that in the same way as Asoka was not just 
another Indian king, Buddhism was not just another religion but 
had formed an early predominantly Buddhist civilization in ancient 
India that could serve as an example for a valid alternative to Western 
civilization and Christianity at its core.71 The message was clear: Not 
Europe but Asia was and would be at the heart of this civilization and 
the Buddha would become the “enlightened Messiah of the World”.72 
The basis for Dharmapala’s claim about the global significance of 
Buddhism was not only its construction as a world religion and core 
of an alternative civilization, but also the creation of “Buddhist re-
sponses to the dominant problems and questions of modernity, such 
as epistemic uncertainty, religious pluralism, the threat of nihilism, 
conflicts between science and religion, war, and environmental de-
struction”.73 In short, he presented Buddhism as the solution to the 
basic challenges of modernity.
 One of the most important challenges to religious systems in 
modern times is their reconciliation with the latest scientific findings. 
Thus, Dharmapala portrayed Buddhism in full harmony with modern 
science, even as a kind of science. For example, in the paragraph 
Evolution as Taught by Buddha,74 he reclaimed the formulation of the 
law of cause and effect for ancient Buddhism and affirmed that the 
underlying “spirit of scientific inquiry” was the central approach of 
Buddhism as “a scientific religion, in as much as it earnestly enjoins 
that nothing whatever be accepted on faith”.75
 On the other hand, Dharmapala only expressed the conviction of 
many Victorians that “Christianity and science directly opposed one 
another” 76 when he argued that “the dogmas of Christianity belong 
to an antiquated age” and were thus opposed to “modern science”.77 
The crisis of belief made European civilization not only “unmoral” 
and “without spiritual advancement” 78 but desperately in need of 
another source of spiritual inspiration. Following in the footsteps of 
Asoka’s supposedly non-military interventions, however, Dharmapala 
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avoided the aggressive rhetoric of the invidious Christian missionaries 
by claiming that he had not come to the “West” to convert West-
erners to Buddhism, but to bring some knowledge of a religion “that 
for more than two thousand years, has quickened the peoples of Asia 
to higher achievements in ethics, industry and art”.79 Buddhism’s 
peaceful and tolerant external mission to Euro-America would thus 
surpass the civilizing mission of the British empire, which was ailing 
from the paradox of the liberal promise of moral and material uplift 
and the violence and oppression employed by the empire in order 
to enforce these values.80 In short, Dharmapala claimed, a Buddhist 
Asian civilization would both redeem and surpass the European civili-
zational model since its civilizing mission would be above all peaceful 
and it would spread a morally superior kind of civilization. Thus, not 
only the strategy but also the focal point of Dharmapala’s initiatives 
was intimately reconstructed in the image of “civilization” and the 
imperial civilizing mission.81 This intimate connection was reflected 
by Dharmapala’s rhetoric: calling Buddhism the “Law of Righteous-
ness” 82 or “ethics of Righteousness”,83 he envisioned an “Empire of 
Righteousness”.84
Institutionalizing Buddhist Asianism
Dharmapala’s most important tool in his attempts at integrating the 
different Asian peoples under the umbrella of Buddhism was the 
Maha Bodhi Society, with its purpose of restoring the assumed place 
of Buddha’s enlightenment at Bodh Gaya (North India) and trying 
to secure it for its “legitimate” owners 85—the Buddhist sangha.86 As 
a “spiritual chain that will bind the Buddhist nations together” and 
“will make them members of one spiritual family”,87 the Maha Bodhi 
Society symbolized the Buddhist Asianist vision of Dharmapala.
 Dharmapala intended to foster discursive activity and enlighten-
ment on modern Buddhism through the circulation of publications 
within the region. He therefore attempted to “start an International 
Record and Intelligence under the name of Maha Bodhi Patrika which 
would serve as the vehicle of communication between the central 
society and its branches all over the Buddhist world” 88 so that the 
Maha Bodhi Society “would become the centre of the mightiest Bud-
dhist Propaganda”.89 As far as I could determine, this magazine was 
never published. But Dharmapala’s Maha Bodhi Journal, “the flagship 
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pan-Buddhist magazine organ across India, Burma, and Ceylon”,90—
which he had established in 1892 in Calcutta—secured the dialogue 
among countries with large Buddhist populations. On each front 
cover the magazine printed first the Buddhist date, thus boldly ad-
vertising its non-Eurocentric perspective. Whenever Dharmapala was 
abroad, the publication was managed by Sarat Chandra Das, a pio-
neering scholar of Tibetan Buddhism, and Neel Comal Mookerji, 
a member of the large Tagore family.91 The Maha Bodhi Journal  
profited from a high literacy rate and knowledge of English among 
the rising middle class as well as an impressive circulation of English 
language journals in Calcutta.92
 Pilgrimage as a core technique of all major religious systems to 
develop a shared identity was Dharmapala’s other means of encour-
aging exchange and cooperation within the region. It had its historic 
predecessor in the inner-Asian pilgrimages of Buddhist monks.93 At 
the assumed place of Buddha’s enlightenment near Varanasi in North 
India, Bodh Gaya, Dharmapala revived, or rather constructed, a 
common place of worship. The politics around Bodh Gaya provide 
a striking example of how Dharmapala attempted to construct Bud-
dhism against the backdrop of local particularities.
 His long-lasting and eventually successful attempts to restore 
the place were inspired by the famous popularizer of Buddhism Sir 
Edwin Arnold (1832–1904) and his widely circulated book The Light 
of Asia, which portrayed Buddhism in the form of a hagiographic 
account of its founder’s life and as the unifying factor in the region. 
This focus on an idealized life of Buddha incorporated devotion 
towards this integrative figure but also lent an additional aura to 
Bodh Gaya as the birthplace of Buddhism. By focusing on the life 
of the Buddha alone (and Bodh Gaya as a historical site) and inter-
preting Buddhism as the heroic effort of a singular individual’s fight 
against the supposedly superstitious and outdated but predominant 
Brahmanic tradition 94 in India, Dharmapala, like European scholars, 
contributed to the disembedding of Buddhism from its social, poli-
tical and religious roots while making it transnationally available. 
Tomoko Masuzawa rightly asks, “What other act or attitude proved 
better than this, that Buddhism was a religion ‘born of a nation, but 
rising above it ’?” 95
 Consequently, when visiting Bodh Gaya in 1891 Dharmapala 
was furious that a Hindu religious authority was in charge of the 
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property and Hindu pilgrims worshipped the Buddha as an avatara 
(incarnation) of the Hindu God Visnu.96 He decidedly refuted not 
only Buddhism’s roots in Hinduism but also the multireligious history 
of the place.
 Like Arnold a couple of years earlier, Dharmapala was devastated 
by the condition of the site and its lack of shelter for Buddhist 
pilgrims and blamed it on the Hindus.97 It was only logical that 
Sir Edwin Arnold, alongside Dharmapala’s close Japanese ally Shaku 
Kōzen (1849–1924),98 a Shingon priest 99 who knew Sanskrit, was 
one of the initial founders of the Maha Bodhi Society—exclusively 
established to restore Bodh Gaya. He envisioned Bodh Gaya as the 
“central head-quarters of four millions of Buddhists” and rhetorically 
asked: “If the Ministry of England from their Downing Street Foreign 
Office could govern nearly three hundred millions of people politi-
cally, why is it not possible for the Buddhists to have a central office 
at the spot so sacred to them?” 100
 Dharmapala’s following campaign and fundraising with “co-
religionists” from Japan, Burma, Siam, India and Ceylon was his first 
attempt to create a transnational Buddhist ecumene based on a com-
mon place of worship symbolizing the common belief by claiming 
“what Mecca is to Muhammedans, what Jerusalem is to the Christians 
and Jews that Buddha-gaya is to the Buddhists of the world”.101
 It was on this ground, however, that Dharmapala faced criticism 
from his American supporters at The Open Court, whose editor—
Paul Carus—was the president of the American branch of the Maha 
Bodhi Society. The June 1896 article “The Buddha Gaya Case” saw 
the universalism, fluidity and individuality of Buddhist belief com-
promised by Dharmapala’s “endeavor to create a center of Buddhism 
in Buddha Gaya, that would be what Rome is to the Roman Catho-
lics, Benares to Hindus, and Mecca to the Mahommedans”. Instead, 
it was stressed that “religion does not consist in keeping sacred certain 
days, or places, or relics, or in making pilgrimage to holy shrines”, 
because “civilized mankind has outgrown the idea that there is any 
religious merit in pilgrimages”.102 The latter argument, particularly 
the denouncing of pilgrimages as not being “civilized”, threatened 
the carefully constructed image of a civilized and civilizing Buddhism 
that was as rational as a natural science, and it jeopardized Dharma-
pala’s attempt to bring Buddhism closer to other world religions. This 
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is illustrative of the contradictory claim to rationality and universality 
on the one hand and Dharmapala’s attempts to invoke a regional 
tradition on the other. Despite Dharmapala’s former cosmopolitan 
politics and invocation of seemingly universal values, his promised 
tolerance was increasingly compromised as he constructed more rigid 
and exclusive Buddhist identities that were opposed to India’s multi-
religious society. The aspired-for transnational Buddhist unity was 
constructed by inventing “an ancient ‘pure’ Buddhist past” stripped 
of its multiple religious and historical strands.103 Dharmapala was not 
alive to see his Maha Bodhi Society in 1949 successfully restoring 
and managing the historical site at Bodh Gaya (he died in 1933).
Buddhist Asianism in Asia
The facts of Buddhism being an assumed common religion in most 
Asian countries, the discursive construction of its founder as an 
integrative figure, and the promotion of a common place of worship 
could not hide the reality that different Asian countries followed very 
different Buddhist traditions and had very different national agendas. 
Against the differing varieties of Buddhism, Dharmapala stressed the 
universal character and adaptability of Buddhism by referring to the 
findings of the Scottish educational missionary J.N. Farquhar, ac-
cording to whom Buddhism inculcated a “‘world-embracing code of 
ethics’”. He claimed that:
… for a heterogenous people, there is no religion better than the 
divine teachings of the Tathagato. The humanitarianism of Buddhism 
appeals to the cultured intellect; its fundamental teachings are based 
on common-sense. Its adaptability is unique. Its teachings suit the 
nomadic tribes of Mongolia as well as the most advanced scientific 
men of Europe and America.104
According to Dharmapala, the phenomenal “adaptability” of Buddhism 
not only integrated far-flung geographical areas but also appealed to 
educated and uneducated people alike. For example, when visiting 
Burma, Dharmapala explained that when Buddhism entered Burma it 
did not eradicate existing cults but integrated them.
 The same rhetoric was applied to Japan. In 1908, for example, 
E.R. Gooneratne, member of the international Pali Text Society—
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which was headed by Dharmapala’s ally, the Buddhologist Davids—
quoted Lafcadio Hearn’s treatise Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation 
(1904), claiming that “the religion of the Buddha brought to Japan 
another and a wider humanising influence—a new gospel of tender-
ness together with a multitude of new beliefs that were able to accom-
modate themselves to the old, in spite of fundamental dissimilarity. 
In the highest meaning of the term, it was a civilising power.” 105
 For Dharmapala, the successful integration of pre-Buddhist prac-
tices with an assumed Buddhist superstructure in the first wave of 
Buddhist expansion to Southeast Asia proved the ability of Buddhism 
to successfully master its reiterated transformation around the turn of 
the century. He claimed that “Buddha appeared as the Saviour not 
only of India, but of the world.… Buddha alone opened wide the 
doors of immortality, and admitted the Aryans106 and non-Aryans 
alike.” 107
 In short, Dharmapala considered Buddhism universally adaptable 
and “portrayed Buddhism as a religion perfectly suited to the chal-
lenges of the modern age, combating notions of Buddhism as nihilis-
tic, pessimistic, passive, ritualistic, and superstitious and promoting it 
as activist, optimistic and scientific”.108 Dharmapala therefore claimed 
that “there is no other religion which offers at the same time a philo-
sophy, religion and psychology as Buddhism”,109 and he concluded 
that “wherever Buddhism went it created a civilization”.110
A Quintessential Asia: Japan
While Dharmapala had introduced Asoka’s ancient Buddhist reign 
as an exemplary Buddhist civilization and, starting from Calcutta, 
attempted to revive this Buddhist glory in India, the perfect, con-
temporary example of a successful Asian civilization, not only for 
Dharmapala but for many of his contemporaries, was Japan.
 The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 signifi-
cantly aroused Asianist sentiments among “anticolonial nationalists 
and intellectuals all over Asia”.111 Dharmapala’s most reliable colla-
borator in Calcutta, the theosophist Norendranath Sen, interpreted 
the impact of the Japanese war and the inspiration behind the first 
Asian power which was held by contemporaries to have defeated a 
European power:
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The attention of the West was forcibly drawn to Buddhism when 
Japan gave a crushing blow to Russia. Buddhism is the foundation 
of Japan’s rise as a world power, and her national strength and her 
great vitality may be distinctly traced to that source.…Well, gentle-
men, it is Buddhism, the early religion of Japanese, that has moulded 
the strong national character of the race. If we examine minutely the 
secret springs of Japan’s rapid rise, we will find that it is Buddhism 
on which the foundation of her early civilisation was laid.112
Differing from the prevalent interpretation that attributed Japan’s rise 
to its successful adoption of Western concepts such as industrialism 
and nationalism, Sen interpreted Asian Buddhism as the source of 
its success. For Dharmapala as well, the success of Japan vis-à-vis 
a European power proved the civilizing effect of Buddhism on an 
Asian society. Although the interpretation of Japan as a successful 
example of an Asian civilization was widespread in Asianist circles,113 
its attribution to Buddhism by Sen and Dharmapala was certainly 
an outsider perspective. However, this example shows how the Russo-
Japanese War was charged with a symbolic meaning that did not 
reflect its actual outcome.
 It was thus imperative for Dharmapala to develop close bonds 
with Japanese Buddhists and deepen the relationship between Japan 
and India. Here again, Dharmapala could rely on theosophical net-
works. In 1889, two years before the founding of the Maha Bodhi 
Society, he had accompanied Henry Steel Olcott on his first three-
and-a-half-month lecture tour to Japan to revive Japanese Buddhism. 
In 1893, on his way back from the Parliament of Religions in 
Chicago, Dharmapala stopped in Japan for another short lecture tour. 
His third visit to Japan in 1903 en route to the United States was 
a very brief one, but in 1913 he made an extended visit to Japan, 
where he was under intensive surveillance by the Japanese government 
at the instruction of the British government—a good example of the 
fact that the Japanese government oriented itself towards its Western 
allies rather than openly cooperating with other Asian powers as 
Dharmapala hoped.114 Unfortunately, in Kobe Dharmapala missed 
out on meeting Ōtani Kōzui (1875–1948), the head of the Nishi 
Honganji sect,115 whom he had met on 10 January 1910 at the 
Japanese consulate in Calcutta to discuss future Buddhist propaganda 
and further strengthening bonds with Japan. On that occasion the 
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“News and Notes” section of the Maha Bodhi Journal  in February 
1910 noted that “Count Otani” had made “it very clear that the 
Japanese Buddhists have no idea of Indian Buddhism, and there is 
very little hope of the Japanese ever helping the Indian propaganda. 
The first thing to be done is to educate the Japanese Buddhists about 
India, for the majority of them believe that India is in heaven.” 116
 Japanese surveillance reports show that during his extended visit 
to Japan in 1913 Dharmapala met with Japanese Buddhist scholars 
such as Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945) and Nanjō Fumio (1848–
1927), both of whom had studied with Max Müller; Buddhist clerics 
such as Shaku Sōen (1859–1919), a Rinzai priest he had met at the 
World Parliament of Religions; Shaku Kōzen, the co-founder of the 
Maha Bodhi Society; and Tachibana Shundō (1877–1955), who had 
studied Pali and Sanskrit in Ceylon for five years.117 Through his 
relationship with the popular Asianist thinker Ōkawa Shūmei (1886–
1957), Dharmapala published various articles on colonialism in the 
latter’s journal Michi (Way) as well as a critique of “white supremacist” 
ideology that denied the equality of non-white races.118 In short, these 
articles devaluated the existing colonial world order and argued for 
the construction of an Asian alternative.
 Dharmapala could rely on a well-established exchange of per-
sonnel and ideas between Ceylon and Japan initiated by Japanese 
Buddhist monks who had come to Ceylon and India often for years 
in order to study “pure” Buddhism at the source. Their early travels to 
Buddhist sites in India and Ceylon in the 1880s and 1890s “increased 
awareness of other forms of Asian Buddhism and marked the start of 
growing Buddhist cooperation within the region”.119 Moreover, the 
pioneering travels and intense interactions of these Japanese Buddhist 
clerics with their South Asian counterparts helped to reconfigure 
modern Japanese Buddhism. At the beginning of the 20th century 
the exchanges between Japanese and Ceylonese Buddhists played an 
important role in the creation of modern Buddhist thought.120
 Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War 
promoted the image of Japan as some sort of wonderland in which 
people “never spent a minute in sleeping” and children were “all 
taught to take great care of physical culture, and to pay proper atten-
tion to manly exercises and body-building”. Therefore, Japanese were 
“all hardy and strong, and to a Japanese it was nothing to walk 40 
miles a day”,121 reported Dharmapala in his house gazette. Following 
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the inner logic of his civilizing mission, and certainly with a good 
deal of wishful thinking, Dharmapala accredited what he perceived 
as Japan’s success to Buddhism,122 while in fact Japan proceeded on 
its expansionist and militaristic path based on an Emperor-centred 
ideology.123 In Dharmapala’s idealized perception, however, only Japan 
provided the perfect example of what Dharmapala perceived as the 
“civilizing influence” of Buddhism:
A thousand years with Buddhism, Japan has become one of the 
greatest world-powers. A thousand years with Brahmanism and 
without Buddhism, India is in the lowest condition of degeneracy.124
This sharp contrast between the “civilizational status” of India and 
Japan led Dharmapala to assume that hitherto “not from the Hima-
layan ashrams, but from the land of the Rising Sun should Buddhism 
disseminate into the world”.125 Although Dharmapala supported the 
recognition of Buddhism’s roots in India, he considered Japan—which 
demonstrated the successful synthesis of selected aspects of Western 
civilization and firm rootedness in Buddhist heritage—to be the 
modern centre of Buddhism.
Conclusion
Anagarika Dharmapala propagated Buddhism primarily because he 
believed it to be civilized and possessed of a civilizing potential. 
Similar to Asianists such as Okakura Tenshin or Rabindranath Tagore, 
Dharmapala promoted Asianism in opposition to the existing world 
order. Although Dharmapala’s vision of world order shared with these 
thinkers the same anti-colonial horizon and aspiration of surpassing 
the Eurocentric system, his assumption of a definite spiritual funda-
ment of this alternative Asian civilization set him apart from their 
rather vague, philosophical visions. Moreover, contrary to Tagore’s
Asianist ideas, Dharmapala did not oppose nationalism.126
 As a member of the Theosophical Society under the tutelage of 
its first president, Henry Steel Olcott, Dharmapala already promoted 
a reformed Buddhism as the spiritual basis for a new civilization. 
“Civilization” became the key concept with which Dharmapala em-
phasized the value of Buddhism, which had a twofold advantage over 
the existing world order: contrary to the colonial system, it would 
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not be based on violence; and, in opposition to Christianity, it was 
not opposed to the latest scientific findings.
 For Dharmapala, like for other contemporary intellectuals,127 
Japan was an example for the successful integration of selected ele-
ments of modern scientific and technological findings with a lively 
Buddhist heritage. Especially in India, Dharmapala contrasted the 
high civilizational status of Japan with the deplorable condition of the 
Indian civilization, which he attributed to the loss of Buddhism in 
the latter country. In order to contrast the present condition of India 
with a golden past and emphasize the potential of a Buddhist civili-
zation, Dharmapala evoked the reign of the Buddhist King Asoka.
 By adopting the “civilizing mission ideology”, the core legitimizing 
discourse of colonial states, Dharmapala aimed to compete with the 
Eurocentric political and cultural system and with orthodox Chris-
tianity on equal terms, or rather to surpass them through the combi-
nation of an “internal” civilizing mission targeting Asian Buddhists 
and an “external” civilizing mission catering to a Western audience. 
Dharmapala’s conception of an Asian civilization, although focused 
on the unification of Asia under the banner of Buddhism and the 
revival of Buddhism in its Indian “homeland”, was indeed meant to 
be universalizing.128 Duara argues that this universalizing tendency of 
civilization differentiates civilizational concepts from the other main 
“imagined community” that evolved in the 19th century, the nation, 
since “the gap between the territorial nation and civilization is not 
only territorial, but principled. Because the spiritual impulse of a 
civilization tends to be universalizing, national boundaries are ulti-
mately artificial and limiting.” 129
 The analysis of Dharmapala’s appearance at the 1893 World 
Parliament of Religions in Chicago as the president of the newly 
founded Maha Bodhi Society, his debates with cosmopolitan Bengali 
intellectuals, and his relentless fight for the creation of Bodh Gaya 
as the “Buddhist Jerusalem” demonstrate how Dharmapala aimed at 
integrating particular elements of Buddhist tradition with the super-
structure of a Buddhist “world religion”, thereby universalizing the 
assumed set of core values of a Buddhism that was presented as indi-
vidualistic, rational, tolerant and abstract. This interpretation was as 
much indebted to Olcott’s revivalist efforts, also described as “protes-
tant Buddhism”,130 as it relied on a global network of Buddhist 
theosophists such as the French travel writer Alexandra David-Neel 
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(1868–1969), the popularizer of Zen Buddhism in the United States 
D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966),131 and the rich heiress Mary Foster (1844–
1930) of Honolulu. Foster was the main sponsor of Dharmapala’s 
philanthropic activities, which included support for orphanages, 
hospitals, temples and schools in India, Ceylon, Hawai’i and Great 
Britain.132 “Religion of Righteousness” 133 and “ethics of Righteous-
ness” 134 were euphemisms Dharmapala frequently used for Buddhism, 
or more precisely for its fundamentals: the four Noble Truths and the 
Noble Eightfold Path. Dharmapala’s engagement combined the rise of 
“Eastern spiritualities” as well as the consolidation of “world reli-
gions” 135 as two major trends in the global religious field around 1900.
 However, Dharmapala’s efforts at collaboration and fundraising 
within Asia were unsuccessful since, as he complained, “no Sinhalese 
Buddhist came forward to help me in my single-handed efforts. No 
Burmese, no Siamese, no Japanese, no Chinese, no Tibetan came 
forward to co-operate with me.” 136 On the contrary, Dharmapala’s 
frustrated attempts at fundraising revealed the wide range of differing 
agendas in the region and his failure to centralize them. He com-
plained that “Japanese Buddhists were suspicious”, the “Siamese said 
that charity begins at home”, and though the “Burmese Buddhists 
started well” and also the “late illustrious King of Siam was quite 
sympathetic with the aspirations of the Maha Bodhi Society” all of 
them eventually declined.137 National as well as other interests seem 
to have been more important to Asians than transnational endeavours 
such as Dharmapala’s dream of an Asian Buddhist federation. Although 
Dharmapala’s vision of an alternative Buddhist Asia was not fulfilled, 
he was preeminent in introducing “new Buddhism” to Euro-America 
and initiating a Buddhist revival in Asia that produced lasting, though 
often problematic, effects on the self-perception of Buddhists.138
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Chapter  Three
Compass Points: Four Indian 
Cartographies of Asia, c.  1930–55
Carolien Stolte
Introduction
In this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of 
Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and 
endeavor … In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively 
in the maintenance of peace. Indeed there can be no peace unless 
Asia plays her part. 1
In the decades surrounding Indian independence, two interlinked 
questions figured prominently in the Indian public sphere: how an 
independent India would situate itself in a decolonizing Asia, and 
how and by whom this new Asia was to be shaped. Many influential 
thinkers, not least Jawaharlal Nehru as quoted above, saw the mid-
20th century as an opportune moment to reshape Asia and create a 
postcolonial, post-war world of greater justice and equality. “Asia” was 
considered as a natural building block of that new world order. But 
if this Asia could be accorded an identity and a mission, in this case 
as a harbinger of peace in a bellicose world, it left unanswered the 
question of who and what this Asia included as a continent. What 
cartography, or cartographies, accompanied such visions of Asia?
 It is fast becoming a platitude that regions are discursive con-
structs and should be viewed as no more than blank canvases on 
which meaning can be projected when a particular agenda so requires.2 
A recent scholarly trend demonstrates an increased interest in the 
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versatile meanings that regions have acquired throughout history, 
particularly when it comes to laying claim to or contesting political, 
cultural and economic hegemonies.3 Asia as a region has arguably 
seen the most marked surge in studies of regionalist movements and 
moments. Much work remains to be done: if Asianism were stripped 
of its statist connotations, one would be left with actors and projects 
that no longer fit national or linguistic categories, which makes 
them both harder to track down in the archive and harder to study 
within the disciplinary divisions of academia.4 Some of these divisions 
have been bridged by the two volumes edited by Sven Saaler and 
Christopher Szpilman, which greatly facilitate access to multilingual 
primary sources on Asian regionalism from the mid-19th century to 
the present.5
 So far, however, this interest in Asianism has largely bypassed 
South Asia. South Asian historiography itself may have begun to break 
out of the constraints of the nation as the primary unit of analysis, 
but the study of Asianism as a concept is still largely focused on 
its East Asian manifestations.6 If Indian actors are represented at 
all in the historiography of Asianism, they figure as recipients of 
Asianist ideologies originating in places far removed from the sub-
continent. They are (self-)exiled revolutionaries, intellectuals and aca-
demics, whose ideas are derivative of Asianist concepts circulating at 
various moments in the 19th and 20th centuries in the Ottoman 
empire or Japan. A notable exception to this rule is Rabindranath 
Tagore, whose Asianism might be said to constitute a field of study 
unto itself.7 But even in the case of Tagore, his links with Japan, 
however important, are often emphasized to the point of erasing his 
many other Asianist engagements.8
 The pull of the Khilafat movement, the impact of the Russo-
Japanese War and the charisma of modernized Japan have been well 
documented.9 But while each of these factors has been influential 
in shaping the Asianist projects of various individuals and groups 
in South Asia, this chapter argues that this narrative of “derivative 
Asianism” for South Asia is reductive in two ways. First, it leaves no 
room for Asianist visions that originated in the subcontinent itself 
and were driven by locally shaped agendas. Second, it leaves no room 
for Asianisms—the use of the plural is deliberate—that employed a 
geographical imaginary of Asia that was not focused either on East 
Asia or on a Muslim world that was conflated with Asia. In fact, Asia 
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as a geographical entity could become many things especially when 
viewed from India. The compass could point in any direction, to-
wards the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean or the caravan routes into 
Central Asia.
 This chapter is a preliminary attempt to stretch our understanding 
of Indian Asianism by looking at four cartographies of Asia that co-
existed in the turbulent decades surrounding independence but were 
informed by very different ideas of what Asia constituted. Here, the 
image of Asia as a blank canvas onto which various regionalist visions 
could be projected is particularly apt. Each of the four cartographies 
described here had a longer history rooted in much older conceptions 
of Asia originating in trade, pilgrimage and warfare on South Asia’s 
frontiers. As consciously articulated ideologies, too, Asianist projects 
and visions had earlier incarnations dating back to World War I and 
even earlier. Nevertheless, the time frame set here is deliberate.10 In 
the years before and immediately after independence, viewed in the 
context of an expanding League of Nations membership, the emer-
gence of Soviet republics in Central Asia, and later a rapidly decolo-
nizing Asia, the question of what Asia encompassed and how its con-
stituent parts should relate to each other became particularly acute. 
As Stephan Hay reminds us, “each Asian Orientophile has entertained 
a somewhat different notion … his image of the East consisting usually 
of an expanded version of those particular traditions he most wished 
to revitalize”.11
 This paper seeks to contribute a directional view from India. 
First, the Province of Pan-Asia as envisioned by the revolutionary exile 
Mahendra Pratap will be examined; this included a mythic Turan in 
the heart of the continent among its five “districts”. Second, Ramesh-
wari Nehru looked farther north in defining an Asia working for 
peace and nuclear disarmament, which explicitly included the Soviet 
Union—including Moscow—as a crucial Asian country. Third, the 
third Aga Khan emphasized India’s ties with West Asia based on an 
imagined cartography that he could propagate publicly as India’s chief 
delegate to the League of Nations. Finally, Hindu Mahasabha Presi-
dent Veer Savarkar looked east in claiming Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist 
space, the cartography of which reinforced the Mahasabha’s views of 
India’s own Hindu identity.
 Although departing from widely varying ideological and political 
standpoints, the four Asianists considered below had several things in 
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common. Born within a decade of one another, they all witnessed the 
first surges of anti-imperialism in India in their formative years. They 
all became ardent internationalists during the proliferation of trans-
national movements in the opening decades of the 20th century.12 
They were able to do so because they were all recipients of a privi-
leged education and comfortable in multiple linguistic environments. 
At home in the world, all four sustained their internationalism well 
beyond India’s independence in 1947. A cohesive and vibrant Asia 
remained central to their thought, and some of their fellow travellers 
easily moved from the orbit of one into the other and back. Put 
together in one room, however, they would have vehemently disagreed 
as to what shape their Asia was to take. As a set, therefore, these four 
cases represent the vibrancy and diversity of Asianism in this period: 
representing the cardinal points on the compass, they showcase the 
different ways in which Asia could be viewed from India.
The Asian Heartland: Mahendra Pratap’s Turan 
in the Province of Pan-Asia
Mahendra Pratap (1886–1979), born in the minor Indian princely 
state of Hathras, embarked on his first trip around the world at the 
age of 21.13 As a self-styled revolutionary exile, he devoted his life to 
achieving the unification of Asia. To Pratap’s mind, Asian unification 
was a crucial prerequisite for his ultimate goal of World Federation. 
The Province of Pan-Asia was to become one of five provinces that 
would form the government of a federated world.
 Pratap’s pan-Asianist thought, however quixotic, has been largely 
forgotten today. So too has his periodical World Federation, proscribed 
but smuggled into British India, in which he reported his activities 
and explained his plans for Asia and the world. If Pratap figures in 
the historiography of anti-imperialism in Asia at all, it is in the con-
text of one of two things: his participation in the Niedermayer-Von 
Hentig expedition during World War I, 14 or as one of the Indian 
pro-Japanese revolutionaries of the interwar years.15 The former 
focuses on his meeting with the Ottoman sultan and his subsequent 
attempt to harness Muslim sentiment to instigate rebellion against the 
British in Asia, leading him to proclaim the Provisional Government 
of Free India in Exile in Kabul with himself as titular head of state. 
The latter generally emphasizes his engagements with Rashbehari Bose, 
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a revolutionary exile in Japan, and Bose’s participation in various 
Japanese pan-Asianist societies whose activities resulted in, among 
other things, the pan-Asiatic conferences of Shanghai and Nagasaki 
in 1926 and 1927.
 But Pratap’s own project for Asian unification was important in 
two ways. First, he was one of very few political activists who pre-
ferred the land routes across Asia to sea travel. Putting his vision of a 
united Asian landmass into practice, he made use of caravan routes, 
railways and donkey trails to traverse Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, the 
Gobi Desert, Turkestan, Siberia, and many other more and less hos-
pitable Asian landscapes. Second, this made him and his comrades 
vital connectors between centres of Asianist activism as far apart as 
Moscow, Kabul, Tashkent, Shanghai and Tokyo.
 In view of Pratap’s choice of routes, it is no coincidence that 
Central Asia figured prominently in his political thought. Aside from 
his unique hand-drawn political map of the region, which will be 
treated below, his focus on Central Asia is noteworthy in itself. Over 
the course of the 20th century, the spatial form of Central Asia 
shifted several times. The political upheavals in the region during the 
opening decades of the 20th century created multiple political divi-
sions. The erasure of Tartary from global geography during the time 
of the Soviet Union has been termed a form of “cartographical dis-
memberment”, while after World War II it disappeared almost entirely 
from the geographical imagination. Finally, it fell into the disciplinary 
cracks of Area Studies in the 1950s.16 However, as Central Asia was 
receding from view in Western cartographies of Asia, it re-emerged in 
others. One of its incarnations was as Turan.
 Although consistently referring to (parts of ) Central Asia, the 
term “Turan” has multiple connotations. In post-Avestan traditions, 
it referred to the area north of the Oxus River. From the 7th century, 
it became identified with those areas of Central Asia inhabited by 
Turkic tribes. In Safavid Persia, Turan was conflated with Uzbek. In a 
more general sense, “Turan” was often used to contrast the nomadic 
areas of Central Asia to the urban or sedentary cultures of, for in-
stance, Persia. To yet others, the term invoked conquerors and empire 
builders.17 This ascription of particular characteristics to the otherwise 
vague cartography of Turan took unexpected forms in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Notable proponents include Sultan Galiev, 
the “Red Tartar” who briefly dabbled in a socialist pan-Turan on 
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behalf of the Bolsheviks,18 but also Puccini, who composed Turandot 
(Daughter of Turan) in 1926.19 In the latter days of the Ottoman 
empire, Turanism became a political ideology that offered an alterna-
tive to pan-Islamism: a movement towards closer association with, or 
even outright expansion to, the Central Asiatic plateau as the semi-
legendary home of the Turkic peoples. It extolled a Turkic ethnicism as 
opposed to the theocratic interracialism of the community of Islam.20 
In this understanding, Turan included the Crimean Tatars, Turkmens, 
Uzbeks, Kazakh and Kyrgyz, but could really encompass any people 
from the Black Sea to Vladivostok. Pan-Turanists from outside the 
Ottoman empire, such as the Hungarian orientalist Ármin Vambéry, 
even accused the Ottomans of having become “de-Turkified”, their 
Mongoloid characteristics lost beneath a cultured urban veneer.21
 How did Pratap, an Indian anti-imperialist, come to incorporate 
Turan in his conception of Asia’s future? The term “Turan” itself had 
long been in use in India, with “Turanī” referring to invaders on 
horseback but also to the feared and valued military leaders from 
across the Himalayas during the Mughal period.22 However, it is 
more likely that Pratap’s incorporation of Turan in his cartography of 
Asia was strategic. Always in search of allies, he was in touch with 
Turkish War Minister Enver Pasha, the most famous proponent of 
pan-Turanism, before embarking on the above-mentioned expedition 
to Afghanistan. And at least one expedition member, Kasim Bey, dis-
cussed pan-Turanism with King Habibullah.23 In a similar vein, Pratap 
had high hopes for the Soviet Union’s pan-Turanian sentiments. 
Although abandoned by the Bolsheviks in the mid-1920s, a group of 
Russian intellectual exiles still advocated Eurasianism by emphasizing 
the commonalities offered by the Turanian myth; others saw a natural 
alliance with Russia’s “Asiatic sisters” against the Romano-Germanic 
colonizers.24 The latter idea would have been particularly appealing 
to Pratap as a pan-Asianist and anti-imperialist. It is no coincidence 
that Pratap’s Turan was actually an acronym: Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, 
SiberiA, TurkestaN (Figure 1).
 The map below, published in World Federation in mid-1935, 
reveals some of Pratap’s plans for Asia.25 First of all, the Province 
of Pan Asia was also known as “Buddha” (he dubbed Europe and 
Africa “Christ” and “Mohemmod” respectively), a religion that parts 
of Central and East Asia had in common. In Pratap’s cartography of 
Asia, Turan did indeed bridge both, “from Turkey to Kamchatka”.26 
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His choice of Srinagar as the intended capital of the Province of 
Pan-Asia, too, seems to have been inspired by its proximity to Pratap’s 
treasured Central Asian caravan routes. The capital of Turan was to 
be Tashkent.27 Pan Asia was further to be divided into four districts: 
Turan (Central Asia), Aryan (South Asia), Golden Aryan (Southeast 
Asia) and Golden Land (East Asia), of which Turan was the largest 
by far. Interestingly, the Middle East had no place in Pan Asia: it was 
attached to Mohemmod/Africa as the district “Arab”. However, this 
seems to have been a consequence of Pratap’s focus on Central Asia 
as the basis of his cartography rather than indicative of a conscious 
exclusion of Islam as an Asian religion. In fact, Pratap would later be 
Figure 1.   Turan in the Province of Pan-Asia.
Source : Pratap, World Federation 7, 4 (1935).
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at loggerheads with the Hindu Mahasabha over this issue, maintaining 
that Islam was as “Aryan” as Hinduism and Sikhism.28
 Although Pratap lived in Japan for most of the 1930s, Central 
Asia continued to dominate his geo-imaginary of the continent. After 
the Pan-Asiatic Conferences of Nagasaki and Shanghai, Pratap pro-
posed holding the third conference in Kabul. When this conference 
failed to materialize in the late 1920s, he revisited the plan in 1937 
and proposed hopefully:
So far the Japanese Government has not taken any official steps to 
organize Asia. Here is an opportunity for the government of Afghan-
istan to take a lead in the matter. Afghanistan can invite Asiatic 
governments to send their representatives to the next Afghanistan 
national festival. On that occasion we can have the first Asiatic Offi-
cial Conference … accepting the principle of a World State.29
This conference did not materialize either. The Asian Army, arguably 
Pratap’s most controversial plan, would eventually come to life as 
the Indian National Army, but certainly not in the way Pratap had 
envisioned it.30 Pratap had desired an Asian Army headquarters in 
Inner Mongolia, led not by the Japanese but by a pan-Asian direc-
torate of warriors: “one Manchu, one Mongol, one Tibetan and three 
Chinese.” 31
 Pratap thus formulated a unique cartography of Asia in which 
Turan figured not only as the geographical heart of the continent, but 
also as its future core: with Srinagar as the capital of Pan Asia and 
Tashkent as the capital of Turan, and with an army operating from 
Inner Mongolia led, in his words, by generals drawn from Central 
Asian martial races, Pratap quite literally re-centred pan-Asianism.
Looking North: Rameshwari Nehru and the Delhi 
Inter-Asian Conference of 1955
Pratap’s contemporary Rameshwari Nehru (1886–1966) was similarly 
fascinated by the landmass north of the Himalayas but gave expres-
sion to her cartography of Asia in a completely different way. Having 
spent much of her early career as a social reformer and women’s 
rights activist, she became active in the All India Women’s Conference 
(AIWC) during the interwar years.32 This was also the locus where 
her Asian engagements took shape. The AIWC had convened an All 
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Asia Women’s Conference in Lahore in January 1931, which brought 
together delegates from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, 
Nepal, Ceylon, Burma and Japan.33 Rameshwari Nehru had attended 
this conference and became one of the founders of a Permanent Com-
mittee, which hoped to convene more Asian Women’s Conferences 
in the future. In 1932, this led to a collaboration with the Oriental 
Women’s Conference at Tehran.34 In 1934, the committee grew into 
a large but short-lived “All Asia Committee” with 50 members from 
across India.35 The All Asia Women’s Conference received official 
representation through a permanent delegate to the International 
Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship in Geneva. 
And when this alliance held its 12th congress in Istanbul in 1935, 
the Asian Committee sent a vocal delegation whose presence did not 
escape the attending press.36 But a second All Asia Women’s Con-
ference failed to materialize, and Rameshwari Nehru’s colleagues in 
the AIWC voted against a merger with the Oriental Women’s Con-
ference “on the grounds of maintaining their identity”.37 This had 
more to do with their mental geography of Asia than with the group 
itself, which, much like themselves, propagated a reformist route to 
gender equality and was connected to the same international plat-
forms. However, “Oriental” in this group was taken to mean largely 
Middle Eastern and Persian, which many of the members of the 
Asian Committee failed to identify with their own Asianist vision, 
which was more inclusive. Given these difficulties, the Sino-Japanese 
War dealt the final blow in 1937, and Rameshwari Nehru and her 
colleagues in the All Asia Committee felt that it served “no useful 
purpose by merely keeping up an association which exists more on 
paper than in reality”.38 The committee was disbanded and would 
remain so until it was revived in the wake of Rameshwari Nehru’s 
Asianist activities in the 1950s.
 Rameshwari Nehru, meanwhile, directed her attention away from 
the faltering All Asia Women’s Conference and towards other Asianist 
initiatives. Initially, during the 1940s and especially in the years 
immediately after independence, she became a vocal advocate of 
inter-Asian governmental cooperation. She was a consultant for several 
of the newly established Indian ministries, including the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. When the latter decided against international coopera-
tion in combating the trafficking of women, she replied that “there is 
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an international traffic in oriental women and girls in the near, mid-
dle and far east … and that the bulk of this traffic is traffic in Asiatic 
women from one country in Asia to another”.39 To her mind, “closer 
collaboration between the Inter-Asian authorities” was crucial.40 
However, in the 1950s her Asianist activities shifted from govern-
mental work to civil society organizations working for peace and dis-
armament, notably the All-India Peace Council. The resulting voyages 
and conferences were constitutive of the Asian vision she propagated 
in her later life.
 With Rameshwari Nehru as its president, the All-India Peace 
Council was the driving force behind the Conference of Asian 
Countries, held in New Delhi on 6–10 April 1955. Its story has 
been drowned out by the thunder of the Bandung Conference, which 
opened 11 days later and in which the other Nehru—Jawaharlal was 
a first cousin of Rameshwari’s husband, Brijlal—played an important 
role. But whereas Bandung was an intergovernmental meeting, the 
1955 Delhi conference followed directly in the footsteps of the 1947 
Asian Relations Conference by gathering nongovernmental representa-
tives for an international discussion on the future of Asia, which was 
to be built on a shared sense of continental solidarity.41 It also copied 
the 1947 conference by structuring its proceedings in discussion 
groups on diplomatic, cultural and social issues, including women’s 
rights. But most importantly, the 1947 conference was reflected in 
the list of invitations that was issued. The 1947 Asian Relations Con-
ference has gone down in history as the only Asian conference ever 
to invite the republics of the Soviet Union, the Middle East and 
Eastern Asia all at the same time.42 But the 1955 conference did 
so, too. And, as Jawaharlal Nehru had said in his inaugural address 
of the 1947 conference, India was uniquely situated to bring Asia 
together; and Rameshwari Nehru and her colleagues felt the same 
way. As Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, a prominent politician and 
peace activist, wrote to Rameshwari Nehru:
… this continent is split into three parts: the Islamic mid-west area, 
east- and southeast Asia, and India … India’s heart is with the east- 
and southeastern people, but history has forged a very strong bond 
with the mid-west. So she feels she is part of either of these—maybe 
she is thus in an advantageous position, commanding a perspective 
which the others do not enjoy.43
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In this way, the conference situated India as the centre from which 
Asia extended in all directions.
 Though the conference invited writers, peace activists, scientists 
and social workers, its final delegation list showed a considerable im-
balance towards red Asia. This was no surprise, considering the under-
lying network of the All-India Peace Council, which was a chapter 
of the resolutely leftist World Peace Council.44 Among the attendees 
were delegations from, among others, Soviet Russia, Communist 
China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet delegation sent 
representatives hailing from Russia, but also from Uzbekistan, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.45 The other delegations included 
Japan, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Ceylon, Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, 
Transjordan and Mongolia. Interestingly, Indonesia sent a full delega-
tion as well, although the Delhi conference had not been appreciated 
at all by Sukarno, who felt it might upstage Bandung.46 He had 
complained to Jawaharlal Nehru, who subsequently in a protracted 
correspondence with Rameshwari Nehru could not prevent the con-
ference from being held but dissociated himself from it explicitly.47 
Jawaharlal’s Asia, which had once been no less inclusive than Ramesh-
wari’s, had now become subject to other diplomatic considerations.
 Regarding the list of delegations, Nehru was not the conference’s 
only critic. Some felt that Soviet attendance defeated the very purpose 
of promoting Asian solidarity:
More! It embraces Russia as an Asian nation. And, what is far worse 
still, it refuses to take due note of Russian imperialism in Siberia, 
and in North Korea and Chinese mainland and certain other coun-
tries of Asia … It will force [the nations of Asia] eventually nearer 
and nearer the heels of Communist Russia in the false pretext of 
reducing world tension, or of building peace and solidarity in Asia.48
But despite the critics, few conferences were ever better attended. 
As most of the meetings were held outdoors, an estimated 2,000 
people had gathered to cheer the 188 delegates as they arrived at 
the conference opening.49 A dais was erected for the delegates, with 
a specially made map of Asia showing all the countries represented 
with their flags. Nationalist dailies such as the moderately left-leaning 
Bombay Chronicle carried reports of each congress day on their front 
page, which may have contributed to the fact that by the closing 
ceremony, crowds had swollen to 25,000 people.50
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 The atmosphere was perhaps best reflected in the gathering of 
writers at the conference. Several Indian associations, such as the 
Romain Rolland Club and the Tagore Society, hosted receptions, at 
which the Indian MP Manarasidas Chaturvedi emphasized strongly 
that the conference was not a communist-inspired stage-piece. In 
accordance with the spirit of the conference, the Japanese poetess 
Setsuko Tammo Kiyoko Nagase, Chinese author Pa Chin, Vietnamese 
poetess Tran Khanh Van and Central Asian Soviet author Mirza 
Khurshunzade gave a joint statement that “all the Asian countries had 
had common cultural bonds for centuries. They had also the com-
mon object of establishing lasting peace and building up their respec-
tive countries for prosperity and happiness of the people.” 51
 The resolutions at which the conference finally arrived, however, 
indicated tension rather than unity. The geographical spread of coun-
tries covered in the list of resolutions did reflect the inclusive 
Asian cartography on which the conference was founded. But the 
Arab delegation’s motion that Israel be considered “an implement of 
imperialism” did not carry.52 The Israeli delegation, already angry be-
cause they had been demoted to “observers” rather than “delegates”—
ostensibly due to an administrative error—protested vehemently. In 
the end, Rameshwari Nehru explained to the Israeli delegation that
… instead of blaming all the Israelites as being aggressors, we per-
suaded the Arab delegates to limit their remarks to a certain section 
of the people termed as the “ruling class”. The Arab delegates did 
not appreciate it … but agreed to it to avoid the break-up of the 
Conference. Our acceptance of this resolution was also due to the 
same reasons.53
In the end, the conference could only arrive at a condemnation of 
colonialism and imperialism and call for a “normalization of diplo-
matic relations between all countries of Asia”. Among the other resolu-
tions were a demand for admission of the People’s Republic of China 
to the United Nations; the restoration of relations severed during the 
war; and full equality for Japan in the comity of nations.54
 The Delhi conference, by far the largest undertaking in Ramesh-
wari Nehru’s long career as an internationalist and social reformer, 
adopted the most inclusive geo-imaginary of Asia among the carto-
graphies considered here. Over the years, it would expand to encom-
pass parts of decolonized Africa and shift its administrative base to 
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Cairo. It also sparked a series of successful spin-off conferences, such 
as the Afro-Asian Women’s Conference and the Afro-Asian Writers 
Conference, which continued to include the Soviet Union and its 
Central Asian republics.55 Eventually—in Rameshwari Nehru’s own 
terms—this Asian people’s alternative to the Asian governments’ 
Bandung, which had grown out of Rameshwari Nehru’s personal net-
work of internationalist peace and women’s rights activists, grew into 
a full-fledged People’s Solidarity Movement for decolonization and 
against (neo-)imperialism, in which she continued to play a leading 
role throughout the 1950s.56 Rameshwari Nehru stepped down in 
1962 at 76 years of age.
Looking West: West Asia in the Imagination of Aga 
Khan III
A very different cartography of the continent was put forward by 
Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III, the 48th imam of the Shi’a 
Ismaili Muslims (1877–1956).57 He offered a very concrete geographi-
cal definition of Asia as “extending from Aden to Mesopotamia and 
from the two shores of the Gulf to India proper, from India proper 
across Burma, including the Malay Peninsula, and thence from 
Ceylon to the States of Bokhara, and from Tibet to Singapore”.58 
The political scientist Werner Lévi has argued that this statement by 
the Aga Khan, made in 1918, was the first expression of India as 
a “pivot” in the region and “has remained fashionable ever since”.59 
The Aga Khan’s cartography of Asia was informed by two underlying 
notions of the shared historical connections that to him defined Asia: 
those offered by the caravan routes through the Central Asian land-
mass, not dissimilar to the “Asian heartland” concept put forward by 
Pratap; and the common Asian heritage of Islam. For instance, he had 
always considered Turkey to be an Asian country, and he had warned 
as early as 1913 that “Turkey must in the future be an Asiatic Power; 
she must concentrate on Asia.” 60 To a certain extent, the Aga Khan’s 
own family reflected the relations between these two ideas: his grand-
father had been forced to leave Persia, taking refuge in Bombay, in 
which city the Aga Khan, though born in Karachi, spent most of his 
youth. But his family still retained a large following in Central Asia. 
So much so that when Mahendra Pratap passed through the Oxus 
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Valley in Badakhshan, the border region between Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan, he encountered many of the Aga Khan’s followers in re-
mote places such as Wakhan, Ishkashim and Shighnan. He found this 
peculiar enough to mention in his diary.61
 In this regard, it should be mentioned that the Aga Khan did not 
fit well into a pan-Islamic mould. As noted above, much has been 
written on the Khilafat movement of the early 1920s and its connec-
tions to anti-imperialist movements in Asia generally and in India 
particularly. However, this form of pan-Islamism in India cannot be 
equated with Asianism.62 It offered a vision of a strong umma, the 
community of the faithful, whose territory incidentally overlapped 
with large areas of Asia; but Asianism was not its driving feature. 
The Aga Khan’s conception of Asia, by contrast, was informed by his 
Muslim identity and his interests as the imam of the Ismailis, but it 
was not Islam-centric; while he frequently appealed to Muslim senti-
ments, he considered himself very much part of a diverse Asia with 
multiple religious and cultural identities. In that sense, his invocation 
of Islam and his inscription of it onto the history of all of Asia is 
more reminiscent of the multifarious networks across Asia that made 
up the “Arabic Cosmopolis” as described by Ronit Ricci, than of the 
blueprint offered by “untranslated” Arabian Islam.63
 In the 1930s, the Aga Khan received a new platform for his ideas 
through the international institutions in Geneva in which he was 
involved. As India’s chief delegate to the League of Nations between 
1932 and 1938, he was also active in the Red Crescent Society and 
the Geneva Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Arma-
ments. At these organizations he chose to put forward his views from 
an Asianist perspective. The Aga Khan saw no contradiction between 
his multiple identities as a Muslim, an Indian and an Asian. Instead, 
he saw them as complementary, so much so that he advocated the 
political union of West and Central Asia into a federation.64 But un-
like Pratap, who had abandoned his India-centric views when he went 
into exile, the Aga Khan did view every Asian connection through an 
Indian lens. For instance, when Turkey entered the League of Nations 
in 1932, he stated:
the history of India has been linked for countless centuries with 
that of Turkey, sometimes in the clash of rivalry, but more often 
with ties of culture and friendship  …  India thus gives Turkey a triple 
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welcome to the League: as age-long neighbours and cooperators in 
culture and civilization; as recent opponents; and now we can say, 
with confidence, as life-long friends.65
When Iraq entered into the League, he emphasized the “long and 
intimate spiritual, cultural and economic relations between India and 
the lands that today form the Kingdom of Iraq”.66
 Central Asia was incorporated into his Asian geo-imaginary 
through a similar emphasis. He noted “a big Muslim square from 
Samarkand to Sind and from Egypt to Constantinople”,67 and he 
invoked the same image in incorporating China into this geography 
by saying, “China is our good neighbor … and with her province of 
Turkestan we have had, since time immemorial, friendly cultural and 
economic relations”.68 This inclusion of China on the basis of its 
western provinces is rare. In this period, Indo-Chinese connections 
were affirmed by many, but primarily on the basis of shared suffering 
under the imperialist yoke (by invoking the treaty ports) or on the 
basis of a shared Buddhist heritage (see Maria Moritz’ chapter and 
below).69 Insofar as the overland caravan routes were invoked, this 
was only to demonstrate that they had been travelled by Buddhist 
monks during the spread of Buddhism.
 However, it would go too far to say that Eastern Asia played no 
role in the Aga Khan’s geo-imaginary. When the Sino-Japanese dispute 
was brought before the League, the Aga Khan volunteered to mediate:
I felt that it was my duty as India’s representative—as an Asiatic—to 
do all I could in bringing about a direct understanding by con-
versations between China and Japan … while such a departure by 
an Indian representative, at a time when India was still without 
self-government, might seem unusual … the value of an Asiatic inter-
mediary in a solely Asiatic dispute might be considerable.70
But his truly Asianist exultations were directed at West and Central 
Asia. When Afghanistan was admitted into the League, he proclaimed 
that “no representative of India, no Muslim, no Asiatic could play 
his part on this historic occasion unmoved”.71 He synthesized India’s 
religious and cultural variety into a single sphere of “Asian-ness” and 
directed this amalgam towards a shared commonality with, in this 
case, Afghanistan:
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For India, however much she may seek from the West her political 
institutions, remains a true daughter of the East, proud of her 
Eastern blood, her Eastern languages, her Eastern cultures. These she 
shares with Afghanistan, and seventy millions of her people share, 
as I share, with Afghanistan in the glorious brotherhood of Islam.72
The Aga Khan consciously played up his multiple identities as a South 
Asian, a Muslim, an internationalist and the religious leader of a sect 
scattered throughout Asia, in order to speak in a pan-Asian idiom. 
He invoked Asia’s historical interregional connections to map an Asia 
that was held together by the roads of trade and religion. He conti-
nued to look at Asia from an Indian perspective, and in doing so 
looked largely to West Asia, with which region he had more affinity. 
The inclusion of West Asia made the Aga Khan a minority among 
Indian Asianists, but he was certainly not alone. In keeping with 
Nehru’s aim of maintaining close relations with the Middle East, 
the Asian Relations Conference would invite the entire Arab world, 
as would Rameshwari Nehru’s 1955 Conference. Nevertheless, the 
Muslim East was resolutely excised from the Asian map by others.
Looking East: Veer Savarkar’s Religious Cartography 
of Asia
To Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966; more commonly known 
as Veer Savarkar), who remains a controversial figure to this day, the 
Muslim East did indeed fall outside of what he considered as Asia.73 
His focus lay entirely on East and Southeast Asia, with India as the 
westernmost point on the Asian map. The resulting geo-imaginary 
reflected what he considered as the unifying identity marker of Asia: 
the Hindu-Buddhist religion. Islam, and with it most of Central and 
Western Asia, had no place in his cartography of the continent. 
Where the Aga Khan had approached China through Turkestan, this 
was precisely the part of China that Savarkar abhorred. Rather than 
as the heart of the continent, he depicted Central Asia as an existen-
tial (and external) threat:
China was once ruled by the Tartars, and when the Tartars embraced 
Islam, these Moslems made China their home … But the great 
Buddhistic Empire which rose on the ashes of the Tartars showed 
the Moslems their right place and they were more or less thoroughly 
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reduced to unquestioning subjection. But with the fall of the 
Chinese Empire, the Japanese conquest and the simultaneous rise 
and spread of the Pan-Islamic movement … Chinese Muslims refused 
to merge themselves with the Chinese, but maintained that they 
should keep up their separate entity.74
Given these diametrically opposed ideas, there was little love lost be-
tween Savarkar and the Aga Khan. The mutual dislike actually dated 
back to a discussion on Madan Lal Dhingra’s assassination of William 
Hutt Curzon Wyllie in 1909. The moderately loyalist Aga Khan had 
argued that the attack should be condemned. This incensed Savarkar, 
a revolutionary nationalist, so much that a physical fight ensued. And 
as the communal issue intensified, so did their enmity. A further 
casus belli was the issue of Shamsi Ismailis, known to Savarkar as the 
gupti (secretive) Ismailis in Punjab, a community that wore “Hindu” 
dress but had followed the Aga Khan since the second decade of the 
20th century. The presence of a Muslim community with the outward 
appearance of Hindus intensified Savarkar’s view that his religion was 
under threat, and he vowed to “save the Hindu Society from the 
dangerous practices of these gupti followers of the Aga Khan”.75 In 
the 1930s, as both directed their attention to the future of Asia, their 
differences literally took on continental proportions.
 In order to claim Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist continent, it was 
first necessary to establish that Hinduism and Buddhism were one. 
This was a task well suited to the aims of the Hindu Mahasabha, 
in which Savarkar had risen to prominence after his release from jail 
in 1924.76 The Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee passed a reso-
lution stating that in the beginning, Buddhism “was only a reforma-
tion movement among the Hindus. Hence Buddhists are as much 
Hindus as Protestants are Christians.” 77 This resolution directly echoed 
Savarkar’s own ideas on the issue. His definition of Hindu-Buddhist 
unity dated back to 1923, later published in his 1928 Hindutva: Who 
Is a Hindu? Of the Buddha, he said: “Thou art ours as truly as Shri 
Ram or Shri Krishna or Shri Mahavir … when the law of Righteous-
ness rules triumphant on this human plane, then thou will find the 
land that cradled thee, and the people that nursed thee, will have 
contributed most to bring about that consummation …” 78 When 
Savarkar became president of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937 (inci-
dentally the same year that the Aga Khan was elected president of the 
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Muslim League), Hindu-Buddhist Asia became an often-heard trope 
in Mahasabha circles, and one on which the organization took action 
through active networking with Buddhist organizations across Asia.
 Savarkar’s cartography of Asia was influenced strongly by Greater 
India thought, which held that ancient India had played an active 
role in the cultural and religious development of Southeast Asia.79 
The thesis that India had not only had a highly developed civilization 
that predated most of Europe, but was also a hegemon and an ex-
pansive force in Asia, was propagated primarily by the Greater India 
Society in Calcutta, established in 1926, and through publications by 
its members, notably Kalidas Nag, P.C. Bagchi and R.C. Majumdar.80 
It was a small step to assert next that India had “civilized” Asia through 
the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism. As the Greater India idea 
was translated from academic publications into the popular press, 
this was the shape in which it became popular in the Hindu Maha-
sabha. In view of this, it is perhaps peculiar that the Mahasabha did 
not view India as the natural leader of Hindu-Buddhist Asia. Instead, 
it looked towards Nepal as the only independent Hindu country in 
the world. All through the 1930s, the Mahasabha kept up a frequent, 
if one-sided, correspondence with the Nepali court, urging them to 
rise to the occasion and show Asia the way, “now that the awakening 
of the Pan-Hindu consciousness is making us Hindus in Nepal and 
outside, realizing the oneness of our life as an undivided and indi-
visible nation”.81
 Some in the Mahasabha were even “devoutly cherishing the hope 
of a speedy consummation of our great ideal of creating a federation 
of powerful and peace-loving Hindu nations from the Himalayas 
to Ceylon and from Sindh to far-off Java”,82 but this went too far 
for Savarkar himself. His geo-imaginary of Asia, in which Muslim 
regions were cartographically excised from the map, was a call for a 
united stand against the “slow penetration of Islam” 83 rather than a 
proposal for an Asian political federation. Savarkar advocated a Hindu 
Dharma Parishad, not a Hindu Rashtra Parishad, roughly translated as 
a Hindu “religious” association versus a Hindu “national” one.84 He 
made the difference explicit when he called for closer contact with 
East Asia in the name of Hindu religious brotherhood, but explained: 
“Hinduism is one of the constituents of Hindutwa [sic] which we 
share with the Japanese, Chinese and all our co-religionists. The 
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Japanese and the Chinese are our co-religionists but they cannot be 
our co-nationalists. We have a religion but no nation in common.” 85
 However, the vocabulary of the Hindu-Buddhist Asia concept 
soon became an idiom in which not only Mahasabhists were conver-
sant, but also those who petitioned the organization with an agenda 
of their own. Savarkar’s private correspondence offers an insight into 
both the transnational networks that were fostered through this per-
ceived Hindu-Buddhist unity and the existing revolutionary networks 
that were eager to use the rhetoric for their own ends. Savarkar main-
tained a lively correspondence with the aforementioned Rashbehari 
Bose in Tokyo. Bose, who had become a naturalized citizen in Japan 
and had married locally, was a pan-Asianist first and foremost, and his 
activities give little cause to think of his Asianism in a strictly Hindu 
or Hindu-Buddhist format.86 In writing to Savarkar, however, he had 
no qualms in adapting to the latter’s Asian cartography in writing:
Every attempt should be made to create a Hindu bloc extending 
from the Indian Ocean up to the Pacific Ocean. For this purpose, 
the Hindu Sabha should take immediate steps for establishing 
branches of Mahasabha in Japan, China, Siam and other countries 
of the Pacific and sending their representatives for creating solidarity 
among the Eastern races.87
Although Savarkar was reluctant to devote Mahasabha resources to 
international activities, he had no objection to sympathizers expanding 
his organization on their own dime. The Bombay secretariat of the 
Mahasabha officially authorized the Japanese branch to be established.88 
Privately, Savarkar wrote to Rashbehari Bose that his “scheme of 
building a Pan-Hindu temple in Japan is excellent”.89
Conclusion: Asia Viewed from India
Savarkar was not in search of Asia’s geographical heart but of a uni-
fying religious identity, as expressed by a cartography that was limited 
to those regions that followed religions that had their roots in India. 
Savarkar and Pratap both excised the Middle East from their maps 
of Asia, but they did so for very different reasons. For Savarkar, this 
cartographical deletion served to demonstrate that Islam was not an 
Asian religion; for Pratap, the erasure put further emphasis on the 
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dominance and centrality of “Turan”. And while Pratap’s Turan over-
lapped largely with Rameshwari Nehru’s focus on the Soviet Union 
and its Central Asian republics, the latter’s inclusive conception of 
Asia was based on ideas of post-imperialist solidarity and reconstruc-
tion rather than on a historical understanding of what the various 
Asian regions had in common. The latter view, finally, was very much 
the Aga Khan’s, who based his Asia on the shared heritage of Islam 
as well as the connections of historical trading routes.
 These four short vignettes demonstrate that in the decades sur-
rounding India’s independence in 1947, multiple cartographies of Asia 
coexisted in India. These cartographies, while informed by different 
assumptions of what Asia constituted and how Asia’s future should be 
shaped, had other features in common: they are not easily reconciled 
with narratives of pan-Asianism as understood in its predominant East 
Asian regionalist form. They also fail to conform to ideas of a spiri-
tual, non-materialist Asia as opposed to a soulless and industrialized 
West, as attributed to Anagarika Dharmapala, Tagore and other Indian 
thinkers. Instead, the four Asianists described here offered carto-
graphies of Asia that were driven by locally shaped agendas. With the 
exception of Mahendra Pratap, who refashioned himself as somewhat 
of an honorary Turani by going into exile and renouncing his Indian 
citizenship, they saw a special role for India as the geographical, spiri-
tual or political heart of Asia. While for Savarkar the importance of 
India to Asia was historically informed, the Aga Khan and Ramesh-
wari Nehru saw India as a potential leader of a decolonizing Asia.
 In 1927 J.M. Gupta, a nationalist and a Gandhian, envisioned an 
India that would be “mistress of the Indian Seas, leader of an Asiatic 
Zollverein, and upholder of the right of the colored races throughout 
the world”.90 None of the thinkers above were quite as jingoistic. 
Rather, they demonstrated that in whichever direction the compass 
pointed, Asia was indeed a terra incognita onto which multiple re-
gionalist ideas and visions could plant their flag.
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Chapter  Four
Uniting the East via Western 
Amateur Sports Values: Asian 
Integration, the Olympic 




This is the first meet managed entirely by Chinese. This is symboli-
cal of New China, it is in keeping with the Nationalist movement. 
We are in our way adjusting ourselves to meet the demands of a 
modern world! We in our way are working for our own national 
salvation to be attained only by our strenuous efforts. You represent 
the flower of young manhood of the renascent Orient, alert, physi-
cally fit, and under keen self-discipline. You, together with our own 
young men, represent the hope of the Pacific. You will, I trust, learn 
from each other, and try to understand and appreciate each other’s 
national aspirations and problems. You have a golden opportunity 
to learn from each other during this congenial gathering. You will 
carry the spirit of fairplay that characterizes clean amateur sports-
manship and friendly rivalry into your future life work; fair play 
that is essential in international dealings, and in everything con-
cerning human intercourse. It does not matter much whether games 
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are lost or won, if they are fairly and well played. A game can be 
honorably lost the same as it ought to be justly won. To you collec-
tively and individually this meet means much, but to the future of 
friendly international relations among the three nations represented, 
perhaps it means more.1
For those who know what happened later, it did not mean more. 
During the following years Sino-Japanese relations were plagued by 
several military incidents, culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (1937–45). In 1927, however, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister 
Guo Taiqi (Quo Tai-chi) still hoped for a scenario in which East 
Asia would be more united—not as a result of the enforcement of 
Japanese hegemony, but through mutual acceptance as equal partners. 
He rightly said during the opening ceremony of the Eighth Far 
Eastern Championship Games (FECG), hosted in 1927 in Shanghai, 
that the Games were “symbolic of New China”. For the first time 
since the Games’ founding in 1913 in Manila by American members 
of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Chinese officials, 
not Americans, were in charge of organizing this inter-Asian sports 
event.2 This newly gained independence from foreign tutelage was 
to demonstrate China’s ability to “meet the demands of a modern 
world”, meaning that after decades of decline the Chinese had now 
finally regenerated and become truly independent. Guo integrated 
the Games into the growing nationalist movement in China and the 
Guomindang’s (Chinese National Party) struggle to unite and reform 
China into a “modern” state able to survive on its own in a world 
order conceived in social Darwinist terms. Guo even described the 
Games as a possible means to bring Chinese nationalist aspirations of 
a “rebirth” together with the same aspiration in Japan and the Philip-
pines, the other countries participating in the Games. The athletic 
youth of the three Asian countries, educated in Western amateur 
sports ideals such as internationalism and egalitarianism, would be 
the “hope of the Pacific”, ready to resist the unmentioned enemy—
Western colonialism. In Guo’s speech, the Eighth FECG therefore 
served as an Asianist project in two ways: first, they would provide a 
value system allowing members of different Asian societies to trans-
nationally cooperate with each other on equal terms by regulating 
their behaviour based on Western amateur sports values such as fair 
play, team spirit, self-control and non-discrimination.3 Second, the 
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Games would be an event from now on organized for Asians by 
Asians, “liberated” from the control of (paternalist) Americans. In 
other words, the so-called Western civilizing mission, which justified 
Western colonial rule and practices as necessary to bring backward 
and incompetent local populations up to Western standards, would be 
substituted by an Asian civilizing mission.4 This Asian civilizing mis-
sion would embrace Western amateur sports values, whose usefulness 
for Asians was not debated, but would end the former colonial power 
asymmetry between the West and Asia inherent in the Western civi-
lizing mission. Modern sports, which spread into Asia in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries and which were characterized by equality, 
bureaucratization, specialization, rationalization, quantification and 
obsession with records, would thus be the affair of Asians, not Ameri-
cans, in their respective nation building and modernization processes.5
 Applying Sven Saaler’s classification of pan-movements to Guo’s 
claims, these features fit the description of an anti-colonial pan-
movement, which calls for the independence of a group of countries, 
proclaims or tries to construct a regional identity, and has a tendency 
to produce a hegemon (this last aspect being rejected by Guo through 
a focus on a regional identity founded on democratic fairness).6 Since 
the late 19th century, a variety of state and non-state actors had voiced 
similar Asianist claims, mainly as a reaction to Western imperialism 
and colonialism. During the 1930s and 1940s, Asianist rhetoric was 
instrumentalized to legitimize Japanese imperialism and aggression. 
After the war Asianism remained tainted by the bitter and brutal 
experience of Japan’s oppressive rule over the territories it had tem-
porarily occupied. However, the idea of Asian solidarity survived, for 
instance, in the form of the (Asian parts of the) Non-Aligned Move-
ment and Third Worldism and discussions about an East Asian Com-
munity. Geography, cultural commonality, historical interactions, racial 
kinship and spirituality as well as a common destiny were among 
the components pre-war pan-Asianists had emphasized.7 With these 
concepts in mind, Guo had welcomed the Filipino delegation at the 
arrival ceremony by arguing that many of the athletes (like many 
Filipinos in general) had some “Chinese blood” running through 
their veins.8
 Taking Asianist conceptions as a point of departure, this chapter 
reconstructs a narrative Guo identified as fundamental, namely the 
process of the Asianization and nationalization of the sportive Western 
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civilizing mission. Research on this topic is still almost nonexistent.9 
By focusing on the Far Eastern Championship Games from their 
inception in 1913 to their dissolution in 1934, a transnational study 
will answer the following questions: How did the founders of the 
Games, the American YMCA physical (education) directors, proceed 
in the three nations? How, when and under what circumstances did 
Chinese, Filipino and Japanese officials gain control over the hosting 
of the events? How did American YMCA physical directors respond 
to Asian claims of being ready to take over the sportive Western civi-
lizing mission? And how do these developments relate to the history 
of Asianisms in the first half of the 20th century?
The Founding of the Games by the American YMCA 
(Manila 1913)
In early 1910 Elwood S. Brown, an official of the American YMCA, 
went to the Philippines as its physical director in Manila. Soon after 
his arrival he began to increase the YMCA’s influence by collaborating 
with Governor General W. Cameron Forbes and the Bureau of Edu-
cation. He developed physical education programmes for Filipino 
clerks, constabulary soldiers and schoolchildren; set up playgrounds; 
organized athletic competitions during the annual Manila Carnival; 
and was the primary figure in the establishment of the Philippine 
Amateur Athletic Federation in early 1911. In 1912–13 he founded 
the FECG as a tool to promote sportive Christian citizenship training 
in the American colony, China, Japan and, less successfully, in other 
Asian countries.10 Western amateur values, perceived as a vehicle for 
the implementation of Protestant values in the realm of physical edu-
cation, were to overcome the perceived social and cultural deficits of 
“backward” Asians.11 Brown and his colleagues, imbued with a mis-
sion to “uplift mankind”, were practitioners of American purportedly 
benevolent imperialism. In a long-lasting modernization process under 
American tutelage, “uncivilized” peoples were to be made ready for 
successful American-style self-government. For example, while Filipino 
assemblymen were first elected in 1907, real power, including the 
right to veto their decisions, remained with the American governor 
general. In China, the Xinhai Revolution (1911) brought a new group 
of politicians to power. Many of them had received a Western educa-
tion or had even converted to Christianity. Generally, they were much 
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more willing to accept American tutelage in their struggle to change 
China than the Qing dynasty had been. Only in Japan, which had 
already undergone a rapid process of transformation and had become 
a regional great power after its military triumphs over China (1895) 
and Russia (1905), did semi-colonial American “uplifting” activities 
find little support in government circles.12
 During the First FECG in Manila in January–February 1913, 
Filipinos had hardly any influence. The contest committee consisted 
of Brown and two American collaborators. Governor General Forbes 
and Brown served as the president and the secretary of the Far Eastern 
Athletic Association (FEAA) respectively. The Chinese delegation, too, 
was under the supervision of American YMCA officials active in 
China. Wu Tingfang, a politician and former Chinese minister to the 
United States, attended the Games but limited himself to representa-
tive functions. Only the very small Japanese delegation, including 
Meiji University’s baseball team and two track and field athletes—the 
latter being sponsored by a Kansai (Osaka-Kobe) region newspaper 
(Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun) with which Brown had negotiated—
remained under its own control.13 Strictly speaking, it was not even 
an official delegation, since it lacked backing from Kanō Jigorō, the 
president of the (Great-)Japan Amateur Athletic Association (JAAA/
Dai-Nippon Taiiku Kyōkai) and, since 1909, a member of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee. Kanō, the founder of modern judo, 
had already developed his own Bushidō (Way of the Warrior) based 
physical education ideology, which focused on individual training and 
on shaping loyal subjects of the Emperor. He thus was not interested 
in the YMCA’s ideas of democratic Christian citizenship training 
through team games (for example, basketball and volleyball, both 
invented by YMCA members); nor did he perceive American tutelage 
for Japan as desirable, as this would put the latter on the same level 
as the Philippines and China. Having experienced Japan’s compara-
tively successful struggle to become a regional great power, he rejected 
this US-devised Asianism that was based on the view of all of Asia—
including Japan—being backward and in need of Western assistance.14
The American YMCA Rising (1915–21)
The Second FECG, held in Shanghai in May 1915, brought only 
very limited changes in terms of nationalization, but it strengthened 
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the American YMCA’s influence in Asia. In late 1912 a Democrat, 
Woodrow Wilson, was elected US president. This led to a Filipiniza-
tion process initiated by Wilson’s new governor general, Francis B. 
Harrison, which gave more power to Filipinos. Filipinization culmi-
nated in the Jones Law (1916), the first official declaration that the 
Philippines at an unspecified future point in time (when Filipinos 
had become capable of governing themselves according to American 
standards) would receive their independence. In line with this process 
of indigenization, Jaime de Veyra, a former governor of Leyte, assem-
blyman, and member of the Philippine Commission, served as the 
first official representative of the Philippines during the FECG. Never-
theless, in practice the Filipino delegation remained under the control 
of Brown.15 The Japanese team was again very small and lacked offi-
cial backing from the JAAA. The Japanese Twenty-One Demands, 
issued to the Chinese government only weeks before the Games com-
menced, further complicated Asianist projects based on the ideals 
of egalitarianism and internationalism. Without the intervention of 
American YMCA officials, not even this small group, led by a sports 
reporter at the Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun, would have travelled to 
China. The team would then have been reduced to the few Japanese 
living in Shanghai who also participated.16 The most important posi-
tion in the contest committee, the secretary, was again held by an 
American, this time John H. Crocker, the YMCA’s national physical 
director for China. Its Chinese officials, Wu and Zhang Boling, a 
Christian and founder of Nankai University, both no physical edu-
cators, limited themselves to representative positions. In the FEAA, 
Wu became president but Brown remained the secretary.17
 The Third FECG, which took place in Tokyo in May 1917, 
brought another increase in the influence that American YMCA secre-
taries enjoyed in East Asia. After the Second Games, Elwood Brown 
and Franklin H. Brown, from late 1913 the YMCA’s national physical 
director in Japan, had convinced Kanō through public pressure to 
agree to host the next Games in Japan.18 Kanō and the Browns also 
reached a compromise regarding the disciplines, which were not to be 
changed for the Games but would be open to discussion afterwards. 
Moreover, Kanō and the still very young JAAA, which had never 
organized an international sports event before and had attended the 
Olympics only once, lacked the necessary knowledge to organize the 
Games.19 Kanō thus became president of the FEAA, but Elwood 
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Brown remained the secretary. Franklin Brown, who until then had 
had only very limited influence in Japanese physical education, became 
the secretary of the contest committee, the other nine members being 
Japanese. Elwood Brown had already confided to Pierre de Coubertin, 
the founder of the modern Olympic Games, that in contrast to the 
Olympic movement the officials in East Asia would always be those 
of the host country (not a mixed group), with the possible exception 
of the secretary of the FEAA and the contest secretary: “We find in 
the Orient that these men must be of the white race if things are to 
move.” 20 Elwood Brown’s comment makes it obvious that the Games 
as an Asianist project still were based on a perception of Asia being 
a backward region, but simultaneously, due to Japanese cooperation, 
they marked an internationalist counterexample to the slaughter on 
the European battlefields.
 The Fourth FECG, held in Manila in May 1919, were again 
marred by Sino-Japanese tensions. The Chinese failure at the Versailles 
Peace Conference to force Japan to return the German concessions in 
Shandong province it had won during World War I and the subse-
quent boycott of Japanese goods as well as the nationalist awakening 
of the May Fourth Movement worsened relations between Japan and 
China. These tensions made Asianist projects more difficult to realize, 
but at the same time the devastation caused by the war, questioning 
the superiority of Western civilization, and the increasing rhetoric of 
self-determination created some Asian commonalities.21 The Japanese 
foreign ministry rejected Japan’s participation, while the Ministry of 
Education complained about the unwillingness of the organizers of 
the Games to reschedule them so that Japanese student athletes would 
not miss exams. Since the JAAA lacked money and needed govern-
ment support, Kanō decided to leave the FEAA shortly before the 
start of the Games. His decision resulted in tensions between Kantō 
(Tokyo region) and Kansai. Officials from the latter region seceded 
from the JAAA and set up their own organization, the Japan Athletic 
Youth Club (Nihon Seinen Undō Kurabu), to participate in the 
Games under the command of the same people who had been in 
charge during the Second FECG.22 
 In the Philippines, the implementation of the Jones Law had led 
to the formation of the Philippines Senate as an upper house. Its 
president, Manuel L. Quezon, was a leading Nacionalista Party politi-
cian, who would in 1934 secure the official promise of independence 
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and serve as the president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines 
from 1935 onwards. As president of the Senate he had already been 
asked in 1917 to represent the Philippines, but he had delegated the 
office to Manuel Earnshaw, a resident commissioner returning from 
his period in the United States. Now, Quezon became president of 
the FEAA, but like before, American YMCA physical directors and 
their colleagues were in control of the actual work. Walter W. 
Marquardt, the director of education, held the office of contest secre-
tary. He apparently had close relations with the YMCA and was 
chosen due to his position as secretary of the Philippine Amateur 
Athletic Federation, not because of his government office. Independent 
of that, the mere existence of an (acting) American governor general, 
Charles E. Yeater—who as head of state took over certain ceremonial 
business—restricted Filipino self-government in comparison to Japan 
and China.23 
 In China the preparations for sending a delegation to the Fourth 
FECG had led to the decision to create the China Amateur Athletic 
Union (Zhonghua yeyu yundong lianhehui) as a national sports orga-
nization. Almost all the delegates were American or Chinese YMCA 
leaders, the former holding the most influential positions. The Chinese 
delegation was thus still headed by an American YMCA secretary, 
Robert W. Clack. Clack even gave the official Chinese response to 
Yeater’s closing remarks, even though several leading Chinese politi-
cians from both north and south China attended the Games.24
 During the Fifth FECG, hosted in Shanghai in May 1921 while 
the Shandong Problem was still unsolved, the tensions between Japan 
and China were again overcome only through the intervention of 
American YMCA secretaries. Wang Zhengting (Chengting Thomas 
Wang), a leading Chinese YMCA official and politician, had been 
elected president of the FEAA and the contest committee. Elwood 
Brown, who meanwhile had become senior secretary of physical edu-
cation in the YMCA’s foreign department in New York and was there-
fore responsible for its physical education activities abroad, had to 
convince Wang to act according to the internationalist ideal:
It developed upon him to sign the invitations or notices to Japan 
and the Philippines. At that particular time he was the leading 
spirit in the group of Chinese business men in Shanghai who were 
urging a boycott of all things Japanese. He felt that it would not be 
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consistent for him to be the active backer of the Japanese boycott 
plan and at the same time to have an active part in a plan to bring 
Japanese to China on a friendly basis.25
Wang’s unwillingness also illustrates that the unequal relations between 
Chinese and American YMCA leaders had become increasingly un-
easy. He finally informed the Japanese delegation but limited contact 
with them as much as possible. The secretary of the FEAA and the 
contest committee, John H. Gray, who had recently come from India 
to serve as the YMCA’s national physical director in China, also kept 
his distance from the Japanese delegation, feeling that to do otherwise 
would taint his position in China. He did the same regarding Elwood 
and Franklin Brown and only grudgingly organized the Games.26 In 
the Philippines, on the other hand, a leading education politician of 
the Nacionalista Party, Assistant Director of Education Camilo Osías, 
who had close relations with the Manila YMCA, had become secre-
tary of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation in 1920. He 
served as the official representative of the Philippines, while Frederick 
O. England, a YMCA-trained physical educator who had gone to 
Manila after Elwood Brown had asked the government for a play-
ground supervisor, was in charge of the team.27 This can be inter-
preted as another minor setback for the YMCA, since the colonial 
administration began to increase control over physical education, 
limiting the influence of nongovernmental organizations. In Japan, 
the attempt to unify the JAAA and the Japan Athletic Youth Club 
had resulted in Kanō having to step down as the JAAA’s president. 
Kishi Seiichi, a leading civil and corporate lawyer who had practised 
Western sports during his studies at Tokyo Imperial University, suc-
ceeded him. He finally convinced the Japanese government to provide 
funding for the delegation’s trips to the Games, meaning that for the 
first time a large group of athletes could be sent to China. Even 
though Kishi led the delegation to the Games, Franklin Brown’s 
informal position as adviser increased in importance, though not as 
much as planned. After Elwood Brown had convinced the relevant 
people in the Philippines, the Japanese declared that they were willing 
to support Franklin Brown becoming a permanent secretary (or at 
least serving for a period of six years) of the FEAA. The attempt 
to further strengthen the control of the American YMCA over the 
Games to enforce its internationalist ideal was dropped only because 
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the strong anti-Japanese stance of the Chinese made it unrealistic that 
they would accept permanent headquarters in Tokyo.28 Even more 
problematic for Franklin Brown was Gray’s apparent inability to re-
treat to the position of a “gray eminence” similar to himself, who 
would de facto have more influence than the delegates. The meeting 
of the FEAA had visually demonstrated this deficit in official Chinese 
representation: “China—two Americans and one Chinese; Philippines
—two Filipinos and one American; Japan—three Japanese. The only 
Chinese to open his mouth at the meeting was the President.” 29 
According to Franklin Brown, choosing at least two Chinese delegates 
would have made a much better impression on the Japanese, who 
would accept Americans speaking for Filipinos but would be sceptical 
regarding American dominance of Chinese issues. The Japanese dele-
gation indeed got the impression that the immense influence of the 
Americans in the Games, also illustrated by the fact that almost all 
referees were Americans (or British), might mean that the Asians were 
mere puppets in an American puppet theatre.30 It seems that Gray’s 
indifference regarding keeping the American YMCA more subtly in 
control of Chinese amateur sports resulted, within months, in another 
quarrel with the Browns. Gray had given up leadership of the China 
Amateur Athletic Union, but Elwood Brown reminded him that the 
Chinese would still need his personal tutelage:
However, I do not need to emphasize the fact that this Union or 
Federation will need for a long time the technical guiding hand of 
someone. It was my hope that this person might be you in order 
that the difficulties and pitfalls which have beset amateur organiza-
tions around the world might be avoided. In addition to this, I be-
lieve we should continue for some time to be the guiding influence 
in China, Japan, and the Philippines in the Far Eastern Games.31
Already before that, he had confided to Franklin Brown that it would 
“be a calamity if the inspiration for Chinese participation should get 
out of the Association hands”. Gray, on the other hand, complied but 
warned Brown that a Chinese anti-foreign reaction would only be a 
question of time.32 The increasing anti-colonial nationalisms in the 
participating countries, accelerated by World War I and the rhetoric 
of self-determination, thus laid the foundations for an Asianist project 
that would be more Asian and less American.
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The American YMCA Dwindling (1923–25)
The Sixth FECG, hosted in Osaka in May 1923 as a compromise be-
tween the Kantō and Kansai branches of the JAAA, ironically brought 
about a nationalization of amateur sports in China. Anti-Christian 
movements had further fuelled nationalism in China, and Chinese 
boycotts of Japanese products continued after Tokyo was unwilling 
to retrocede the Kwantung Leased Territory. Gray and his American 
colleagues in the end succeeded in sending a delegation to Osaka 
in accordance with the internationalist ideal, which was essential for 
their “civilizing” aims, even though they attracted the hatred of many 
Chinese, enraged by this Asianist endeavour:
China would not have put a team on the field if it had not been 
for Gray, Peabody and myself. In the face of the boycott which was 
projected by some organization in Tientsin [Tianjin] and which 
threatened to break up even the National Tryouts, we in South 
China brought about eighty athletes and defied the boycott. As it 
turned out we supplied nearly all the athletes for China but it is a 
mighty good thing we foreigners forced it through.33
Gray also made it clear that the Games would not be the property of 
Japan and that even the Philippines would be annoyed should China 
decide not to participate. Wang, for example, eventually accepted his 
responsibilities as honorary president of the FEAA but did not go to 
Japan himself.34 The fact that Gray held the speeches for the Chinese 
team during the ceremonies, combined with the rather poor perfor-
mance of its athletes, caused a wave of criticism that eventually forced 
him out of power. In July 1923, Chinese sportspersons formed the 
China Athletic Association (Zhonghua tiyu xiehui) as a rival to the 
American YMCA’s China Amateur Athletic Union. Following some 
serious quarrels between the two organizations, they merged in July 
1924 into the China National Amateur Athletic Federation (Zhonghua 
quanguo tiyu xiejinhui), which limited Gray’s role to that of an ad-
viser. A year earlier, Gray had already made the following observation:
In the Physical work nationally there has been no difficulty with the 
local associations but in the country as a whole there has appeared 
considerable disapproval of Foreign leadership in National Athletic 
Organizations. I feel that American leadership has about passed out 
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of the Far Eastern Athletic Association, to be taken over by the 
people of each country in turn.35
Similar developments occurred in the Philippines. Here, Osías served 
as the representative of the government for a second time while also 
being first vice president of the FEAA. England, who in 1922 had 
been appointed National Physical Director of the Philippines—an 
office created mainly through Osías’ political influence—remained in 
charge of the team. Through this important step towards govern-
mental control over physical education, the American YMCA lost 
much of its influence in the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation. 
England was primarily responsible to the government, in contrast to 
the YMCA’s physical directors in the Philippines, who worked for 
a nongovernmental organization. Moreover, Osías’ final aim was Fili-
pinization of control over Philippine sport, and he seems to have 
created the office to pave the way for a Filipino official as England’s 
eventual successor.36 In contrast, in Japan Kishi became president of 
the FEAA, but Franklin Brown served for another term as the secre-
tary of both the contest committee and the FEAA, not yet having 
been negatively affected by another wave of disruptions within the 
JAAA that broke out during the following year.37
 The Seventh FECG, hosted in Manila in May 1925, was the last 
event organized mainly by an American. It also was the second time 
that the person was not a full-time YMCA secretary but a govern-
ment official. Government control of the Philippine Amateur Athletic 
Federation was even further strengthened since this time England as 
the National Physical Director automatically became secretary of the 
FEAA and the contest committee. Like in 1919, Quezon had been 
elected as president of both the FEAA and the contest committee 
and this time found time to fulfill some of his duties, which again 
had to be shared with the American governor general.38 The Chinese 
delegation, in contrast, for the first time was headed by a Chinese, 
Shen Siliang (William Z.L. Sung), a physical educator trained in the 
United States who had returned in 1923, becoming head of the phy-
sical education department at St. John’s University in Shanghai. The 
Chinese consul general in Manila represented the government.39 The 
Japanese delegation was led by Kishi, while Franklin Brown served 
as one of the delegates to the FEAA. Both, however, were unable to 
prevent an escalation during the Games caused by the increased use 
Chap4 (75-98).indd   86 10/8/15   11:15:34 AM
 Uniting the East via Western Amateur Sports Values 87
of Filipino referees, some of them apparently either lacking experience 
or (though this never came up in the official discourse) misusing 
their power to support the Filipino team. Neither Kishi nor Franklin 
Brown was able to convince a group of Japanese athletes, who left the 
Games in protest, to rejoin. Tensions between them and the JAAA’s 
leaders, especially Kishi (who according to Franklin Brown was very 
competent but neither democratic nor very diplomatic), had already 
built up the year before over the selection process for the Olympic 
Games and had now escalated. These tensions would, like the accel-
eration of the Asianization and nationalization process, continuously 
reduce Franklin Brown’s influence.40
The American YMCA Losing Its Central Position 
(1927–30)
As mentioned in the introduction, the Eighth FECG, which took 
place in Shanghai in August–September 1927, was the first event in 
which Asians held all the influential positions on the contest com-
mittee. Wang became the honorary president as well as the president 
of the FEAA, delegating some of his responsibilities to the contest 
committee’s president, Zhang. Shen served as the secretary of both 
organizations.41 Guo represented the Guomindang government, whose 
commander-in-chief, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), at the time of the 
Games tried to unify China via the Northern Expedition (1926–28). 
As mentioned in the introduction, the campaign led to the hope of 
recreating a powerful China that would be able to withstand foreign 
oppression. Furthermore, the Japanese government’s decision against 
a major involvement in the conflict (though it sent some troops to 
China) supported Asianist rhetoric. However, to ensure that the 
Chinese preparations for the Games were not being affected by the 
protracted war in China and the exclusion of foreigners, the JAAA 
sent its secretary to China. His suggestion that the Games be orga-
nized by officials from all three countries, which Shen rejected, made 
it obvious that the Japanese lacked trust in the Chinese organizing 
skills. Nevertheless, despite quarrels about referees between Japan and 
China, the Games were held without major incident. Many Japanese 
sports functionaries, for example Yamamoto Tadaoki, a professor at 
Waseda University and leading YMCA official, were therefore very 
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pleased that the Games had finally got into Asian hands.42 This was 
particularly true since even the foreign delegations were under the 
control of Asians, finally turning the event into an Asianist project 
organized for Asians by Asians. The tensions within the JAAA had 
resulted in a temporary isolation of Franklin Brown. The Japanese 
delegation, led by Hiranuma Ryōzō, an Upper House member who 
was also involved in the physical department of the Yokohama YMCA 
(despite not being a Christian), instead of Kishi, apparently almost 
completely ignored him.43 Another dark side of the Asianization pro-
cess was the waves of mutual criticism of “inexperienced” referees 
and functionaries. Osías, who again represented the Philippine govern-
ment, found it necessary to remind his Japanese and Chinese col-
leagues in a long speech to keep up amateur values and standards, 
meaning to accept each other as equals and not to jeopardize the 
civilizing aim of the Games. For the first time, too, a Filipino was in 
charge of the Philippine team. Regino R. Ylanan, who had been edu-
cated by the YMCA at its Training School (now Springfield College) 
and had served as the physical director of the University of the 
Philippines in Manila, had become National Physical Director in 
1927 following England’s retirement.44
 In combination with the Ninth FECG, hosted in Tokyo in May 
1930, the Asianization process was completed. Elwood Brown had 
left the Philippines in 1918 and died in 1924. In China, American 
YMCA physical directors had lost their power following the Sixth 
FECG in 1923; and Gray had left China before the Eighth Games 
were held in Shanghai. Only Franklin Brown had remained in Japan, 
but after having served there since 1913 he intended to return to the 
United States in 1930 following the Games. This time the Japanese 
did not ask him to become secretary of the contest committee. 
Takashima Fumio, secretary of the JAAA, received that office. How-
ever, after it became evident that the Japanese could not manage 
certain business without him, Franklin Brown became secretary of the 
constitution and the official report committee as well as a member of 
the contest committee.45 Despite having lost his central role in orga-
nizing, he still wielded a lot of authority, illustrated by the fact that 
he was asked for advice on certain important topics: During the 
Eighth FECG Osías had suggested changing the name of the Games 
to “Oriental”, since “Far Eastern” would reflect an American influence 
over them instead of an Asian one. When the topic came up again in 
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1930, Franklin Brown reminded the Asian delegates that this certainly 
could be done, but that “Oriental” would be no less English than 
“Far Eastern”, and the issue was dropped. His authority in 1930 is 
further shown by the fact that it was only in 1934, after Japanese 
and Philippine officials had dissolved the Far Eastern Athletic Asso-
ciation, that the newly established organization was named Amateur 
Athletic Association of the Orient, as Osías had suggested years 
before. Regarding ideas in 1930 to extend the FEAA to North and 
South America to provide Japanese athletes with stronger opponents, 
Franklin Brown declared that this would mean that the Asians would 
lose all elections on further host cities and that the International 
Olympic Committee would hardly react well to such an attempt to 
take over half the world. This issue was also dropped. Before Franklin 
Brown left Japan, he was received by Prince Chichibu at his palace; 
and in 1932 he was awarded the Fifth Order of the Sacred Treasure. 
Later on, he would be a special guest at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.46
Conclusion
The Asianization process of the Games, which was a reaction to the 
Games’ origins being rooted in Western colonialism and the Western 
civilizing mission, begs the question of whether the voluntary (or in-
voluntary) withdrawal of the American YMCA physical directors de-
termined the dissolution of the Games in 1934, when they were sub-
stituted by Games involving Japan, Manchukuo and the Philippines.47 
The Asianization process of the Games since the 1920s had consisted 
of nationalization processes in Japan, China and the Philippines, all 
of them occurring at about the same time and entangled with each 
other. The Asianization process was thus “Asian” insofar as it led to 
Games organized for Asians by Asians, without American tutelage. 
The nation was never overcome by the process, precisely since it oc-
curred in the contexts of three different nations struggling against 
(different degrees of ) Western colonialism and paternalism to gain 
self-government in terms of the Games. In the Philippines (in con-
trast to China and Japan) the process did not directly lead to Filipino 
responsibility, but in an intermediate step it brought in American 
government employees instead of American YMCA officials. After the 
common “enemy” (or, to be more precise, the common paternalist 
tutor) was finally gone, the question arose of whether the three Asian 
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nations would be able to permanently take up the sportive civilizing 
mission by finding new working relationships via mutual acceptance 
of one another as equals (or unequals). Since the Japanese were un-
willing to do the former, which was illustrated in the political arena 
by the conquest of Manchuria in 1931–32, and the Chinese were un-
willing to do the latter, illustrated by their refusal to agree to Japanese 
predominance, the breakdown of the Games in their current form 
was predictable.
 As a consequence, one can say that American YMCA officials were 
the better pan-Asianists. For them, Asia was already united, even if 
only through its backwardness. All three Asian nations were roughly 
equal to each other, since they all lacked American-style sportive 
Christian citizenship training. The Browns, at least, were aware that to 
permanently secure their work in Asia, it would be necessary to hand 
over to Asians in a controlled way, even though the latter would still 
need subtle American advice. They believed that the Asians should 
be trained by the YMCA and sympathetic to it, creating a trans-
national network. In the face of growing nationalistic pressure, YMCA 
membership proved to be as insufficient as amateur sports ideals such 
as internationalism and egalitarianism in convincing enough Asians 
to potentially risk their (often political) careers (or even lives) to keep 
the Games in their current shape, with both Japan and Guomindang-
China as members. One has to assume that without the missionary 
zeal of American YMCA officials, which was based on civilizational 
criteria and not foreign policy aims, the Games would not have been 
founded and would have lost either Japan or China as a member even 
sooner had the Americans withdrawn earlier.
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The Western neoliberal formula of civilization and progress is rooted 
in Social Darwinism with its rugged individualism, self-centeredness, 
cut-throat competition, and survival of the strongest—that is, the 
“natural” or “divinely ordained” right to dominate the lesser people 
and nations. American neoliberal capitalism rests on the belief that 
the state should play a minimal role in the economy, that unlimited 
inequality in wealth and power is natural and good, and that pros-
perity of the “masses” is achieved by the trickle down effects 
(Dimitri Mikheyev, BRICS and US models: “Beijing Consensus” 
and “Washington Consensus,” The Voice of Russia, http://english.
ruvr.ru/2013_04_02/BRICS-and-US-models-Beijing-Consensus-and-
Washington-Consensus/).
 A historical perspective must take into consideration the fact 
that in the thirteenth century the theological code played the role 
that today is attributed to sociological or economic codes. The dif-
ference among the frames of reference in terms of which a society 
organizes its actions and thoughts cannot be held as insignificant. 
Reducing one to the other would mean that the very labor of his-
tory is denied (Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, 82).
If truth is essentially undecidable from the perspective of the situation, 
it is nonetheless through subjective action that a truth can come to 
displace knowledge (Sam Gillespie, “Badiou’s Ethics”, Pli 12 [2001]: 
256–65).
 It is quite likely that Hillary Rodham Clinton, former US Secre-
tary of State and former US senator, will run for the presidency in 
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2016.1 Even now she is outlining policies that will define her presi-
dency; most distinctive of these is the doctrine of women’s social con-
tract and rights of the person. Clinton is a lawyer and an advocate 
of US economic hard power. She is also a long-time player in the 
United Nations’ inspired “international feminism”, and her diplomatic 
style shows a thorough understanding of international laws and diplo-
matic women’s rights agreements, such as the 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), the 2000 Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies and the 
2005 Beijing Platform for Action. In fact, Clinton has become a 
vocal advocate for Chinese women in her exemplary, American-style 
international feminist fashion.
 Clinton draws on a huge body of mass or faux erudition rooted 
in stories about women’s singularity and the power of capitalism to 
emancipate them. In our times this international feminist erudition 
takes generic form as “women’s voices”, that is, allegedly unmediated 
accounts by women whose cultures have victimized them; “country 
reports” indexing degrees of native male misogyny and female poverty; 
“gender mainstreaming” textbooks for teaching abused Asian women 
how to accumulate economic and political rights; the “development” 
of the 1980s and 1990s NGO system for promoting stories about 
abuse and redemption; and “testaments” about women’s liberation 
from putative non-personhood into legal and economic personhood, 
conventionally dated to the 1975 launch of the United Nations’ 
Decade for Women.
 Should Clinton become commander-in-chief, her policy will 
mobilize this popular erudition into US Asia policy, probably with 
specific emphasis on China and Muslim countries. As many have 
noted, the Chinese government’s unhelpful reaction to the 1995 
United Nations NGO Forum set off another round of repetitive, 
familiar stories about Asian women’s degradation.2 In 2011 Secretary 
Clinton made a point of declaring that US Asia policy would hence-
forth include India, and US state policy seems currently rooted in 
Clinton’s 2013 version of this Obama doctrine. “Asia now consists of 
the People’s Republic of China, Asia-Pacific ‘pivot’ countries of East 
Asia, as well as South Asia, India and particularly the nations encir-
cling China—Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, Cambodia 
and Vietnam.3 Particularly if Clinton becomes the US president, uni-
versal women’s rights will be sought and contracts with Asia pursued. 
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The question of political Asianism and its relation to the world’s 
“Asian women” will take on increasing diplomatic urgency, and that is 
why international women’s human rights is more than a simple index 
of platitudes.4
 Clinton’s international feminism forwards core legal doctrines 
about property and investment. It promotes contractual, capital in-
vestment in the world’s poor women and declares one of women’s 
natural rights to be the right to own her body, labour and property.5 
Clinton’s “Remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference 
on Women” in Beijing on 5 September 1995 made explicit this cen-
tral question of value. Since one of the primary differences among 
women is that some women have dollars and others do not, the then 
First Lady announced that the United States would invest in girls’ 
education in Africa, Asia and Latin America (following the missio-
logical Bible map). Investment would involve a compulsory stepping 
forward of women into their social contract and into an understanding 
of their own capital value, value as capital, value as capital owners 
and value as capital-producing entities.
 The backbone of this paper is a concern with faux erudition 
infused in US popular thinking about Asia, capital accumulation, 
natural law and sexuality, natural rights and liberation.6 This kind of 
erudition sustains Clinton’s claims to be historically accurate and the 
belief of many voting citizens in the United States that her position 
is ethically irreproachable. Asianisms, in other words, are historically, 
painstakingly, politically sustained, and it is within our power as 
scholars to refute them.7 This essay accepts the truism that faux 
scholarship has an ambivalent relation to the history project but 
maintains that they are not the same thing. Pretense to learnedness, 
like learnedness itself, has to be open to critique. Faux erudition must 
be illuminated just as charges that President Barak Obama is a non-
citizen and a Muslim are, and as Holocaust deniers are debunked. 
Since these ideas are not—and cannot be—allowed to stand, taking 
missiology and clavellianism deadly seriously will perhaps decrease 
their powers.8
Missiology and Asia
According to the historian Dana Roberts, US Christian missiology—
the theory of mission work and its objectives—was a body of universal 
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knowledge that centred on “Asia”. This Asia consisted of a significant 
swath of heathendom stretching from East, North and Southeast Asia 
to Egypt, Palestine, the Balkans and the residual Ottoman Empire or 
Oriental Middle East but focused on making China American. Asia 
existed in the global context along with heathen Africa, Latin America 
and Canada, which sometimes appears as part of Asia, perhaps because 
the indigenous population had Asian-looking bodies. China-bound 
and China-focused American missionaries usually visited mission sta-
tions in this amorphous, larger Asia or extensively studied them be-
fore going into the field. Although many American missionaries had 
sojourned in British imperial domains, they had come to specialize in 
the United States’ Asia by the late 19th century.9
 US missiology refers to a flourishing, progressively nuanced, 
cumulatively researched, theoretical, empirical, scientific and anthro-
pological body of faux knowledge, theories and objectives aimed at 
Pacific Asia and particularly China, which most considered to be 
the jewel in the crown of the US Christian movement.10 In British 
and US journals such as Torchbearer, Daybreak, The Zenana, India’s 
Women, China’s Daughters and particularly The Heathen Woman’s Friend 
one finds, moreover, an explicitly woman-centred Asian evangelical 
knowledge. The capacity of Christ to lift out of bondage all women 
no matter what their language, caste or creed bound missiology to 
women’s emancipation, for example, choice marriage, literacy and 
hygiene.11
 Beyond British orientalism, US missiology included four elements. 
First, training gave trans-Pacific female missionaries a general institu-
tional, sociological and theoretical grasp of Asian women’s condition.12 
Second, leaving for China service, American missionaries were already 
grounded in information gleaned from reports, letters, books, and 
accounts about Shanghai but also Tokio, Rangoon, Beyroot, Bulgaria, 
Liberia and Turkey, as well as work in Liberia or Canada, and they 
often visited those places, particularly if the final destination was 
China.13 Third, missiology was never isomorphic with nation since 
heathen Asia did not have fixed boundaries. Thus, fourth, while it 
had a fused and systematic intellectual profile, missiology was founda-
tionally and topologically heterogeneous.
 Protestant missiology stated that once freed from heathen sanc-
tions holding them in bondage, a natural, God-given womanhood 
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would replace customary degradation. Protestant missionaries estab-
lished a template to achieve this end, mounting transformative insti-
tutions, such as orphanages, day schools, boarding schools, etc., in 
Hawaii, Shanghai and Lucknow, Hiroshima and Beirut, Chiang Mai 
and Rangoon. In the process women emerged as the full measure or 
integer of God’s work in Asia.
Women in Asia
When Miss Laura Askew Haygood set off from San Francisco Bay 
on 18 October 1884, on the steamship City of Pekin headed for 
Yokohama and then Shanghai (where she became co-founder with the 
Rev. Young John Allen of the McTyeire Home and School for girls), 
she already knew Asia.14 As they struggled to acquire foreign language 
competency, missionaries read reports about their “field” larded with 
learned citations from pioneer Sinologists or Japanologists such as 
Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803–51) and Justus Doolittle (1824–
1910). The Heathen Woman’s Friend and other media distributed 
information globally to missionaries and the hundreds of thousands 
of women and men in the United States who financed them.15
 Earlier in the 19th century, American Protestant missionaries had 
worked under the umbrella of the British holdings, India, Burma, 
Ceylon and the Ottoman empire, in the evangelical style the British 
initiated in the 1790s. By the mid-19th century, however, as US 
regional ambitions and pretensions escalated, US Protestant outreach 
set off from Canada and other North American targets in the Pacific 
basin, consolidating first in the Hawaiian Islands and then moving 
into what Mrs Edith Moses in 1900 on her arrival into Manila Bay 
would call “Oriental America”.16 Following the Taiping Revolution, 
the “Far East” came to dominate missionary thinking. And as US 
Protestant mission projects settled into the Far East as their field, 
a “gender-based missiology” moved from a peripheral to a central 
strategy and practice.17
 Single women missionaries gravitated to the centre of imperial 
US catchment areas, a singular drama of the 1870s and subsequent 
missiology. Women were allowed to answer the Almighty’s Call 
instead of being barred from service, and as women they were said to 
know more about Oriental women’s degradation than men did and 
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provided access to heathen families. Women missionaries argued that 
studying Asian, Eastern or Oriental women readied them to serve, 
and so did subsequent missionaries looking from the vantage point 
of the early 20th century. Indeed, Mrs Helen Barrett Montgomery’s 
influential Western Women in Eastern Lands: An Outline of Fifty Years 
of Woman’s Work in Foreign Missions (1910) dated the initiation of the 
US women’s missionary movement from 1835, not the more conven-
tional date of 1861.18 In 1835, the China-based American missionary 
David Abeel transited London and “was invited to address a little 
company of ladies gathered in a private drawing-room” in what be-
came in Montgomery’s view “perhaps the most important afternoon 
tea in history”:
The helplessness and misery of the women of the Orient had pro-
foundly touched him, and he had seen also the hopelessness of at-
tempting to dislodge heathenism while its main citadel, “the home,” 
was unreached, and unreachable by the agencies then employed .… he 
had come to hold the then revolutionary doctrine that it was abso-
lutely necessary to bring into the field unmarried women to reach 
and teach the women and children.19
On the strength of Abeel’s firsthand account, the British women at 
the tea established the Society for Promoting Female Education in 
the East. They vowed to send unmarried, educated evangelical women 
to proselytize in China, South India, Ceylon, North India, Palestine, 
Persia, South Africa and Japan—the area that constituted “Asia” in 
their minds at that time. Describing the event in her 1898 volume 
Eminent Missionary Women, the American erudite Mrs Gracey offered 
an explanation for why it took so long to establish an analogous US 
female missionary force even though the initiative was American from 
the start. “Sufficient knowledge of the condition of Eastern women,” 
she wrote, “had not reached the Christian women of America for 
them to have their hearts touched and aroused to action.” 20
 American women missionaries had to learn about Asian women 
first, and when that goal was met, US strategy placed woman-to-
woman transition at missiology’s centre. Gracey wrote a history of 
woman-to-woman erudition starting with Mary Lyon, pioneer of US 
woman-based missiology and founder of Mount Holyoke Seminary. 
Holyoke was a clearing house for “the constant communication kept 
up with those who had gone from the school to missionary labor” in 
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the form of the “electric chain” of letters from “the wilds of America, 
the islands of the sea, from Persia, India, China, Africa”.21 Gracey 
introduced the Mount Holyoke-trained scholar Fidelia Fisk, the first 
unmarried missionary to work in Persia; the learned Ann Wilkins, 
who devoted her life to Liberia; Miss Rankin, who, while not herself 
an Asianist, held wide appeal to budding missionaries to Asia and 
whose Twenty Years among the Mexicans Gracey pronounced to be 
“a thrilling missionary story” by a woman with “unlimited faith in 
woman and in her power to bring this to pass”.22 Miss Aldersey, pio-
neer to Java, China and Australia (a country that even today struggles 
with its Asianness) studied Asian languages before she left for the 
field.23 Miss Beaulah Woolston had been a linguist and Latin and 
Greek teacher.24 Gracey brought women readers into this magic circle.
“Asia”, a Field of Erudition: Amanda Smith, 
Mrs Ahok, Laura Askew Haygood
Amanda Smith, Laura Askew Haygood and Mrs Ahok each defy easy 
analysis. Together they illustrate that the logic of missiology reached 
beyond race, class or personal circumstances: erudition was not iso-
morphic with racial identity, in other words. Amanda Smith, a holi-
ness preacher in her time, wrote The Story of the Lord’s Dealings with 
Mrs. Amanda Smith, the Colored Evangelist.25 Born a slave in 1837, 
she recounts in her autobiography the tale of her family’s struggle to 
purchase one another, their flight to the North, and the events that 
led Smith in 1856 to be converted to John Inskip’s Holiness Move-
ment, a sect of Methodism. Smith travelled the world from 1870 to 
1910, testifying to white US audiences, racially mixed congregations 
of Holiness Christians all over South Asia, and blacks and whites 
in Liberia, where she worked eight years.26 Adrienne M. Israel’s bio-
graphy stresses Smith’s successes in the US and British Isles with pro-
gressive, integrationist, anti-racist preachers of various ethnicities, races 
and national backgrounds.
 Smith’s job was to send information about Burma, India, the 
United States and Britain through the “electric chain” to other Chris-
tians. She encountered Europe, Asia and Africa with fully formed 
structures of perception, enlivening her Biblically inspired descriptions 
of the old British Orient, Alexandria, sailing on the River Nile, iti-
nerating in Burma and India with learned reflection. Highly sensitive 
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to colonial race politics, she presented her blackness in the following 
way: “And out of all the world round,” she wrote, “it pleased God to 
bestow this great honor” of Moses “on the black race, which ought 
to be held in everlasting remembrance.” She added, “I prefer being 
black, if for no other reason than to share this great honor with my 
race.” 27 Yet Smith’s description of the bloodstained “great juggernaut 
car, so well known in the history of sacrifices in India, whose wheels 
have crushed so many infants at the hands of their poor mothers”, 
was as persistent a scholarly trope of India as bound feet and female 
infanticide in China. Smith’s perceptions of native heathen customs 
in Burma and India were as clichéd, familiar, comfortable and repeti-
tious as those of any white, middle-class contemporary.28
 The Han China missionary Mrs Ahok is a second example of 
religious missionaries’ voluminous knowledge.29 Mrs Ahok was alleged 
to be the first Chinese woman visitor to Europe (a highly suspect 
claim). It is not so much the pathos of Mrs Ahok’s genuinely tragic 
life, but rather that the native informancy, which structured her per-
formances in London, included vast amounts of information about 
the missiological category of Asian women. Mrs Ahok already knew 
what there was to know about the conditions of women in India 
and so could testify to the degradation of her own kind. She told 
the supportive Christian ladies in London, where she came to raise 
funds and to help recruit women into the China field, that there was 
no need for her to convey details of “the cruel custom of binding 
women’s feet” since “you have heard what is done in India and, as 
far as I can tell, the women [there] are treated much the same [as we 
in China are] [emphasis added]”. What Mrs Ahok “knew” was the 
suffering heathenism inflicted on women in a region India’s women 
called “Australasia”.30 The essay suggests that Australia was included 
in Asia, possibly because missionaries classified as “Asian” Maori, 
Hawaiians and First Nations peoples from the Americas. The reports 
on Mrs Ahok in the journal pose versions of the same preoccupation: 
“How could we raise the women of India, Ceylon, and China to 
their rightful dignity?” The conversion narrative of Mrs Ahok pro-
vided the answer.31
 Laura Askew Haygood is a third example of the pervasive shaping 
power of missiological knowledge. The daughter of a slave-holding 
minister’s family, educated at Wesleyan College, Haygood spent her 
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early adulthood as a teacher, administrator and Mission Board offi-
cial.32 She had a long-term interest in China, which the Sinologist 
Young John Allen had cultivated in her. She went to Shanghai ex-
pressly to work with Allen and establish a model day school for 
Chinese girls and women, McTyeire Home and School; her bio-
graphers wrote extensively about her advertising strategies and fund-
raising, as well as the joint stock company she established to finance 
the purchase of land and property.33 Haygood’s general observations 
are bookish and missiologically structured.34
 Mrs Ahok, Smith and Haygood shared the same set of presuppo-
sitions about Asian women’s conditions, which each woman’s work 
expressed differently. Their common conjecture held that Protestant 
Christianity, usually Methodism, held the key to resolving oppression 
just as it had alleviated the suffering of slaves in the United States, 
the wives of “Mohammedans” and all the other zenanas 35 or secluded 
women, as they were known, of the British Orient. This rhetoric 
helped women at home to contribute to the cause. Haygood spoke 
eloquently about missiology’s intellectual presuppositions, though like 
most missionary women she did not write in a sustained analytic 
mode. Male figures who did, established general systems to stabilize 
renewable social outreach institutions.
Knowledge and Missiology
When Mrs. Gracey raised the question of the “sufficiency” of knowl-
edge about heathen women’s conditions as a factor in recruiting, she 
was pointing out that erudition about Asia was cumulative. Late 19th 
century American women’s missiological strategies rested on a massive 
volume of knowledge gathering, citations, and normative studies of 
the East collected earlier in the 19th century, such as David Abeel’s 
Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighboring Countries from 
1829 to 1833. Abeel, the first to advocate for unmarried women mis-
sionaries in the Asia field, wrote extensively and systematically about 
the abomination of infanticide: the method of killing, the ratio of 
infants allegedly permitted to live, the allegation that infanticide led 
to the assassination of elderly parents.36
 A more sophisticated work of Asianist erudition is the missionary 
and missiologist Howard Malcolm’s 1839 two-volume Travels in South-
eastern Asia.37 Malcolm truly marks the beginning of a transition from 
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British colonialism to what emerged after the 1860s as the US colo-
nial project in Asia.38 Because US missiology focused on Asia, the 
region—no matter how defined (that is, it only indirectly targeted 
the British empire and Latin America)—and because of the tenor of 
the emerging US empire, Malcolm’s field reports were rooted in the 
political economy of commercial capitalism.39 He wrote extensively 
on how to finance religious printing offices, steam paper mills and 
durable typesetting. These schemes included accumulating mission 
property and selling coupons to shareholders. In fact, Travels is a brief 
for investing Christian capital into China-oriented projects in antici-
pation of China’s “opening”. Malcolm wrote about “taking” China 
circuitously by a strategy of evangelizing overseas Chinese throughout 
the Pacific Asia region. He arrived in China after extensive field 
studies at mission stations in India, Burma, Singapore and Malaysia, 
ready to maximize his own China initiatives. He wrote about the 
terrain and the languages of the peoples living where he hoped to 
displace local customs.40
 There are several implicit measures at work in Travels in South-
eastern Asia. One is that for Malcolm, region and civilization were 
co-terminus.41 Another measure concerned China’s relative economic 
power in the Chinese-dominated Asian regional political economy. 
Malcolm’s preoccupation with China and its diaspora rested in part 
on developed international political economy.42 The third was the 
Roman alphabet. To Malcolm in the 1830s and Smith in the 1880s, 
mission work was Bible-centred. That meant either teaching English 
or translating the Bible into local languages. Malcolm argued that 
transliterating heterogeneous Asian languages was cost effective, and 
he rationalized his position in several ways.43 Chinese script, ancient 
and even beautiful, was a barrier to women’s uplift and “knowledge of 
the proper attributes of Deity”.44 He truly believed that the Roman 
script was universal.45
 Because the Bible addressed women, the effect of Malcolm’s re-
gionally based Asia strategies was to set missiology onto a path depen-
dent on Asian women. In the 1830s and 1840s male Christians like 
Gutzlaff, Abeel and Malcolm and early American female Asia evange-
lists like Henrietta Shuck (Hong Kong), Sarah Smith (Japan) and Ann 
Judson (Burma) had already noted a characteristically “Asian” style of 
feminine debasement.46 By the 1870s such writing was prodigious; 
Rev. Ross C. Houghton’s 1877 Women of the Orient systematized and 
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made it canonical and universal. Houghton combined citations and 
his own direct observations about Asia (which for him consisted of 
the old Orient of Egypt, Syria, Turkey and India along with the new, 
American, East of Japan and China).
 Women of the Orient systematized a hallmark American mission-
ary slogan: “The Gospel of Jesus is eminently a gospel to woman.” 47 
Houghton created a life cycle grid and filled out stages of Oriental fe-
male degradation placing Asian woman at the centre. “In the Orient,” 
he noted, “a female child may be permitted to live for various rea-
sons, among which are the following, some of which apply more 
particularly to China.” 48 And: “When [Chinese] girls are born and 
permitted to live, it is customary for the fathers almost entirely to 
ignore them.” 49 In sequential chapters titled “Birth”, “Infanticide”, 
“Education”, “Binding the Feet in China”, “Betrothal”, “Marriage in 
Japan”, “Marriage in China”, “Marriage in India” and “Polygamy and 
Divorce”, Houghton made his case that all women in Asia shared de-
graded life cycles because heathen regional practices led to punishing 
social conventions and that his ranking of specific national degradations 
of women in Asia indexed Asian characteristics.
 In 1871 Houghton took part in a debate that the Heathen Woman’s 
Friend had opened over the slogan “Christianity is the woman’s 
Magna Carta”.50 Not all missionaries concurred on the thesis of pan-
Asian degradation, so the debate is actually refreshingly agonistic.51 
It also focused not on the bodies but on the souls of Chinese women. 
Rev. H. Mansell took the position that the missiological theses on 
degradation had to be about souls. From India, he wrote:
I belong to that class of ardent ones, who look upon the condition 
of any heathen or idolatrous people as intensely bad in every respect, 
and I try with all my power to better it; and yet I must confess that 
those who take a more favorable view are usually those who have 
investigated the subject very well, and if we discard their writings 
we will often lose valuable information .… Read all you can, then, 
and form your judgments from the whole. The women of India 
cannot be as happy as those of America.52
In November 1871 Mrs. Rev. H.N. Lowry in “A Word From Peking” 
argued the familiar thesis that illiteracy, ignorance and polygamy made 
it impossible for Chinese women to be elevated “from heathenism 
and slavery to the position of a human being”.53 Nonetheless, in the 
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same issue Rev. J.M. Thoburn cautioned enthusiasts to rest their case 
on evidence. Horrible stories were circulating “which are true, without 
being truthful”.54
 The epistemic question of what exactly degradation meant was 
problematic and reappears in altered form in James Clavell’s vision 
of Asia, which rebukes the missiological position and argues that 
Asian women in social evolution play a significant but secondary and 
natural role in the evolution of capitalism. Asian women are happy 
because they understand their sexual needs and their secondariness 
(see Part 2). But for the Rev. J.W. Waugh in the March 1872 issue 
of Heathen Woman’s Friend, it was a libel and perhaps blasphemous 
to claim that heathen parents discounted their children. Like all of 
God’s children “they do obey our common nature’s behest”. It was 
not true that “heathen parents do not love their children, both 
male and female”.55 But even the natural love of Hindu parents 
for their children did not ameliorate the fact of “horrid, corrupting 
heathenism”. In other words, epistemically speaking all humanity had 
the same claim on basic altruism towards offspring because the 
Almighty had made us filial. In the various vernacular societies of 
Asia, however, heathen “steps inhere at the very threshold of a new 
life, and so warps and distorts the view of these loving parents”. The 
high rates of female infanticide could not be attributed to physical 
want but were the effects of religious oppression.
 What is to be drawn from the growth over a century of missio-
logical knowledge? First, as scholars have argued for two decades now, 
these catalogues of abuses were not groundless. Foot binding, female 
infanticide, widow sacrifice and so on imposed forms of brutality 
on elite women in societies where missionaries undertook conversion 
projects. Second, if the word “culture” is substituted for “religion” in 
the debate over the causes of Asian women’s degradation a century 
later, debates on women’s international human rights raise similar 
questions and struggle with the problem of happiness, too, the ques-
tion being how women can be happy if they do not have their 
human rights.
 Third, foundational Christian missiology delivered the argument 
that not just Asian but all women deserved better. This is a point made 
in Coffin’s Our New War Round the World. “One of the glories of the 
Christian religion,” he wrote, is “that it elevates woman; and one of 
the brightest features of the time, that men are coming into clearer 
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perceptions of the claims of the female sex.” 56 Coffin was convinced 
that a wave of progress would roll across the Pacific to Asia from the 
good men in the United States and Britain and their good example. 
But even if the situation on Coffin’s side of the Pacific was actually 
bleaker than he let on, the merits of his position are clear. His 
measure held up and was equally efficacious no matter where the 
claim to female elevation might be made. Christian missiology, devel-
oped in Asia to fight specific Asian abuses of women, had incubated 
modern female uplift as a universal claim.
 This discussion of missiological erudition points to several further 
generalities. Active missionary women and men criss-crossed the world 
learning and creating knowledge about a place they called Asia. In 
the end the wholesale or systematic quality of heathen Asian women’s 
degradation—as opposed to theories about their physical discomfort—
is the common denominator marking Asia as a distinctive place. 
Literacy projects for female conversion linked Romanization projects 
to women’s natural rights in the belief that access to the Christian 
Bible would save Asian women (just as later, under Ford Foundation 
auspices, Our Bodies Our Selves would be translated and published in 
Chinese to save Chinese women’s ownership of their own bodies).57
Clavell and Capital Accumulation
[I]n 1978 [Newt] Gingrich [Speaker of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives] was reading the novel “Shōgun,” by James Clavell and …
a major character—Toranaga, a seventeenth-century samurai warlord
— had a powerful influence on him. Daryl Conner, too, told me that 
Toranaga was a critical model for Gingrich.
 “Newt said, ‘Toranaga, I think is the perfect example of a leader
— you should read it,’” [Carlyle] Gregory said. “The way Toranaga 
used people and manipulated events and built a mythology about 
himself—I think that had a lot to do with how Newt saw himself.” 58
Clavellian erudition mapped Cold War Asia in the “male interest 
fiction” of the 1980s and reflected and shaped American historians, 
political scientists and politicians because it celebrated a global telos 
of capital accumulation. Male interest fiction was an industry-wide 
category for generic fiction in the last decades of the 20th century.59 
Gingrich was by no means the only Toranaga groupie in politics, and 
Clavell was not the only writer of male interest fiction. Tom Clancy, 
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who wrote the thriller series The Hunt for Red October (1984), Red 
Storm Rising (1986) and The Cardinal of the Kremlin (1988), was also 
favoured among American policy experts of the time. During the 
heyday of the Cold War the culture industry pumped out hundreds 
of novels replicating Clavellian stereotypes, logics and presuppositions. 
The major mass market writers Larry Bond, Malcolm Bosse, Clive 
Cussler, Adam Hall, Eric Helm, David Klass, Pamela Longfellow, Tim 
Lukeman, Colin Maxwell, Marc Olden, Barth Sussman, Paul Wilson, 
Eric Van Lustbader and David Wingrove—the list of second- and 
third-tier writers would be endless—produced fiction that recycled 
the Asia that Clavell canonized in the Cold War era.
 A hard right-wing style anarchist realist, who fused together the 
“Objectivist Individualism” of the pseudo-philosopher Ayn Rand 
(1902– 82), the US John Birch Society’s brand of demonic anti-
communism, and William Buckley’s vision of the US class system 
rooted in merit, Clavell narrativized conservative cultural politics, 
laissez-faire economic theory and anti-communism. His pop literary 
Asianism surpassed all competitors and left a persistent record of 
direct and indirect citations in Cold and post-Cold War middle-brow 
fiction, pedagogy, popular film, and from that erudition into main-
stream political and cultural theory.60 Samuel Huntington’s theories 
about culture and civilization are utterly congruent with Clavell’s fic-
tional and political positions.61
 In other words, male interest erudition saturated politics, news 
reporting, TV culture, iconography, advertising and children’s culture 
over the last three decades of the 20th century and propagated a 
mythic cultural erudition about capitalism, culture clashes and evo-
lutionary inevitability.62 Clavell’s Asia Saga (examined below in this 
section) has been recycled, sampled, tasted, cribbed, infantilized and 
mocked.63 The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (1987), Mighty Morphin 
Power Rangers (1993) and Superhuman Samurai Syber-Squad (1994) 
are television series for children that rip off Clavell’s cultural essen-
tialism and have captivated generations. A charming 2006 satire of the 
classic Clavellian-Lustbader ninja fighter story Wendy Wu, Homecoming 
Warrior generically fuses Buffy the Teenager Vampire Slayer and Jackie 
Chan-style comedic martial arts to a plot set in a Valley Girl high 
school screenplay about a Clavellian multigenerational saga regarding 
Chinese and Chinese American identities and a hero’s rediscovery of 
the real “Chinese tradition”.64
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 However infantilized, Clavell is not a laughing matter. Like the 
Biblical presuppositions that guided Asia missiology and its generic 
conventions, Clavell’s erudition has been sufficiently banalized that it 
is unremarkable. It has disappeared like an old stain into the fabric 
of US popular arts. What it leaves behind is consumers’ obsessive 
interest in “Japanese culture” fused with a fear and loathing of the 
Chinese, each articulated and propagated in Clavellian-like narratives 
about the clash of good and evil cultures and the great dynasties that 
govern the political and, more important for the world, the economic 
fate of all Asia. To briefly summarize 10,000 pages of Clavell’s preten-
tious writing is not to anyone’s advantage, but some understanding 
of the core plot of his “The Asia Saga” is because it bears on the 
author’s political claims and their long-lived role in US media.
 Clavell’s “The Asian Saga” consists of the novels King Rat (1962), 
Taipan (1966), Shōgun (1975), Noble House (1981), Whirlwind (1986) 
and Gai-jin (1993). Clavell’s Asia is a map of the international accu-
mulation of capital mediated through cultural differences that are ap-
propriate to a specific stage of global development or “modernization”. 
The novels did not appear in chronological order. However, the plot 
arc focuses on economic imperialism and its positive evolutionary 
role in human history. Thus, for instance, the third and most popular 
novel, Shōgun, discloses a secret history of the English colonial drive 
into Asia, why England defeated the Portuguese, French and Dutch, 
and how it came about that Japan attained European rationality with-
out England having to directly colonize it. (The fabulous “Japan” of 
this novel owed its charisma to Clavell’s ability to spin a great yarn 
but also to the contemporary widespread perception that efficient 
Japanese capitalism was threatening US dominance in the world sys-
tem.) In the novel, the pilot of the fictional ship the Erasmus, John 
Blackthorne, brings into a closed Japanese “feudal” cultural system 
the DNA or seeds of European rationality that will develop an island 
nation into a capitalist powerhouse three centuries later. Blackthorne 
struggles to resolve his Protestant Reformation rationalism with the 
spiritual code of the warrior, or Tokugawa-era samurai. By the end 
of this novel Blackthorne is a bushi (he owns his enemy’s katana or 
long sword, which in endless spin-offs becomes the unsubtle signifier 
of the Japanese phallus) and a foreigner, a European and a Japanese, a 
mathematician and an ethicist, a representative of European rationality 
and an advocate of Asian social superiority, particularly in the area of 
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hygiene, which sets off another endless evocation of Japanese bathing 
rituals that characterize the entire genre of Cold War Asianist writing.
 Taipan, novel number two in the Saga, begins in 1841 with the 
Opium Wars and the European Treaty Port system. It initiates a saga-
long competition between good capital and bad capital in the figures 
of Dirk Struan and Tyler Brock. As the major missiologists had, 
Clavell believed that the centrality of China in world capitalism was 
inevitable. Shōgun delivers the secret history of Japanese cultural pre-
conditions for global capitalism; Taipan relates the secret cultural fac-
tors that awakened China to its capitalist destiny. The novel circles 
around the evolutionary role of the opium trade, which, Clavell 
argues, was a positive event because it introduced the idea of com-
modity exchange to “Chinese culture” although it had a negative 
impact on individual addicts. European and US rationality drive this 
esoteric foundationalism of bio-capital and capital answers to a higher 
authority than missionary notions of liberation, cultural uplift or 
female political emancipation. Dirk Struan and his faithful mistress, 
May-may, perish together in a typhoon, symbolizing the legitimacy of 
Struan’s genetic line and its organic connection to Asia.65 The white 
man is Asia.
 In the Saga’s third major installment, Gai-jin, Clavell discloses 
the true meaning of the 1860 Meiji Restoration, which in his vision 
organically restructured the region of Asia, enabling white men, 
mixed-race men, and the latter’s Asian wives and consorts to quickly 
reconsolidate global capital. Toranaga Yoshi, a scion of the original 
shōgun, fights historical inevitability. Despite Yoshi’s agonistic strug-
gles, the shōgunate must fall in order that Japanese capital accumula-
tion can accelerate and the island state can aggressively modernize, or 
become what historians call an empire, an imperialist power. Despite 
readers’ by this time engrained love for martial Japanese values, the 
1862 Satsuma Rebellion and the subsequent Meiji Reform era abolish 
samurai-dom, and the Clavellian regional link between “Japan” and 
“China” and “Hong Kong” is fully established. (Hong Kong was 
Clavell’s ideal culture forged of Chinese respect for family, Japanese 
zen compliance with the wa [being] of existentialism, and Anglo 
democratic, individualistic, laissez-faire values forged into one new 
stage of capital accumulation.) This historical period posits evolution 
of the four key Asia family lines or dynasties.
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 The 1963 setting for Noble House introduces the major taipan 
Ian Dunross and pits the good capitalist model against the chaotic 
trading company Rothwell-Gornt and its anti-hero, a scion of the 
Brock-Gornt lineage. The Straun dynasty is rule-governed, sensitive 
to injustice, ethical when possible, but it confronts a world of mad-
ness; the Brock-Gornt dynasty of lawless capitalists, criminal gangs, 
Cold War espionage unrelated to capital accumulation, as well as 
weaknesses, open an Asian-based firm to possible hostile US-based 
corporate takeover. Titanic struggles (struggles in this genre are never 
less than titanic) unfold whenever Dunross must reassert the positive, 
Asia-based, progressive, redemptive corporate forms of giant capital. 
So the final volume, Whirlwind, takes the Straun dynasty from “East 
Asia” to the old Ottoman empire, the “Middle East” and the 1979 
Iranian Revolution. Like Michael Corleone in the 1972 movie The 
Godfather, seeking legitimacy for his mass of capital, taipan Dunross 
dispatches a Straun consigliore, Andrew Gavallan (who has roots in 
the Chinese Wu family) to establish a real estate empire in the North 
Sea and integrate the family business into the emergent oil industry 
and its technology sector, never to sell opium again.
 Clavell’s history of global capital accumulation cemented the 
notion of thick and impenetrable Asian “culture” in the immediate 
post-Pacific War era popular imagination. Commentators have dis-
cussed Clavell’s auto-didacticism and the alleged historical roots of 
his literary imagination. A branch of popular erudition tracks how 
the characters in the Saga are “real people” and the works possess real 
documentary basis, as demonstrated below. Clavell himself loved to 
tease about the line he blurred between history and fiction. In Gai-jin 
he states explicitly that his novel “is not history but fiction” and yet 
it might just be more real because works of history “do not neces-
sarily always relate what truly happened ” and consequently that he 
has “played with history—the where and how and who and why and 
when of it—to suit my own reality and, perhaps, to tell the real history 
of what came to pass”.66
 Periodization of the desire and logic of capital underlie Clavell’s 
taunting claim to be writing realer history than the historians, the 
history in “history” or secret history. Like the missiologists whom he 
loathed, Clavell’s historical stake was his claim to be demonstrating 
universality—the evolutionary power of capital accumulation—
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working its way through the particularist diversity of cultures. His 
work is powerful because by this logic he seized the historian’s prero-
gative of periodization and dramatized specific historical moments. 
His teleology fictionalizes European capital expansionism over a 
longue durée, and it alleges that heroic white men and natural Asian 
women seeded Asia with their multiracial sons and planted the logic 
of capital in the Orient. The real story of what came to pass is not 
about the facticity of the historical company Jardine Matheson, but 
rather an allegedly deeper story of how “great houses”, noble and 
ignoble, accumulated great fortunes and engaged in great commercial 
development of the hinterlands, also known to professional historians 
as the colonies. According to Clavellian-style Asianism, the historical 
truth lies in the allegation that robber barons and their compradors 
invented Asian capitalism and that only a politically correct storyteller 
can teach it right.
 Clavell directly inverts missiology in his thesis that only Asian 
women truly understand the biological imperative connecting pro-
creation and capital accumulation. Men must seek fertile women 
throughout life, and natural women seek behind the scenes power 
once their sexual attractiveness disappears. The men of the Straun, 
Chen, Toranaga and Brock families intermarry and produce sons who 
form open marriages with stalwart power-seeking women such as the 
Struan concubine May-may, Tess Brock and the unforgettable Mariko, 
who sacrifices her life to Blackthorne and Toranaga, thus setting off 
an unspeakable frenzy of dagger-plunging female suicides in this 
genre. Clavellian women are never blighted souls or degraded bodies 
awaiting redemption in Christ, but natural, biological companions to 
the white man’s drive for a world historical outpost in Asia.
 Clavell’s bio-capitalist “spirit of world history” is most clearly 
stated in his first novel, King Rat, which he wrote at the height 
of the Cold War hostilities in 1962, just after completing his 1958 
metaphysical movie, The Fly.67 King Rat takes place in the historical 
Japanese army prison Changi, located in occupied Singapore, where 
Clavell claimed to have briefly been a POW. Changi is said to be 
a “genesis, the place of beginning again” (8). Although critics have 
pointed out that Clavell did not get any of the facts right, in a lit-
erary sense the novel’s ahistoricity reinforces the views that forward the 
origin story for his Saga.
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 King Rat is Hobbesian in two foundational ways. First, it pro-
motes Hobbes’ version of the authoritarian social contract, which 
compels citizens to obey the sovereign in order to avoid the state of 
nature. Clavellian supermen bend lesser people and societies to their 
will for that charitable reason. Second, Hobbes’ natural philosophy 
underwrites Clavell’s interest in business competition and ethico-
naturalist activities that turn capitalist values into evolutionary ones, 
remaking the state of nature in emphatic value-making activities.68 
Clavell’s point is that capitalism is what keeps the state of nature 
at bay.69
 Pop Hobbesianism provided Clavell a remarkable philosophic 
agon. King Rat promotes an ethics and an erotics of submission, 
which Clavell eventually mutated into his enormously attractive libid-
inous “bushido ethos”. He devised a magical value system he called 
“Japanese culture” or Asian culture, and he used the derivative ideas 
to characterize political authority and taipans who became modern 
shōguns, and Chinese compradors (e.g., the Eurasian Chen family) 
and bandits, who all compelled submission from inferiors to save 
ordinary people from scarcity, brutality, abuse of power and rape. 
The agon of “Japanese culture”, which Clavell suggests was Asia-wide, 
was that shōguns could not become capitalists on their own because 
Japanese and Asian values required leavening from “the West”. Sub-
mitting to a white, “Chinese”, Japanese-style, authoritarian taipan, for 
instance, was the best possible choice for all inferior peoples during 
the Cold War because all other alternatives, some obviously more 
equitable, would be less effective against counter-evolutionary Com-
munist dictators.
 King Rat lays out this logic efficiently. At Changi the Japanese 
guards are “child-like” figures who accidently engage in violence as 
boys might haphazardly kill a kitten. The difference between the 
Japanese guards and the white POWs is that the prisoners concur on 
a sovereign by virtue of “the true doctrine of the Lawes of Nature”, 
which are “the true Morall philosophie”, and live by its rules. The 
natural moral philosophy compels citizen-POWs to accept the au-
thority of the American called the “King” because he is a ruthless 
genius and magically accumulates capital wherever he lands. Among 
the prisoners he is always the most fit, clean, life affirming and opti-
mistic. He is preeminent because he keeps himself, his friends and 
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his subordinates alive by turning a profit and running schemes that 
benefit every POW in the camp. These include Philip Marlowe, 
a British officer who comes to understand why the King is so impor-
tant to the survival of all. The King can afford every commodity—
meat, eggs, cigarettes, medicine, watches, entertainment, women—
available in the bare life of camp society; his plenty is presented as 
unfair only in the sense that Natural Law is itself unjust.
 The King is an absolute hierarch by two rationales. First, some 
men are born more talented at wealth making than others. Clavell 
detests the British class system and its penchant for putting untalented 
or unsuitable men in positions of command. He offers the example 
of the US character type, the King, who gives everyone around him 
the chance to play the capitalist game by franchising his operations 
and cutting in everyone who wants wealth, so there are never pure 
losers or winners (except himself ) in economic exchanges. The King’s 
instinctive drive is to make material life better for all at the expense 
of some. In the pure market society of Changi prison, capitalism 
brings together heroic men to befriend one another and lesser men 
to serve them. So, second, the King is an absolutist capitalist because 
he rules over a capitalist system that is essentially generous and life 
affirming. Not “fair”, it does not seek to enlighten, convert, reform 
or salvage humans. Natural law trumps religion.
 The King turns everything into a commodity. Learning native 
techniques, he cures tobacco; and once he has franchised out his tech-
nique, he undercuts pricing in the prison market that he has created 
to neutralize his own franchisees so he can reinvest his capital in a 
new venture. The King sees potential everywhere. He single-handedly 
runs the black market in watches, cigarette lighters and, of course, 
rats. Defending his meat racket, he notes that since rats are “scaven-
gers, like microbes”, without them “the whole world’d be a stink-pile” 
(98). It takes a capitalist to create value out of nature’s raw materials. 
As Clavell puts it: “We got one rat. … All we’ve got to do is find 
out if it’s a male or a female. Then we get the opposite one. We put 
them together. Presto, we’re in business” (99–100). Under the King, 
the original rats—Adam and Eve—transform a hellish prison camp 
into capitalist heaven stocked with the processed commodities that 
nature’s abundance offers. The King gives his citizens a good life and 
social capital.
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 This is the heart of Clavell’s vision, and he closes the novel with 
a meditation on the laws of nature. When V-J day arrives, the men 
are liberated. They leave and return to their various national cultures, 
stupid social inequality in inherited class society in the post-war eco-
nomic order. They leave the state of nature to the rats; the spooky 
italics appear in the original text:
And the rats.
 They were still there. Beneath the hut. And many had died, for they 
had been forgotten by their captors. But the strongest were still alive.
 Adam was tearing at the wire to get at the food outside his cage, 
fighting the wire as he had been fighting it for so long as he had been 
within the cage. And his patience was rewarded. … Eve joined him and 
he had his fill of her and she of him and then they forged in consort. 
Later the whole side of a trench collapsed, and many cages were opened 
and the living fed on the dead, and the living-weak became food for 
the living-strong until the survivors were equally strong. And then they 
fought among themselves and foraged.
 And Adam ruled, for he was the King. Until the day his will to be 
King deserted him. Then he died, food for a stronger. And the strongest 
was always the King, not by strength alone, but King by cunning and 
luck and strength together. Among the rats (352).
“Among the rats” is to say not among the humans. Humans do not 
exist exclusively in the spiral of natural selection. Humans are value-
producing mammals that rely on culture and industry to evolve. A rat 
natural law is a contradiction in terms, for rat procreation is nothing 
more than a state of nature. Only humans, among the mammals, 
translate desire into capital accumulation. Biology reinforces society, 
but human desire prompts competition; the sovereign authority must 
stabilize social relations in service to accumulation. This is Clavell’s 
secret core of history’s truth.
Erudition
The paradox of potboilers or blockbusters is that while they cement 
key concepts they are exempted from criticism. Just as Christian lit-
eracy was unremarkable in 19th century missiology, knowledge about 
US Asia remains just “known”. On a Wednesday evening, 15 March 
1996, the radio talk show “Fresh Air” was on and Marty Moss-Coane 
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was interviewing the China specialist Orville Schell about his latest 
book. Moss-Coane opened with the question of why American citi-
zens always got bilked by Chinese in political and trade negotiations. 
American citizens rely on notions of fair play, Schell declared, whereas 
the Chinese, steeped in Sun Tzu’s infamous 36 strategies—the touch-
stone of Chinese thinking for thousands upon thousands of years—
play for keeps and therefore resort to pretence—pretending to be a 
friend, for instance—to achieve their goals. Schell’s reference to Sun 
Tzu is a ripe bit of Clavellian knowledge, and in fact Clavell even 
polished a translation of the piece as part of propagating the idea 
that Chinese have the cultural skill to deceive because they cut their 
teeth on Sun Tzu. The “expert” Schell was cavalierly applying national 
characteristics to China that had only recently been systematically at-
tributed to Japan. He was nominating China to replace Japan as the 
United States’ scariest and most treacherously “cultural” trade partner. 
And most remarkable of all, with casual and authoritative chauvinism, 
Schell transmitted to listeners the oldest clichés in the world of mass 
market, male-oriented, popular Asia fiction, as scholarship.70
 This is not surprising because Clavell’s 1975 Shōgun had spawned 
a pop-“scholarly” interpretive industry, and five years later—in 1980
— a 12-hour Shōgun TV series, projecting “an image of quality pro-
gramming for television”, screened on NBC. This 1980 media event 
included publications explaining Clavell’s erudition and showing how, 
as Henry Smith put it, one could “learn from Shōgun”.71 Pedagogic 
aids included Michael Macintyre’s The Shōgun Inheritance: Japan and 
the Legacy of the Samurai; Henry Smith’s edited volume Learning from 
Shōgun: Japanese History and Western Fantasy; and the Stanford Uni-
versity guide—part of a series titled “Teaching Japan in the Schools”
— Shōgun: A Guide for Classroom Use. Delta Books put out a fan 
book called The Making of James Clavell’s Shōgun with pictures, har-
rowing production stories and cultural tidbits. Even now, intricate, 
footnoted online fan sites exist about the major families and charac-
ters in the Clavell Saga along with more current Reader’s Guides, 
which cycle the same interpretive frameworks and reference points 
over and over. There is even a commentary, as when Gina Macdonald 
writes knowingly about the “masterful control of perceptions” in the 
“gripping portrait of gradual acculturation” in Shōgun’s “sophistication 
about the clash of cultures”, which has “much to teach modern 
readers”, during the Cold War.72
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 So what were contemporary readers supposed to learn from 
Clavell’s erudition? The Japan historian Henry Smith observed that 
readers were getting a “popular-cultural version of Harvard sociologist 
Ezra Vogel’s controversial Japan as Number One (1979), which pro-
poses that America has much to learn from Japan in terms of social, 
political, and economic institutions”. The TV series had actually 
quashed Smith’s expectations, he wrote in his Postscript. Unlike the 
novel’s charming story of mutual understanding, where Americans 
are instructed to learn Japanese ways because they are superior, Smith 
claimed that the “theme of ‘learning from Japan,’ which we considered 
so fundamental to the novel”, had been reversed and Blackthorne 
became instead “an aloof victim of Japanese aggression” who was a 
samurai by adhering to his “Western values”.73 Co-contributors to the 
Smith manual mostly corrected minor concerns, such as there were 
actually six earlier versions of the Will Adams story; James Clavell 
did not spend any time in Asia during his childhood; the romance 
with Japan was an inexplicable conversion narrative; and Japanese 
“tradition” had been invented many times before Clavell.
 Shōgun: A Guide for Classroom Use was even more eager to illus-
trate how much history could be extracted from the novel and TV 
series. The Japan historian Peter Duus endorsed the Guide and justi-
fied the novel and TV series on the grounds that despite superficial 
errors—using “banzai” is anachronistic, and a samurai does not “cock” 
his sword—Clavell had got the essence of Japan right. More than 
Smith, Duus confirmed the legitimacy of Clavellian logic in two ways. 
First, he noted that in his own historical writing he took positions 
similar to Clavell’s on questions of culture, barbarity and “continuities 
within change”. They shared, he wrote, a belief in Japan’s singularly 
thick culture, an essence that had stewed in the 300-year-old Petri 
dish of cultural isolation yielding a cultural Galapagos Island. So 
while “values and social attitudes undergo transformation over time … 
a cultural essence persists” (3). Second, Duus endorsed Clavellian 
historiography by agreeing with Clavell’s major claim about global 
capitalist diffusion. Duus drew on Cold War modernization theory 
and endorsed the Blackthorne figure because the “economic and 
cultural impact of Blackthorne and his crew on the Japanese was 
tremendous” (35). As the Guide argued, “trade was a significant 
catalyst for cross-cultural activity” in the 17th century as it is today, 
when the “level of mutual penetration” is vastly larger. The Guide 
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provides a lesson plan, “U.S.-Japan Trade”, which allows American 
schoolchildren to work on geopolitics of trade and engage in role 
playing around questions such as “How might Japan’s dependence 
on trade affect its relations with other nations, especially the United 
States, Germany, fellow Asian countries, and the Middle East?” And 
it provides worksheets so that students can gather “data” about 
Japanese-branded commodities in their own homes.
 Duus wanted “accuracy” in detail. He believed that the historian 
was responsible for correcting errors of fact. That left him free 
to endorse Clavell’s periodization, and particularly to commemorate 
Clavell’s depiction of Japanese culture. On the question “What is 
history?” Clavell and Duus concurred. The modernization narrative 
common to them neglected the history of Japanese territorial expan-
sion, colonization projects, forced industrialization, the War in the 
Pacific, the post-War US occupation, and the political, economic 
symbiosis of Japanese and US Free World Order. Duus never had to 
question his methodological or theoretical assumptions, because histo-
rians and fabulists held them to be self-evident: they reinforced each 
other. “Shōgun brings life to Japanese history in a way no scholarly 
text can” (5) because the novel, the Viewer’s Guide to James Clavell’s 
Shōgun and Duus’s historiography share a pedagogic position.74
 The Viewer’s Guide was adult pedagogy, too. It summarized pre-
vailing academic opinion about cultures and culture shock, appealed 
to expert opinion, and democratically engaged viewers as potential 
erudites. References to scholarship appear in the guide’s copious foot-
notes to Edward T. Hall, Alvin Toffler, Masao Kunshiro, Raymond 
Cormier, Ruth Benedict, Ivan Morris, William Forbis, Hosegawa 
Nyosekan, Edwin O. Reischauer, Robert Bellah, John Whitney Hall, 
Robert Jay Lifton, George Sansom and Paul Varley. In the lesson plan 
NBC and its experts provided for viewers, there are the following 
assurances. First, “Shōgun is a high-class entertainment but it is also 
a journey with ample educational value. This television production 
elicits our involvement and challenges us to become something more 
than passive spectators.” The challenge involves suggestions that 
viewers form Shōgun clubs and read the novel and the supplementary 
text on the making of the TV series.
 Second, ambitious viewing collectivities should engage Shōgun as 
an occasion for informal anthropological fieldwork and make obser-
vations on Japanese life—housing arrangements, eating habits, sexual 
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practices, reactions to death, ways of greeting strangers, bodily adorn-
ment, decorative arts, division of labour, etiquette, folklore, funeral 
rites, gestures, gift-giving rituals, attitudes towards hygiene, language, 
law, status differentiation, etc. The TV program serves as a starting 
point for an extended study of Japanese culture. Bibliographies lead 
to more “information [and] … those who are especially interested in a 
personal experience with Shōgun and Japan may want to keep a diary 
in which they record their feelings, reflections, and insights gained 
from the TV presentation. A diary of this kind can be a vehicle for 
personal growth” (4).
 When adults reviewed Clavell’s work, the same suspension of 
belief usually prevailed. Again unselfconscious pedagogic openness is 
on display, whether the reviewer is Terry Teachout, William Buckley, 
Christopher Lehmann-Haupt or Burton Pollin.75 When Thomas 
Edwards posed the question “Why would anyone, of any age, occu-
pation, or state of culture, want to read such a book?” the rhetorical 
question attacked Clavell’s alleged lack of erudition about Iranian 
politics during the Pahlavi regime and not his super-right-wing poli-
tics, inane plotting and transparently foolish ideas.76
 A knowing handle on global telos of capital accumulation and 
the struggle of great agonistic men to get on the right side of history 
are Clavell’s potboiler, Asianist legacy. The reviews, guides, critiques, 
accounts, wannabe novels, satires, websites have spread this form of 
cultural literacy far and wide. Like a bad love affair, the confusion 
over what Asian culture is and where it ends has not been resolved, 
because criticism cannot call into question the foundational assump-
tions of the 1980s or resolve that the Japan-centred historiography of 
that era resembles in many ways the colonial love that male-identified 
readers felt for that defeated “enemy culture” of Japan. The suturing 
of Japan to Asia has had the effect of presuming thick cultures 
throughout a region that coalesces when a magisterial white man tells 
magical stories about economic DNA, political reason and biological 
regionalization.
✻ ✻ ✻ ✻ ✻
Wendy Wu: Homecoming Warrior (2006) perfectly assembles much of 
the erudition described here. Even Hillary Clinton could not fault 
Wendy’s Buffy the Vampire Slayer-like solidity as a rights-bearing 
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human person, morally intact (even virginal), learning heterosexuality 
and martial arts to protect her own well-being, exercising and eating 
well, and relearning her racial-cultural heritage in order to save 
Chinese culture and also, given her hyphenated position, to globalize 
her country, the United States, that is, extend its cosmopolitan uni-
versality. Wendy’s union with the avatar Shin, the very, very handsome 
real Chinese man from the past (“I’ve been eating mooncakes for 
thousands of years. Let’s go get a cappuccino”), reconciles past and 
present, cultural China and liberated United States, for their destiny 
is to marry and to live a Chinese American life of capital accumula-
tion in a triumphant US paradise. Two years before the 2008 global 
financial crisis, the union of a virile Chinese man and a warrior 
American girl, Adam and Eve, reconciles differences again in family 
formation. Asianism, like Eurocentrism, Americanism and orientalism, 
is shown again to be a warm, cute, descriptive, prescriptive part of 
everyday common sense in Disney World.
 Two objectives have driven this inquiry. First, faux scholarship 
is a palliative: scholars must take responsibility as public intellectuals 
and critically displace these ideas. Second, popular Asianisms’ extra-
ordinary level of detail and the repetition of the same signifiers year 
in and year out (infanticide, polygamy, capital accumulation, bathtubs, 
suicide, bloody juggernauts, femininity based on an acknowledgement 
of its evolutionary secondariness, dagger plunging, heroic fighting 
women, family as corporation, etc.) hammer big, old ideas into a 
sweet familiar banality. Calling attention to the difference between 
erudition and detail, historiography and storytelling, critique and 
ideology helps decelerate the cycle and illuminate Asianisms’ repeti-
tive, ideological operation.
 Walter Benjamin-style immanent critique of writing, attention to 
historical indiscernibility a la Badiou, a caution from De Certeau 
that the project of history must be to show how history’s logic as a 
lived and written experience changes over time, and a detailed archival 
adventure intended to draw attention to the giant archive of US 
Asianisms have laid out one historical pathway. Mass popular under-
standing of natural philosophy and natural law, sexual evolution, 
Christian ethics, and pleasurable storytelling about Asian lives and 
folkways can be connected to histories of many kinds.77 Immanent 
critique usefully clarifies past Asianisms as untenable, or untruthful, 
because their predicate—cultural difference in relation to capitalism—
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is and is not a universal. In liberal political theory, difference instan-
tiates universality because difference is always part of a whole: the 
problem is that the whole is rarely severely examined or questioned. 
“Cultural difference” is, in the end, considered remediable because 
it is a part that has not yet evolved into the whole—for example, 
recognition and authorization of implicit, natural, universal women’s 
human rights, God’s universal soul, and, perhaps most important of 
all, the universal work of capital.78 We can barely discern historical 
givens in our own daily life, as the Badiou position notes, but finding 
out the history of things helps us act when decisions lie within our 
competency.
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Bourne Identity franchise, which Lustbader took over in 2004. The hero, 
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World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), “which divided the 
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 some priest, contacts the airhead American girl Wendy and through many 
plot devices convinces her that she is the reincarnation of a Chinese 
warrior woman and has an ethno-ethical-cultural obligation to save the 
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 marize these plots. Readers knew that Taipan fictionalized two trading 
companies, the Brock lineage representing Butterfield and Swire and 
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Chap5 (99-133).indd   131 10/8/15   11:16:11 AM
132 Tani Barlow
cross-breeding. A scientist creates a way to dematerialize and rematerialize 
matter, but when he transports himself he accidentally fuses with a fly 
trapped in the transporter. The result is two intermingled beings, a fly 
with a human head and a man with a fly head. These ideas about cros-
 sing species show up in Clavell’s dramas of interracial sexuality.
68. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/. Hobbes’ natural ethics 
 closely parallels Clavell’s position.
69. Gina Macdonald, James Clavell: A Critical Companion (New York: Green-
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Stevenson, Rider Haggard and Rudyard Kipling, and the orientalist con-
 ventions of Sir Richard Burton, T.E Lawrence and Lafcadio Hearn.
70. Clavell thought that colonialism was good for China. Much Cold War 
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assumptions, evidence, periodization and ideologies while Clavell has not, 
until now.
71. Louis Allen, “Images of Undivided Souls”, Times Literary Supplement, 30 
Oct. 1981 reviews several of them. Allen quotes Michiko Kaya, director 
of the International Society for Educational Information, as saying, “an 
American University [recently] proposed that Shōgun should be used as 
a basis for a secondary school textbook. In as much as Shōgun is histori-
 cal fiction, as indeed is stated by its author, and in a number of ways 
does not present an accurate picture of Japanese customs, language or 
way of thought even in the feudal age, its widespread use as an educa-
 tional instrument is inadvisable.”
72. Michael Macintyre, The Shōgun Inheritance: Japan and the Legacy of 
the Samurai (New York: A & W Publishers, 1982); Henry Smith, ed., 
Learning from Shōgun: Japanese History and Western Fantasy (New York: 
Japan Society, 1980); Peter Duus et al., eds, Shōgun: A Guide for Class-
 room Use (Stanford: Teaching Japan in the Schools, Stanford University, 
Grant from the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and the Consulate 
 of Japan, 1980).
73. Smith, Learning from Shōgun, p. 19.
74. Frederic and Mary Ann Brussat, directors of the Cultural Information 
Service (CIStems, Inc.), a “nonprofit resource agency and publisher of 
a biweekly magazine on television and the arts/media”, perhaps a CIA 
front group. The development and distribution of this guide was made 
 possible by NBC.
75. http://www.enotes.com/james-clavell-criticism/clavell-james-vol-87; reviews 
by these critics appear in Christopher Giroux, Contemporary Literary 
 Criticism, Volume 87 (Farmington Hills: Cengage Gale, 1995).
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77. Walter Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities”, in Selected Writings, Vol 1: 
 1913–1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings (Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 297–8.
78. In the United States there has been a revival of the Right of Frederic 
Bastiat (1801–50), who belonged to the pre-Austrian School stream of 
French economic theorists, who included Jean-Baptiste Say, Francois 
Quesnay, Charles Comte, Richard Cantillon and Anne-Robert-Jacques 
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Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich August Hayek, Wilhelm Roepke and Lionel 
Robbins. Right-wing think tanks popularize these ideas, just as Clavell 
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“America’s Asia?” Revolution, 
Scholarship and Asian Studies
Fabio Lanza
In 1971 Pantheon Books published America’s Asia, a collection of 
“dissenting essays on Asian-American relationships”.1 Edward Friedman 
and Mark Selden, the two editors, explained the title of the collection: 
“Asia is America’s in three important ways,” they began:
First, it is America’s in the sense that we impose American categories 
to describe, evaluate and direct Asian experience. Our cultural chau-
vinism might mainly provide material for humorous self-analysis 
were it not for the overwhelming explosion of American economic 
and military might throughout Asia. For Asia is America’s in this 
second tragic sense that American power has channeled, distorted, 
and suppressed much that is Asia.2
This was, at the time, a very powerful statement and one that carried 
important implications, especially as it was pronounced within—and 
against—the entire field of Asian studies. America’s Asia was not just 
the result of a conference or of a short-term collaboration among aca-
demics; rather, it was the second volume to appear under the name 
of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), an organi-
zation of graduate students and young professors who had come 
together in 1968, united in their opposition to the Vietnam War and 
US policies in Asia but also to the very structure of their field of 
study.3 The quote above summarizes well the layered and multifaceted 
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criticism waged by the committee at the time. CCAS proclaimed 
its unwavering condemnation of the Indochina War but also of the 
economic and diplomatic strategies of the United States in the entire 
region; Vietnam was just the most extreme example of policies that 
ultimately constituted Asia as an extension of the United States’ stra-
tegic interests. Those policies, CCAS argued, were made possible and 
viable through the collaboration of American scholarship on Asia, 
that is, through the work of their own teachers, who had shaped the 
categories used to distort, obscure and suppress the very humanity 
of Asian people. In articles, conferences and debates,4 the Concerned 
Asian Scholars described how the field—and all area studies—had 
come to be instituted in the immediate post-war period precisely as 
part of a government project, through grants, fellowships and founda-
tions; they traced the legacy of the McCarthy purges, which, they 
argued, had transformed Asian specialists into obedient experts, in-
capable or unwilling to see the moral or political implications of 
their scholarship; finally, they hinted at the mutual imbrication of this 
scholarship with the actual genocide of Asians.5 The field of Asian 
studies was then directly responsible for the making of America’s Asia, 
for the intellectual, economic and military appropriation of Asia and 
Asian people by US interests.
 Yet CCAS’ devastating critique of US policies and scholarship 
on Asia had another, more positive, goal, which was to highlight 
the new Asian realities that those policies and scholarship had made 
invisible. This was the third way in which Asia could and should be 
America’s, Friedman and Selden continued:
The essays in this book suggest, moreover, that an Asia conceived in 
antagonistic or contemptible categories is an Asia where much that 
is humane, valuable, and worthy of emulation is ignored. This adds 
a final meaning to America’s Asia. If we could change our relation 
to Asia we would be open to learning much from Asian people that 
could help us create a more decent and just society in the United 
States.
Asia was not just a site of oppression, the location of carnage; rather, 
it was truly “America’s Asia” in the sense that it offered a viable poli-
tical alternative to the United States, and potentially to the world. 
What was going on in Asia transcended its geographical and historical 
position, as it posed questions and proposed solutions that challenged 
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the political assumptions of people globally. The very last sentence of 
the book—found at the end of Steve Andors’ essay on the Maoist fac-
tory—makes precisely this case: “Ultimately, however, this process of 
struggle and development going on in China transcends the Chinese 
situation, and poses critical questions of action and philosophy for all 
of us.” 6 Asia and Asian people had shifted from objects to be studied 
to subjects with whom experiences could be—and were—shared.
 This chapter investigates the meanings of “America’s Asia” within 
the experience of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, first 
of all as a political signifier: unlike the “Asianisms” of the late 19th or 
the early 21st century, CCAS discourse did not focus on ethnically 
or culturally based values, nor did it espouse the myth of a “rise of 
Asia”. Rather, Asia, once divested of the culturalist trappings that 
scholars and political strategists had created, appeared as one of the 
crucial motors of global change, and Asian peoples were leading 
the transformation that we now identify with the “global sixties”: 
“national liberation movements against colonialism and imperialism; 
new extra-party and extra-trade union organizational forms and new 
forms of political subjectivity; radical critiques of capitalism, in poli-
tics, activism, cultural production, and life; and radical forms of ex-
perimentation in everyday life.” 7 In this perspective, CCAS’ Asianism 
is part of the more general shift in the global, political and intellec-
tual frame of reference in the 1960s–70s, when what was happening 
in Asia acquired a new centrality for people all over the world. 
Christopher Connery has highlighted the “worlded character” of Asia 
in the long 1960s, a worldedness of “links and co-presence”, when 
even an overwhelmingly nationalist movement such as Vietnamese 
communism had international and multiple significance because of 
its oppositional power vis-à-vis US hegemony, “its actualization of 
the Great Refusal”.8 That is why workers in France could call for 
“Vietnam in Our Factories” and Maoism was a shared reference of 
Parisian students and Indian revolutionaries.
 But CCAS was not just a political organization, it was also—and 
primarily—a group of young students of Asia, and such a radical shift 
in their position vis-à-vis the object of their studies had huge impli-
cations for their intellectual and professional life. Within the field of 
Asian studies, the concept of America’s Asia, as framed by Selden 
and Friedman, involved a critique of “orientalism” before orientalism, 
and without the support of Said’s elaboration. But in addition, and, 
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I would argue, more fundamentally, America’s Asia—at least in its 
third meaning—suggested the need and the possibility of a post-
orientalist praxis, as much in scholarship as in politics. It was not 
enough to criticize the existing epistemic structure of Asian studies 
and the very practical connections with US foreign policy and mili-
tarism; an indispensable next step was to ask what the recognition of 
the previously inscrutable “Asian other”9 as a political subject signified 
for the academic, intellectual and political practice in the United 
States and globally, and to act upon this recognition. Or, to put it in 
the much more vigorous terms of the CCAS Newsletter:
Are we going to analyse from a distance, or join in the fray? Are we 
going to take the opportunities offered us (to educate Americans in 
their imperial present) by the Koreans, Thais, Indians, Malaysians, 
Filipinos and Taiwanese in their fight to emerge from a decadent 
reactionary past? And by the Chinese, Indochinese, and Koreans in 
their drive for a socialist future? Or will we miss the boat? The time 
to act is now—not next week, or next year. NOW! 10
This essay then takes the specific case of CCAS as an example of 
how this particular form of Asianism affected political, intellectual and 
organizational practices in the 1960s and 1970s. The framework of 
America’s Asia opened the way to intellectual and political insights, 
but it was also dependent on specific historical conditions—the 
viability of revolutionary movements globally and specifically in Asia. 
When these conditions changed CCAS experienced a profound crisis, 
and the organization eventually disbanded in 1979. Some of its mem-
bers left academia—either of their own volition or because they were 
refused tenure; others moved to completely opposite positions or 
found different venues for activism. How does America’s Asia help 
explain the development of CCAS, its successes, its internal debates, 
its final dissolution and its fragmented legacy?
Discovering Humanity in Asia
The essays collected in America’s Asia took shape in part during a 
CCAS Summer Seminar at Harvard University in 1968,11 and while 
the participants did not agree on everything—including the very idea 
of the book—they were conscious of the novelty of considering Asia 
as a source of ideas rather than a target of ridicule and the object of 
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technocratic manipulation. However, the closest model they could 
muster for their approach dated two centuries earlier:
The philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment believed there was 
much to learn from China about social organization. But as the 
nineteenth-century West turned to massive imperialist assault on 
China, the Chinese people became, to our “practical” men, objects 
of ridicule and contempt, not alternative models to be contemplated, 
criticized, and, where fitting, emulated. A century later, American 
social scientists, generals, and politicians continue to see Asian needs 
in terms of American advice and aid.12
There was obviously a need to unpack, expose and dissolve the accu-
mulated layers of 200 years of scholarship, policy and opinion before 
one could tackle and accept the new lessons coming from Asia—or 
even the simple fact that Asia had anything to teach. The first two 
sections of the volume appropriately deal directly with the ideological 
premises of Asian studies, the optics distorting not just the perception 
of Asia but also the practice of US foreign policy and military inter-
vention, thus tracing a direct line of responsibility between Asia 
scholars and invading troops. It is only the last section of the volume
—the three essays by Selden, Gurley and Andors—that moves away 
from that critique and proposes instead a new model of scholarship, 
one that does not dissect or demolish but rather aims at creating
… a new Asia for America. It is one that can be approached hope-
fully and critically, not condescendingly and destructively. Focusing 
on the humanity of their subject, they [the authors of the last three 
essays] find inspiration and application to general human problems, 
to problems Americans as well as citizens of Third World nations 
face here and now.13
I will return later to the references to “humanity”, “human” and 
“humane”, which pervade this and other texts by the Concerned Asian 
Scholars (CAS), but first it is worth pointing out how the structure 
of the edited volume, while it makes sense to the reader, is intellec-
tually and politically in reverse order. It was the revolutionary expe-
rience of Asian nations that made it possible to expose the encrusted 
ideological blinders of the profession. Asian revolutions—that is my 
point—came first; they were the necessary precondition for the 
Chap6 (134-155).indd   138 10/8/15   11:52:28 AM
 “America’s Asia?” Revolution, Scholarship and Asian Studies 139
scholarly and intellectual shift of CCAS. Asia itself could exist as a 
point of reference only in the light of the new revolutionary expe-
riences of the 20th century: people’s wars of liberation (from China 
to Vietnam) and the economic and social experiments of the Great 
Leap and the Cultural Revolution. The simple acknowledgement of 
the existence of the Maoist economic experiments, land redistribution 
in liberated Vietnam, Indian peasant rebellions, Japanese pacifists and 
Okinawan activists forced a reconsideration of one’s position as an 
Asia scholar, of one’s relationship to Asia, and of the structure of the 
field itself, because the field could not even see (let alone study or 
examine) these phenomena. What made Asia change from an object 
into a subject was the recognition that Asian peoples had already be-
come subjects of their own politics, and by so doing they had stated 
the possibility of alternative solutions to issues not confined to Asia. 
As Friedman succinctly summarized, “the experience and creations of 
some 700 million Chinese this century provides a basis for asking and 
probing the most pressing human questions”.14
 In this sense, the last three essays of America’s Asia, which de-
scribe the universal value of these revolutionary “new things”, consti-
tute the logical and political premise of the entire book and, possibly, 
of the entire CCAS enterprise. For example, in his analysis of people’s 
war, Selden argues that from the protracted wars of liberation in 
China and Vietnam “emerged a radically new vision of man and 
society and a concrete approach to development”.15 In the liberated 
areas Selden saw, in embryo, the possibility of new forms of society 
antithetical to the struggle of “atomized individuals” fighting for 
private ends—a not-so-subtle reference to his own capitalist society. 
Rather, Selden concludes, they embodied “the freedom of all conti-
nually redefined by an accepted and cherished community”.16
 As we have seen, the CAS stressed repeatedly the need for a 
more “humane” approach to Asia, a concern that was inscribed in 
their statement of purpose: “The Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding 
of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and 
to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism.” 17 
I was at first a bit puzzled by the insistence on this term, the extent 
to which these scholars felt compelled to show that “the Chinese are 
human too”.18 It seemed at the same time excessive and vague. What 
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was to be gained by stressing a shared “humanity”? Was that really 
necessary?
 This insistence makes more sense if we once again reverse the per-
spective: “humanity” was not just lacking in the eyes of the Western 
beholder; rather, “humane” was the defining character of the Asian 
revolutions, which, as such, required a humane approach to be under-
stood. The participatory model of Vietnam and China offered “hope 
of more humane forms of development and of effectively overcoming 
the formidable barriers to the transformation of peasant societies”.19 
Similarly, John Gurley described the Cultural Revolution as “perhaps 
the most interesting economic and social experiment ever attempted, 
in which tremendous efforts are being made to achieve an egalitarian 
development, an industrial development without dehumanization, one 
that involves everyone and affects everyone”.20
 Here “humane” stands in stark opposition to models (first and 
foremost those imposed by American planners, but also Soviet tech-
nocracy) that were considered “inhumane”, in the sense that they 
erased the human costs of development under the mask of scientificity 
and rationality. “Humane” stands in as a reference to the radical 
equality of the Asian revolutions, as exemplified first and foremost by 
the Chinese experiments of the 1960s and 1970s.21 The reference to 
“humanity” also expressed a frontal attack to modernization theory, 
which dominated both US state policy and academia. As the under-
standing of societies in terms of modernization levels and stages of 
development was connected with a foreign policy that imposed these 
models onto other nations, those Asian revolutions that presented al-
ternative practices could be understood only through a more humane 
scholarly approach, one that abdicated the technocratic/culturalistic 
framework of the existing social sciences. Accepting the “humanity” 
of Asian revolutions required a radical shift in the very structure of 
academia and the intellectual world.
 It was the recognition that something unprecedented was hap-
pening in Asia—yet it was something not exclusively Asian nor 
confined by culture and geography—that allowed for many of the 
exceptional scholarly contributions in the early period of CCAS. John 
Dower used the US economic and strategic concerns in Vietnam 
as a starting point to rethink the history of Japan’s own imperial 
enterprise in the 1930s.22 The Chinese and Vietnamese experience of 
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peasant revolution made it possible for South Asianists within CCAS 
to rethink agricultural policies and peasant rebellions on the Indian 
subcontinent.23
 But possibly the most valuable contribution of CCAS came in 
the unveiling of the orientalist prejudices embedded in the field of 
Asian Studies and in the public culture of the United States. James 
Peck and others showed how the dominant explanations that framed 
modern Chinese history in terms of a “cultural failure” were an excuse 
for the continuing imposition of a Western (US) power over Asia. 
These analyses placed the blame on Asia’s “lack”—of rationality, of 
modernity, of science—rather than on imperialist aggression; they 
argued for a “natural”, univocal road to development off which many 
Asian nations had dangerously veered. By peddling these theories, 
CCAS accused, Asia scholars in the United States supported the idea 
that “backward Asians” needed to be shepherded back onto the right 
path, possibly under the vigilant eyes of American “experts”. In re-
vealing the deep orientalist biases of the field, CCAS anticipated 
the work that cultural studies and cultural history started a decade 
later, and with the support of a much more sophisticated theoretical 
framework.24
 Beyond the critique and rethinking of existing scholarship, what 
I find perhaps more interesting is how the recognition of the extra-
ordinary value of Asian revolutions allowed CCAS to expand connec-
tions and spaces of comparisons, based on the assumption that “Asia” 
truly had something to teach the United States and the world. This 
was visible, for example, in the attention devoted to Asian Americans 
and the issues of migration, racism and activism within that commu-
nity (in its relations to Asia).25 It led CCAS to try to identify “Asian 
models” for agrarian revolutions in Latin America.26 And it also justi-
fied a new understanding of Asia, this time one not filtered through 
colonial or neocolonial discourse, but rather viewed through the lens 
of hope for more radical transformations. CCAS discussed whether 
there was something called “Asian socialism” that connected China, 
Korea, Vietnam, but also potentially India and South Asia. “India,” 
argued Gail Omvedt, “might be used as a negative case to prove 
that without socialism there is no economic development. India needs 
what China had: a revolution. And to some extent, the Indian prob-
lems enable one to understand what happened in China.” 27 China 
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and Vietnam shifted from being simply “America’s problem” 28 to 
embodying the focal point for a series of Asian connections, a net-
work of activism for which they represented a possible reference. This 
was evident, for example, in CCAS’ relationship with the pacifist 
movement Beheiren in Japan and the journal Ampo.29
 “Asia”, in the discourse of modernization theory, could exist as 
a unity only as the vaguely geographically identifiable repository of 
ahistorical cultural values, removed from the universal normality of 
natural development. Even when brought back (through colonial 
force) into the “normal” path of history, Asia, as Dipesh Chakrabarthy 
synthesized, remained the realm of the “not yet”, endlessly catching 
up and endlessly lacking.30 In CCAS critique, however, this “not 
yet”, the space between Western normativity and Asian exceptionalism, 
instead of a lack, of a failure, becomes an opening, a space of experi-
mentation. Here lies possibly the most important legacy of CCAS to 
students of Asia of the succeeding generations: the ability to see their 
chosen locations of study not as exceptions but as part of a global, 
coeval, and always incomplete political and intellectual undertaking. 
That is, to see “Asia” as “an unfinished project, whose truth is not in 
a new and emergent dominant, but in the end of the very logic of 
domination”.31 In the best of CCAS analysis and practice, “America’s 
Asia” then prefigured the historical universality of equalitarian and 
emancipatory politics.
 The qualifier “in the best of CCAS analysis and practice” is, 
however, not a minor one, as “Asia” remained a point of unresolved 
tension for the Concerned Asian Scholars. On the one hand, espe-
cially in the case of China (but also Korea and Vietnam), it came to 
identify a reified place of desire, the embodiment not of a possible 
and always evolving search for equality, but of an empirically realized 
model. The reality of Asian successes needed only to be unveiled to 
Western eyes: it identified not the open possibilities of the “not yet” 
but the certainty of the “already there”. And this position, especially 
when it took the place of a more universal and critical theorizing, 
was always prone to falling back into a different kind of orientalism, 
one of dream-like positive imagining, On the other hand, Asia re-
mained “America’s” in the more troubling sense that CCAS often 
approached it only through a critique of US imperialism. These co-
existent and complementary yearnings—for a geographically located 
utopia and for the end of US destructive policies—were always 
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present within CCAS. As I will show later, they contributed to lead 
many CAS back into a faith in empiricism and “objectivity”, which 
ended up displacing a profound conceptualization of the revolutionary 
transformations that had allowed CCAS’ critique to exist in the first 
place. When the Asian revolutions collapsed and the urgency of war 
ended, for many within CCAS the critique of US foreign policies 
was all that remained. In other words, Asia once again returned to be 
completely and unequivocally “America’s”.
To Be or Not to Be a Scholar
To take “America’s Asia” seriously as the signifier of potentially eman-
cipatory experiments could not but have momentous implications for 
what it meant to be a scholar, both as an intellectual and as a poli-
tical being. In a field whose methodology had been shaped under the 
financial and intellectual backing of imperialism, a “re-orientation of 
the scholarship and teaching” could not proceed without “a commit-
ment to the need for revolutionary change in Asian land”.32 A revi-
sion of the existing scholarship could only be grounded on a radical 
activist concern; but the articulation between these two sides of the 
intellectual and practical life of the Asia scholars was one not easily 
resolved. Or rather, it was not resolved at all.
 CCAS started from the recognition that “scholarship is inextri-
cably linked to politics, and all research ultimately reflects a political 
standpoint”.33 As Leigh Kagan remarked in the first issue of the 
CCAS Newsletter: “Politically, we submit that Asian scholars are, in 
fact, involved in politics, that we acknowledge this, and that we ad-
dress ourselves to the issue of how we are going to be political.” 34 The 
first response to this acknowledgement was for scholars to be political 
in their scholarship, and it was in this area that CCAS produced 
arguably some of its best contributions.
 CCAS spearheaded a radical critique of the belief in “objective 
scholarship” that framed the entire field. They skewered their own 
professors (John K. Fairbank, in particular) when these men hid 
behind academic “neutrality”, by pointing out how “neutrality” was 
already a political stance, implying acquiescence to existing policies 
and assumptions.35 The claim to “objectivity” also operated in a more 
pernicious and covert way in Asian studies: the empirical and allegedly 
“rational” approach it fostered was blind vis-à-vis the “new things” 
Chap6 (134-155).indd   143 10/8/15   11:52:30 AM
144 Fabio Lanza
of America’s Asia, as it ended filtering through a specific idea of 
modernization and development the experience of people who refused 
and challenged that very idea. The experiments of the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China, to use the most ob-
vious examples, could not be understood in the “rational” economic 
terms of modernization theory, as their novelty, argued many in 
CCAS, resided precisely in that “human” side that remained invisible 
to an “objective” analysis, the search for a development that was at 
the same time emancipatory and egalitarian.
 But that did not seem to be enough for many CAS, in the sense 
that scholarship was often perceived as a fruitless endeavour and that 
true activism resided elsewhere, in the real world. Christine White 
voiced her discomfort at this notion:
One gets the impression from the newsletter sometimes that 
“scholars” is a dirty word, that being an Asian scholar is an illegiti-
mate occupation, and that only by engaging in political activity other 
than leftist scholarship can one attone [sic ] for the sin of being 
a “scholar”; and that only by giving money to “real” movement 
causes such as the GI movement can CCAS attone [sic ] for the sin 
of being an organization of Asian scholars.36
There were very obvious reasons for the push to real “activism”, first 
and foremost the presence of war in the United States, which the 
draft made a daily and lived reality for these young scholars. Radical 
scholarship provided little comfort to people who were faced with the 
daily reports of carnage in Indochina and the (not-so-distant) possi-
bility of being involved in that bloodshed.
 Being “just scholars” (concerned or otherwise) was made difficult 
also by the very Asian experiences that CAS were examining, which 
challenged to the core the role of intellectuals. Students in Paris and 
in Berkeley were discussing the Chinese Cultural Revolution not be-
cause of a blind worship of an exotic and misunderstood model, but 
because they realized that what was at stake in China had to do 
with issues that concerned their own daily experience: the relationships 
between the production of knowledge and the reproduction of social 
roles, between scholarship and politics, and between politics and 
learning. These were issues that resonated deeply within the expe-
rience of the CAS. They were motivated not by the desire to take 
an active role in someone else’s revolution 37 but by the realization 
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that the issues were similar, that many things that had happened in 
China in the 20th century—particularly since 1949—were crucial and 
meaningful even for students and teachers at Harvard and Columbia. 
Peck, in his debate with John K. Fairbank, chose as an example of 
scholarly commitment the pedagogical experiments of 1919, coeval 
with the very idea of a Chinese modernity: “It is not, then, the image 
of a ‘neutral’ university that provides a model, but rather the mutually 
reinforcing intellectual and political forces of the Chinese May 4th 
Movement.” 38
 The May Fourth Movement remained a “suggestive model” 39 also 
because it seemed to identify the situation of CCAS within the larger 
New Left and anti-war movement (an intellectual scholarly group 
integrated in a truly global political upheaval). But after they sum-
moned May Fourth, the Cultural Revolution, and the Vietnamese 
ant-colonial struggles as points of reference, could many CCASers 
still find it satisfactory that “as a group our effective contribution to 
a new politics at this time lies pre-eminently in exposing the turgid 
underbelly of American Asian policy and developing an intellectually 
compelling critique of its ideology and scholarly underpinnings”? 40
The Pull of Objective Truth
Neither May Fourth nor the Cultural Revolution presented ready-
made models of what it meant to be an intellectual, a scholar, a poli-
tical being. Rather, they embodied the continuing search for a con-
ceptualization of the political and for a theory of the production of 
knowledge. A similar search animated CCAS since its very beginning. 
There were, for example, several meetings during the seminar in the 
summer of 1968 at Harvard—the very place where some of the 
essays in America’s Asia were formulated and discussed—that dealt 
precisely with the self-definition of these young scholars and their 
relations to politics. Many evening hours were spent discussing how 
to reconceptualize the relationship with Asia in a non-imperialistic 
frame, how to study Asia without imposing external (Western) con-
cepts and whether some categories could have universal validity.41 
The group discussed the impossibility of fragmenting one’s life into 
“discrete compartments” (here scholarship, there activism) but also 
pondered on what being “radical” meant professionally and in terms 
of everyday life.
Chap6 (134-155).indd   145 10/8/15   11:52:30 AM
146 Fabio Lanza
 In reading through the minutes of these evening discussions, one 
gets a glimpse of an already existing division in the group, a split 
between those who aimed at a “radical scholarship” (in terms of cate-
gories, contents, political bias) and others who were proposing a com-
plete redefinition of what “scholarly” meant, a theoretical rethinking 
of the profession—in general, not just in relation to US policy. This 
division was particularly evident precisely when the CCAS partici-
pants at the Harvard seminar fought over the very idea of publishing 
America’s Asia. Selden had organized the seminar and spearheaded the 
book as a revisionist attack on Asian studies; but other (younger) 
participants objected to a publication bearing the CCAS name, 
arguing instead for the need of a more profound questioning of the 
production of knowledge. They maintained that radicalism could not 
involve just the content of one’s publication, but it also required a 
reconceptualization of scholarship and scholars themselves.
 The idea that “America’s Asia” posed a need for a radical new 
approach, that the United States (and the world) needed to think 
through “theories” in order to appraise, understand and help realize 
the emancipatory experiences of Asia, came to the fore repeatedly in 
discussions within CCAS. In 1970, for example, Ric Pfeffer stated the 
need for “more grand theories” on China:
… we’re going to get a lot of people doing the fact-grubbing and 
lots of people doing kind of middle-level analysis. We have to go 
to a lot of new approaches to China in terms of grand theories, 
like Chinese visions of modernization or Chinese visions of anti-
modernization.42
In the same year, at the 1970 Eastern Regional Conference, a speaker 
called for CCAS to develop a counter-imperialist ideology:
this ideology would be the foundation of a lasting CCAS organiza-
tion and should get at the roots of the whole system we are fighting; 
it should, for example, concern itself with the basic causes of the 
American destruction of Vietnam’s and its own ecology: capitalism 
and imperialism, rather than with the destruction itself. Our oppo-
nents know what they’re at—they live in and manipulate the system 
every day. The questions are: Where are we? What do we believe in? 43
These questions still loomed large in the following years; in October 
1972, the Newsletter encouraged local chapters of CCAS to form 
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study groups on Marxist theory. CCAS had developed a rudimentary 
consciousness of anti-imperialism, yet
people felt that we have never systematically developed an under-
standing of the origins of capitalism, or an understanding of the 
origins of the Marxist movement. People recognize that there is a 
basic difference between simply opposing imperialism, and really 
understanding its causes and effects.44
Indeed, while CCAS produced an impressive scholarly critique of 
US imperialist ventures and of orientalism in Asian studies, it did it 
seemingly without a direct engagement with Marxism, Leninism or 
any theory of imperialism. CCAS produced excellent analyses of the 
Maoist economy, people’s war and revolutionary strategy as well as a 
trenchant critique of Asian studies, but it largely gave up any attempt 
to conceptualize the political and intellectual issues in universal theo-
retical terms. It recognized the universality of “America’s Asia” but too 
often refused to confront it in those terms.
 So the question remains: why? Here I can only propose some 
informed speculations. In part, engagement with theory (Marxism, 
in particular) was perceived by some as a step towards ideological 
conformity — “ideological” here standing for something close to party 
doctrine — and a loose, purposely decentred group such as CCAS 
abhorred conformity to the point of idiosyncratic independence. 
There was also the urgency of the moment, one that seemed to re-
quire less speculation and more action: it made more sense to invest 
the time in drafting a fact sheet on the Cambodia bombing for distri-
bution in high schools, rather than ponder the universal significance of 
the Maoist debates on bourgeois right or on economic construction.
 “America’s Asia” also always carried with it the temptation of 
making Asia into a place, somewhere where the search for a better 
society had been realized and possibly concluded, a destination for 
desires rather than the name of a series of political experiments. This 
was particularly the case with China, which had been literally only 
imagined by China scholars before two CCAS delegations were invited 
to visit the country in 1971 and 1972. The group spent an enormous 
amount of time debating the compositions, the meaning, the political 
and intellectual usefulness of the China trips; and it was evident that 
for many within CCAS, China (but also Vietnam and, to a much 
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smaller extent, Korea) had become the somewhat uncritical grounding 
for political and intellectual positions. China existed, and that was 
enough. Just a few years later — and often for the same people —
“China” became the reason to abandon those very political and intel-
lectual positions.
 Finally, there is the long-standing aversion for “theory” that has 
marked Area Studies since its inception, or rather an aversion for any 
theory that does not include a faith in objective truth and empirical 
measurement (à la modernization theory). For all their exposing of 
the biases and the influences behind their mentors’ claims to scholarly 
neutrality, the lure of “objectivity” was never truly dispelled. The 
models of scholarship available at the time — which many CCASers 
embraced — were also problematic in this sense. Noam Chomsky, 
Howard Zinn and Staughton Lynd 45 were among the few public intel-
lectuals in recent US history who were exceptional examples of acti-
vism, but they were also intellectuals whose main body of scholarship 
was critique, not conceptualization. Their personal and professional 
experience exemplified the tension between scholarship and politics, 
but they had very little to say about it, at least in the terms that 
many within CCAS aspired to achieve.
 Chomsky and Zinn took part in the early activities of CCAS, 
they presented at CCAS conventions, and Chomsky was a member of 
the editorial board of the Bulletin for several years — in spite of not 
being an Asia scholar. Chomsky also was, quite surprisingly, an occa-
sional participant in the CCAS Harvard summer seminar of 1968, 
and his contribution seemed to have been particularly significant pre-
cisely on the issue of politically radical scholarship. Peck summarized 
the results of the seminar (in not very glowing terms) in the second 
issue of the BCAS:
It was not just the nature of our scholarly assumptions, however, 
which was challenged. Could we, even while abhoring [sic] the ends 
towards which our research and knowledge are put, do nothing 
more than polish off another definitive monograph or book while 
pleasantly chatting with a CIA analyst over lunch about our mutual 
problems involved in understanding China? What, precisely, was our 
social role? We debated this with Noam Chomsky and constantly 
among ourselves. And on a theoretical level, at least, the result 
wasn’t impressive; we ended with the truism that truth by nature is 
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radical and the responsibility of intellectuals is to speak the truth 
and to expose lies. Or, in the words of Camus, the intellectuals’ role 
“will be to say the king is naked when he is, and not to go into rap-
tures over his imaginary trappings.” 46
The truism that “truth by nature is radical” was a direct reference to 
Chomsky’s contribution to the discussion and his stress on the value 
of “objective truth” in revealing the weak points of US ideology.47 
This idea was not uncritically accepted even during the Harvard 
seminar: “more is needed than speaking the truth,” seminar members 
argued; “another level is the perceived need for being radical with a 
vision of enlarging human potentiality. The need to lead unified lives, 
whereby scholarship and being radical come together.” 48 But that 
pull of “objective” truth remained strong, and it always stood as an 
easy fallback position. The assessment that objective truth was radical 
did not solve the conundrum of those who wanted to truly integrate 
scholarship and politics, as in many ways it postulated once again a 
divided life. One could follow the Chomsky model, write prolifically 
and successfully within one’s sub-discipline in Asian studies and de-
vote one’s activist efforts to debunking the myths of US foreign 
policy, or stand up for human rights and fight for the liberation 
of political prisoners. They were all extremely worthwhile endeavours 
but, in many ways, a retreat from the openings subsumed in the idea 
of “America’s Asia”.
After Asia
The retreat into empiricism and objective truth—which was never 
uncontested, never complete, and never generalized to be sure—had 
huge consequences for CCAS itself and its relation to and under-
standing of “Asia”. Already in 1973, Selden asked himself and the 
other editors what the Bulletin had produced in China studies over 
the years: his answer was not self-congratulatory in the least. The 
Bulletin had published very sharp critique but “disastrously little in 
the way of positive contribution” on what he still viewed as “the great 
revolution of our century”.49
 By the mid-1970s, empiricism offered little respite from the com-
bined end of the anti-war movement in the United States 50 and of 
“Asia” itself as potential reference for emancipatory politics. In the 
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end, if one had to rely only on the “revolutionary power” of objective 
truth, objectively the Maoist experiments had been revealed to have 
failed, Deng Xiaoping was dismantling all the new things of the pre-
vious period, Vietnam went towards normalization, Cambodia stood 
on the precipice of madness,51 India did not have a peasant revo-
lution, and capitalism was triumphant again. Objectively, the US 
imperialist venture had produced disasters and devastations, but the 
war, at least for Americans, was over. In that scenario, CCAS did not 
have much to offer, if not the acceptance of a new status quo. This 
is how Saundra Sturdevant assessed that specific moment, which co-
incided with the end of her commitment to CCAS:
The second turning point for me occurred in the late 1970s when 
I was East Asian editor for BCAS. I solicited manuscripts from 
virtually everyone and worked strenuously for nine months on what 
became two issues of the Bulletin and then the book on post-Mao 
China. A good number of manuscripts were from old comrades, 
now established China scholars, many of whom had become so as a 
result of their positive analysis of Mao’s China. Now, with only the 
direction of the Deng reforms visible, these scholars were writing 
about the negative features of Mao China and the glories of the 
Deng era. For me, this was extremely difficult. It was a political, 
intellectual, and personal crisis.52
From that total crisis, there was very little that could be rescued. In 
the best outcome, the former Concerned Asian Scholar could conti-
nue to fight the forces of imperialism “which have brought us wars in 
Asia for two centuries and which are still with us”, as the June 1976 
newsletter remarked. But that left CCAS with little to do “until the 
next big, mobilizing war involving us all”.53 The possibilities of alter-
native politics were thus reduced to the somewhat morbid faith in 
the continuing destructive capacity of Western imperialism. Douglas 
Allen, in his evaluation of the Indochina War and the role of CCAS, 
points at the currency of anti-imperialism as the major outcome of 
that experience: “Today,” he writes, “many progressive scholars, with-
out a second thought, quite naturally use such terms as imperialism 
at the heart of our teaching, writing, and public speaking. … Progres-
sive scholars have found the same legacy in their Central America, 
Persian Gulf, antiapartheid, and other activism, often involving at-
tempts to share and apply the lessons of Vietnam and Indochina to 
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contemporary U.S. policies and anti-imperialist resistance.” 54 That is in 
many ways an admirable legacy, but one cannot but wonder what is 
left of Asia, in this perspective, for these “Asian” scholars. The idea 
of “America’s Asia”, I have argued, was predicated on the universal 
value of the emancipatory political experiments that had been at-
tempted by people in that part of the world. With those experiments 
failed or defeated, and Asian people incorporated under capitalism, 
Asia is once again reduced to “place”, a geographical or cultural loca-
tion of dubious unity, and one that can exist only as the negative 
image of a brutal force, shaped by its resistance to the act of being 
shaped. In that, “Asia” might seem empirically approachable but has 
no political reality.
 Maybe this was unavoidable, given the extent of the collapse. 
But now that we find ourselves in a different historical situation, the 
CCAS experience should remind us of the possibilities and openings, 
for scholarship and politics, that Asia could embody when it was 
understood as a globally significant, yet always unfinished project of 
emancipation.
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Asianisms from Below: Japanese 
Civil Society and Visions of 
Asian Integration from the 
Late 20th to the 21st Century
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
Invisible Asianisms
In her recent writings, University of Hawaii scholar Patricia Steinhoff 
speaks of Japan’s “invisible civil society”. Her cogent argument is that 
most research on Japanese civil society has failed to capture the reali-
ties of grassroots activism in Japan. Drawing on conceptual models 
developed in Europe and North America, research has focused on 
national-level organizations, commonly reaching the conclusion that 
Japanese civil society is weak and subservient to the state. This con-
clusion, however, neglects the widespread presence of a mass of very 
small, geographically dispersed local grassroots movements that exist 
throughout the Japanese archipelago.1 These movements are particu-
larly difficult to research because they are so small and localized: they 
are rarely registered with any state organization, do not (therefore) ap-
pear in official listings of non-profit organizations, and produce only 
ephemeral publications that are seldom collected by major libraries 
or archives. Nevertheless, this “invisible civil society” is an important 
part of Japan’s recent history and deserves much more attention than 
it has received to date.
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 Extending Steinhoff’s arguments, I should like to suggest that 
Japan’s invisible civil society has also generated interesting forms of 
“invisible Asianism”. Histories of Asianism in the Japanese context 
often trace a shift from a popularly based and relatively egalitarian vi-
sion of solidarity with Asia in the late 19th century, to an increasingly 
expansionist, Japan-centred Great Asianism in the 1930s and 1940s, 
culminating in the disasters of the Asia Pacific War. Many scholars 
then go on to describe a retreat of Asianism in the years immediately 
following Japan’s defeat in 1945, followed by the emergence of new 
forms of intellectual engagement with Asia from the 1950s onward. 
Oguma Eiji, focusing mainly on post-war “progressive intellectuals”, 
sees the 1950s as an era when the Chinese Revolution, the Korean 
War and the Bandung Conference created a new image of Asia as a 
counter-pole to the dominance of the Cold War superpowers (parti-
cularly the United States). In the 1960s and beyond, he argues, issues 
such as environmentalism and human rights provided new grounds 
for Japanese intellectuals’ commitment to Asia, and these decades 
were also a time when progressive intellectuals became more conscious 
of the presence of marginalized minorities such as Ainu, Okinawans 
and Zainichi Koreans—the “Asia within”.2 Others have depicted pro-
posals for regional economic integration from the 1990s onward as 
representing a new form of Asianism,3 while the rapid growth of pop-
culture flows throughout the region has engendered a phenomenon 
sometimes described as “popular Asianism”.4
 An aspect largely neglected in these studies of intellectual trends, 
economic integration and culture flows, however, is the role of grass-
roots civil society in linking Asian societies across borders. One excep-
tion is the work of Hatsuse Ryûhei, who has highlighted the contri-
bution of Japanese humanitarian NGOs to a phenomenon he defines 
as a new form of pan-Asianism, emerging mainly from the 1980s 
onward. Hatsuse illustrates the characteristics of this humanitarian 
Asianism by exploring the story of the Peshawar-kai, an influential 
medical and development NGO founded in 1983 by the Japanese 
doctor Nakamura Tetsu to provide aid to Afghanistan.5
 Here I shall draw on some aspects of Hatsuse’s ideas, but argue 
that the origins of grassroots Asianisms in post-war Japan go back 
further than the 1980s and that their scope is not limited to humani-
tarian NGOs. Extending the boundaries of the discussion, I hope to 
shed light on the existence of a widespread and loosely linked web of 
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very small grassroots groups across the Japanese archipelago, which 
have sought in varied ways to deepen the integration of Japan and 
other parts of Asia. These groups do not necessarily generate very 
fully articulated visions of an Asian future, but their diverse actions 
and writings constitute an important part of the complex map of 
Asianisms in Japan, and their history casts fresh light on the changing 
contours of this map over the decades from the immediate post-war 
era to the present day.
Post-war Study Circles and the Origins of Grassroots 
Asianisms
Grassroots Asianisms in Japan have a long history. They can be traced 
back at least to the late 19th century ideas of popular rights and 
social reform activists such as Ueki Emori (1857–92), Tarui Tôkichi 
(1850–1922) and Ôi Kentarô (1843–1922).6 But, as many commen-
tators have noted, the gradual drift into an aggressive, Japan-centred 
Great Asianism, followed by Japan’s disastrous defeat in war, led to 
a profound and difficult rethinking of Japan’s place in Asia. In the 
immediate post-war period, Japan’s engagement with Asia had to be 
reinvented, not only at the level of formal politics and scholarly dis-
course, but also at the level of everyday life.
 In the late 1940s and 1950s, significant numbers of Japanese 
people felt a sense of responsibility for the wartime violence inflicted 
on other Asian countries by the Japanese military, and a longing to 
create a new relationship with Asia. But the discourse of war respon-
sibility was not echoed in Japanese national politics, which quickly 
became dominated by conservative parties. Meanwhile, the deep divi-
sions of the Cold War era made the building of grassroots connec-
tions to surrounding countries difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it 
can be argued that the divisive impact of the Cold War was parti-
cularly profound in East Asia (where it rapidly escalated into hot 
wars in Korea and Vietnam). There was an important difference 
between the Cold War order in Europe, where interaction between 
nations in the pro-United States camp was encouraged, and East Asia, 
where the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement of separate treaties between 
the United States and its Asian allies created a more complex set of 
regional fissures.7
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 Even in these unpromising circumstances, though, a number of 
small, regional efforts at re-imagining an integrated Asia did appear 
as early as the mid-1950s. One fascinating example is discussed by 
Curtis Gayle in his study of the post-war women’s history movement 
in Japan. An important element in left-wing political activism from 
the occupation era onward was the development of study circles 
[sâkuru], which aimed to educate ordinary people on topics ranging 
from folklore to politics, while simultaneously promoting “revolu-
tionary consciousness”.8 Gayle’s research looks in detail at the story 
of one relatively long-lived and influential group, the Ehime Women’s 
History Circle, created in 1956 in Matsuyama, on the southern island 
of Shikoku. Inspired by the work of the prominent post-war historian 
Inoue Kiyoshi, the Ehime circle began unearthing the “hidden his-
tory” of their own region from the perspective of women, while also 
endeavouring to develop a sense of international solidarity, particu-
larly with the women of East Asia.
 This aspect of the Ehime group’s work was most vividly illustrated 
by the public events they organized in Matsuyama in 1960 to cele-
brate the 50th International Women’s Day. Gayle describes how the 
celebration of the occasion included the public performance of a 
drama titled “Variety Special: The History of Women” [Baraietê: Josei 
no Ayumi ]. This focused particularly on Asian women’s solidarity, 
incorporating the voices of Chinese and Korean as well as Japanese 
women. The second act of the performance addressed the story of 
Chinese women who had become victims of Japanese wartime aggres-
sion. A chorus proclaiming that “the sadness and suffering of Japanese 
women was the same as that of Chinese women” was followed by 
a challenging response by the actors representing Chinese women: 
“Although the Japanese come from the same East Asian ethnicity they 
attacked our country and as a result a huge number of Chinese men 
were killed and women violated.” 9 The ensuing scenes explored the 
post-war experiences of Japanese, Chinese and Korean women, high-
lighting the liberation of China, the division of Korea, and the “repa-
triation” of ethnic Koreans from Japan to North Korea (which had 
begun just three months earlier).10 The drama concluded with a joint 
chorus of actors representing Japan, China and North Korea pledging 
in unison to work “as Asian women and alongside women from all 
countries” to bring about “the liberation of women worldwide”.11
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 Gayle’s analysis of this event, however, also highlights the prob-
lems that beset efforts to develop “Asianisms from below” at the 
height of the Cold War. Women from the USSR were invited to 
Matsuyama and participated in the International Women’s Day event 
(Japan and the Soviet Union having established diplomatic relations 
three years earlier); but attempts to invite women from North and 
South Korea and China failed because political barriers made it im-
possible for them to obtain the necessary travel permission. As a re-
sult, the roles of the Chinese women in The History of Women drama 
were performed by Japanese members of the Ehime Women’s History 
Circle, while the parts of Korean women were performed by mem-
bers of the local Korean ethnic minority.12 Elsewhere, too, Cold War 
barriers forced study circles with an interest in Asian networking to 
focus on building connections to the “Asia within”. For example, 
the Southern Districts Literary Group (Nambu Bungaku Shûdan, 
founded in 1951 and originally known as the Shimomaruko Bunka 
Shûdan), a proletarian literary circle based in the south-central area 
of Tokyo, extended its connections to Korea by assisting with the 
publication of a journal called Ômura Bungaku, whose content was 
written by Koreans interned as illegal immigrants (sometimes for 
years) in the Ômura Detention Centre, near Nagasaki.13
Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, Matsui Yayori and the New 
Asianism from Below
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the situation was transformed by 
the Vietnam War, the rise and fall of the Japanese students’ move-
ment, and the expansion of Japan’s trade and investment to Southeast 
Asia. As Oguma Eiji notes, the anti-Vietnam War activism of groups 
such as Beheiren14 encouraged a reorientation of the geographical 
boundaries of Japanese critical involvement with Asia: in the 1950s, 
the focus had largely been on China, but now Southeast Asia became 
a growing site of interest. As the student protests of the late 1960s 
descended into increasingly internecine factional battles, some former 
participants turned their attention to other forms of activism, in-
cluding environmentalism, feminism, and the search for alternative 
paths to economic and social development. Out of this emerged 
a range of new social movements, several of which extended their 
activities across Japan’s frontiers to Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
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Meanwhile, the normalization of political relations between Japan 
and South Korea in 1965 and between Japan and China in 1972 
opened the way for closer personal contacts between Japan and 
neighbouring countries.
 The new visions of “Asianism from below” that accompanied 
these trends were clearly expressed in the writings and activism of 
two influential figures whose work spanned the divide between re-
search and engagement in civil society: Tsurumi Yoshiyuki (1926–94) 
and Matsui Yayori (1934–2002). Both Tsurumi and Matsui founded 
social movements that sought to link Japan to other Asian countries, 
which in turn inspired a range of other Asia-focused grassroots 
groups. Their visions of Asia embodied important themes that have 
recurred, explicitly or implicitly, in many grassroots Asianisms of the 
1980s and beyond.
 Tsurumi Yoshiyuki was born and spent a significant part of his 
childhood in the United States, but he was also haunted throughout 
adulthood by a sense of personal connection to Japan’s invasion of 
Asia, because during the war his father had been the first head of the 
military administration of Japanese-occupied Singapore. After gradua-
tion he worked for a long time for International House of Japan, 
and he became well-known as a writer, peace activist and key figure 
in the anti-Vietnam War movement Beheiren. In 1973 he co-founded 
the Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC, Ajia Taiheiyô Shiryô Sentâ), 
a social movement that works mainly on issues of human rights and 
social justice in Asia and on problems emerging from Japan’s relation-
ship to other Asian countries. Tsurumi did not obtain his first formal 
academic post, at Ryûkoku University, until he was in his 60s.
 Matsui Yayori, who was the daughter of a Christian minister, also 
studied overseas, first as an exchange student in the United States and 
later in France at the Sorbonne. It was on the return journey from 
France to Japan by ship in the late 1950s that she first encoun-
tered, as she put it, “the reality of Asia”, an encounter that she de-
scribed as “one of the most shocking events of my young life”:
I saw unimaginable poverty. In Bombay, I saw people curled up in 
foetal positions dying in the streets. Noisy crowds of begging chil-
dren followed me in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and squatting Vietnamese 
women selling food in the streets of Saigon looked exhausted. These 
scenes were in striking contrast to the ostentatious wealth I had 
observed in countries in Europe and the United States during my 
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two-year stay there … In my mind’s eye I could see an Asia exploited, 
deprived, impoverished by centuries of colonial rule and, as an Asian 
myself, I felt intense pain and anger.15
On her return to Japan, Matsui became a journalist at the Asahi 
newspaper, where she reported on environmental disasters such as 
the thalidomide case and Minamata disease. After encountering the 
US women’s liberation movement in the early 1970s, she began to 
be involved in networking activities with women throughout Asia, 
and in 1977 she founded the Asian Women’s Association (Ajia no 
Onnatachi no Kai), “to examine the relationships between Japan and 
other Asian countries from the viewpoint of women, focusing on such 
issues as sex tourism, Japan-South Korea relations, war responsibility, 
Japanese multinationals, exploitation of women for cheap labour, and 
so on”.16 (In 1994 this was reorganized into the Asia-Japan Women’s 
Resource Center [Ajia Josei Shiryô Sentâ].) Some members of this 
association, it should be noted, also played important roles in PARC. 
In the 1990s, Matsui went on to become the key figure in the creation 
of the Violence Against Women in War Network, Japan [VAWW-
NET Japan], which organized the International Women’s War Crimes 
Tribunal, held in Tokyo in 2000.
“Asia Is Not One”: Tsurumi Yoshiyuki and the 
Search for Diversity
Tsurumi and Matsui wrote and campaigned in the context of heated 
global debates about the “Third World” and about the possibility for 
relatively poor societies to pursue an alternative path of development, 
different from the capitalism of the United States, Western Europe 
and Japan as well as the state socialism of the Soviet bloc. “Asia” 
for them was therefore a term of contestation—a representation of 
forces that challenged the hegemonic powers of the Cold War era. 
In Tsurumi’s writings, indeed, the terms “Asia”, “the Third World” 
and “developing countries” are often used almost interchangeably. 
At a time when Japanese multinational corporations were rapidly ex-
panding into the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Tsurumi took a particular interest in Southeast Asia, energetically 
arguing that Asian countries should not seek to follow the Japanese 
path to development (nor, for that matter, the Chinese path), but 
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should seek out their own indigenous approaches to prosperity.17 This 
emphasis on diverse and indigenous approaches reflects another core 
element in Tsurumi’s thought: although he was deeply influenced by 
Marxist thought and by the student movements of the 1960s, like 
a number of other key “progressive” thinkers of his generation he 
emphatically rejected a heavy emphasis on theory and ideology, and 
instead sought a path to social change grounded in the realities of 
everyday life.
 Tsurumi’s writings on Japan’s relationship to its region have some-
times been criticized for presenting a dichotomy between a poor and 
exploited Asia and a rich and exploitative Japan that appears some-
how to stand outside of Asia.18 The Japan/Asia dichotomy seems 
particularly evident from the titles of two of his works: The Asians 
and the Japanese [ Ajiajin to Nihonjin] and Why Is Asia Poor? [ Ajia wa 
naze Mazushii no ka, published in 1982, at a time when Japan clearly 
was not].19 But it would be too simple to assume from these uses of 
the term “Asia” that Tsurumi was just echoing Japanese orientalist 
stereotypes of an advanced Japan versus a backward Asia. Rather, his 
works embody a complex and often uncomfortable sense of Japan’s 
divided identity, one reflected in many grassroots Asianist movements 
in Japan.
 Tellingly, the first essay reproduced in The Asians and the Japanese 
discusses the question of whether it was possible for Japanese people 
to find a “method of living in a non-Japanese manner” (Nihonjin 
banare no ikikata). Asia, in this context, becomes an object of desire, 
an identity in which Japanese people desperately wish to immerse 
themselves but from which they fear they are excluded because of 
Japan’s history of wartime aggression against, and later economic ex-
ploitation of, its Asian neighbours. Tsurumi, with his background in 
the Japanese ruling elite,20 often seemed to share this uneasy sense of 
being “unworthy to be Asian”, but at the same time he suggested a 
variety of methods by which Japanese might actively engage in the 
making of a new Asia, in the process re-creating themselves as Asians.
 One method is the approach that he described as “thinking while 
walking” (arukinagara kangaeru).21 This, for Tsurumi, involved a deep 
and slow interaction with surrounding Asian societies—not through 
brief study trips or conferences, but by staying in other countries for 
periods of time that allowed one to physically experience the life of 
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ordinary people and to participate in leisured and unstructured con-
versations and friendships with local people. Far from emphasizing 
the separation of Japan from Asia, Tsurumi aimed—by “thinking 
while walking”—to develop an understanding of the interconnections 
between Japan and its region that Japanese academia and media gen-
erally ignored. This approach is best illustrated by his two widely sold 
short studies, Bananas and the Japanese [Banana to Nihonjin]22 and 
The Eye of the Sea Slug [Namako no Me].23 Bananas and the Japanese 
uses the simple but—at that time—quite radical device of examining 
Japan’s deep structural relationship to its region by exploring the 
way in which the humble banana finds its way onto Japanese dining 
tables. In the process, Tsurumi shows how minor changes in con-
sumption patterns in Japan can have huge effects on the lives and 
social structures of people many thousands of miles away in the pro-
ducing villages of Southeast Asia. The Eye of the Sea Slug undertakes 
a similar exploration of the historical development of the trade in the 
delicacy namako (raw sea cucumber), this time revealing the threads 
of connection between Japan and the Indonesian archipelago. These 
studies formed the basis of campaigns by PARC and other related 
groups to denounce the environmentally or socially exploitative prac-
tices of Japanese multinational corporations, and to develop alterna-
tive fair trade networks between Japan and Asian communities.
 At the same time, Tsurumi depicted Asia as a prism through 
which Japanese people could come to have a new sense of their own 
history and identity. Reacting against the tradition of Asian studies 
that focused on the unifying influence of the great civilizations of 
China, India and beyond, Tsurumi instead argued for an approach 
that viewed the region from multiple peripheral perspectives. Viewed 
from the periphery, he suggested, the most significant characteristic 
of Asia was its diversity: “Asia definitely is not one.” 24 By studying 
the rich mixture of cultures and languages that constituted a country 
like the Philippines, he proposed, Japanese people might be made 
more sensitive to the presence of minorities and of regional diversity 
within their own society.25
 The Pacific Asia Resource Center, which Tsurumi helped to 
create, reflects this approach, describing its goals as follows:
[to] create a society where people of the “North” and people of the 
“South” can live with equality and harmony. We believe that changes 
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achieved by individuals will help bring about change in Japanese 
society as a whole—as well as help achieve a more balanced North-
South relationship.26
As is the case with many of the more successful grassroots social 
movements in Japan, PARC has helped to spawn a range of other 
related groups working on issues such as human rights and fair trade 
in Asia: among them the People’s Plan Study Group (established in 
1998) and a nationwide network of “Free Schools” ( Jiyû Gakkô ) run-
ning evening classes and lectures on social issues (often those linking 
Japan and other Asian countries).
Matsui Yayori and Women’s Asia
For Matsui Yayori, too, Asia definitely was not one, but a place riven 
with class and gender inequality. While Tsurumi’s Asianism sought 
solidarity with Asian farmers, fishers, craftspeople and factory workers, 
rather than with political and economic elites, Matsui’s Asianism 
sought solidarity specifically with Asian women, who, even as national 
economies expanded, “suffered most from the feminization of poverty 
and an increase in violence, as well as from many other violations of 
human rights and unprecedented environmental destruction in the 
region”.27 For Matsui, the dilemmas of identity visible in Tsurumi’s 
work were in some ways simplified by a focus on gender. Wealth and 
power might separate Japanese women from their Asian sisters, but 
gender provided a basis for solidarity. Women, she wrote, “are truly 
the ‘last colony’, and thus the suffering in Asia caused by the new 
colonialism of First World countries can be seen most clearly through 
the eyes of women”.28
 Yet for Matsui and her colleagues, too, solidarity was no simple 
matter, and an identity as “Asian woman” was something that needed 
to be hard won rather than taken for granted. This problem is parti-
cularly vividly illustrated by the opening words of the founding decla-
ration on “Asia and Women’s Liberation” issued by the Asian Women’s 
Association in 1977:
The “modernization” accomplished by Japan since the Meiji Restora-
tion was a history of the invasion of Asia, and the [Japanese] women 
who have lived their lives during the past hundred years have also 
been aggressors complicit in that invasion. We have finally learnt 
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that fact from Asian women … The people who once formed the 
vanguard of the invading army burning, killing, pillaging and raping 
women in China, the Korean Peninsula and other Asian counties 
were our relatives, friends and lovers. Now, we refuse any longer 
to continue to be women who will send husbands and lovers as 
the vanguard of economic and sexual invasion. Without this deter-
mination, it will surely be impossible to make our own liberation a 
reality.29
In such statements we can see some of the themes repeated in grass-
roots Asianisms from the 1970s and 1980s onward. Asia is under-
stood to be characterized not by any inherent common culture, but 
by the experience of exploitation and suffering. Its “other” is a “First 
World”, which is often identified with the West but which is not 
geographically confined to Europe and North America. Rather, “the 
West/First World” is a particular (exploitative and militarized) form 
of modernity that is also to be found within Japan and within the 
ruling elites of other Asian countries. By allying themselves to ex-
ploited groups within Asia, the participants in this grassroots Asianism 
sought to transform their own identity while bringing about change 
within Japan itself as well as in the broader region. In their critiques 
of “First World” capitalist development and of Japan’s complicity 
with transnational capitalism and US military power, Tsurumi’s and 
Matsui’s ideas are close to those of Nakamura Tetsu and the Peshawar-
kai (as described by Hatsuse Ryûhei). However, neither Tsurumi nor 
Matsui would have identified humanitarianism as the philosophical 
basis of their engagement with Asia. Rather, they saw themselves as 
being involved in a struggle for political transformation based on 
notions of social justice and (in Matsui’s case) feminism.
Regional Society and Grassroots Asianism: The East Asia 
Collaborative Workshop
Both Tsurumi Yoshiyuki and Matsui Yayori were intellectuals working 
largely outside formal academia, but both were very much part of the 
metropolitan progressive circles, and the organizations they founded 
were Tokyo-based. To understand the extent and nature of grassroots 
engagement with Asia, however, it is important also to look outside 
the metropolis and consider the connections made by civil society to 
Chap7 (156-180).indd   166 10/8/15   11:56:20 AM
 Asianisms from Below 167
other parts of Japan. Groups such as PARC and the Asian Women’s 
Association illustrate an important characteristic of Japan’s “invisible 
Asianism”: its “dandelion clock” structure. I shall return to the image 
of the dandelion clock later. In essence, though, it means that groups 
tend to be small and often quite short-lived, but members, as they 
disperse, often move on to establish other small organizations of their 
own, creating loosely linked networks of grassroots activism. The 
Pacific Asia Resource Center spawned the creation of the loose net-
work of “Free Schools”, of which there are now nine—from Sapporo 
in the north to Fukuoka in the south—while the Asian Woman’s 
Association (as we shall see) also inspired locally based activism. To 
illustrate this dispersal of the seeds of grassroots Asianism throughout 
local communities, I shall consider two examples: the cases of the 
East Asia Collaborative Workshop and of cross-border links to Asia 
created by Kim Sun-yeoul, a Sendai-based participant in the 1980s 
Asian Women’s Association.30
 The East Asia Collaborative Workshop (Higashi Ajia Kyôdô 
Wâkushoppu) — founded in northwestern Hokkaido in 1997 and 
originally called the Japan-Korea Collaborative Workshop (Nikkan 
Kyôdô Wâkushoppu) — embodies ideas of engagement with Asia that 
in many ways resemble the approaches of Tsurumi Yoshiyuki and 
Matsui Yayori. The Workshop, however, was also strongly influenced 
by a third stream of late 20th century Japanese thought that had a 
widespread impact on grassroots Asianisms: the concept of “People’s 
History” ( minshûshi ). As Carol Gluck observed, the People’s History 
movement began to emerge in the 1960s as a reaction to both ortho-
dox Marxism and modernization theory. Its leading proponents, who 
included Irokawa Daikichi (b. 1925), Kanô Masanao (b. 1931) and 
Yasumaru Yoshio (b. 1934), aimed “to revive the individual as an 
agent of historical change” and “to make the people into the subjects, 
not merely the objects, of political authority”.31 In this sense, they 
approached history with a focus on the everyday life of “ordinary peo-
ple” and a suspicion of dogmatic theorizing that resembles Tsurumi 
Yoshiyuki’s approach to Asian studies.
 People’s History, particularly in its early phases, focused largely on 
events within the national boundaries of Japan but also had impli-
cations for perceptions of Japan’s place in the region. Takashi Fujitani 
explores how the People’s History pioneer Yasumaru Yoshio developed 
a view of history that radically confronted the modernization theories 
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popular in 1960s Japan and the United States.32 Modernization theory 
tended to depict Japan as somehow distinct from the rest of Asia in 
its unique potential to follow US and European models of economic 
and social development, thus transforming itself into the “New Far 
West”.33 Yasumaru, on the contrary, explored radical, politicized and 
conflictual histories of local society to present a picture of Japan’s 
recent past far removed from that of the modernization theorists, 
and thus “effectively intervened in the 1960s and 1970s against the 
modernist social scientists’ classical orientalist assumptions about 
peasants, the village community and Asia”.34
 Just as Inoue Kiyoshi’s approach to history had helped to inspire 
local circle movements in the 1950s, so in the 1970s and 1980s the 
People’s History movement inspired the creation of a number of local 
history groups throughout Japan, and (like the Ehime Women’s His-
tory a quarter of a century earlier) some of these went on to promote 
new visions of Asian solidarity. In northern Hokkaido, a key figure 
in this process was an energetic and charismatic local history teacher 
named Koike Kikô (1916–2003), originally from Tokyo. Because of 
his involvement in trade unionism and his opposition to the content 
of officially approved history textbooks, he lost his position as a 
high school teacher during the “Red Purge” in the latter part of the 
occupation period. In 1953 he obtained a position as a teacher at a 
school in Kitami, in northeastern Hokkaido, where he spent the rest 
of his career, and in the early 1970s he established a local research 
group called the Okhotsk People’s History Study Group (Ohôtsuku 
Minshûshi Kôza), named after the Okhotsk Sea, which washes Hok-
kaido’s northern shores.
 Within a few years, the Okhotsk group was attracting audiences 
of several hundred to its regular lecture series, and its tenth anniver-
sary conference in 1982 was attended by around 1,000 people.35 The 
group’s aim was to uncover the forgotten voices of local residents: 
voices unheard in mainstream grand narratives of the settlement of 
Hokkaido, which tended to present relatively triumphalist stories of 
the achievements of pioneer settlers. Among the early subjects of 
its research were the experiences of convict labourers who had been 
brought to northern Hokkaido to work on construction projects. 
(Kitami’s neighbouring city of Abashiri is still home to one of Japan’s 
largest prisons, with a history dating back to the 19th century.) Even 
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after the abolition of convict labour in the 1890s, poor and unem-
ployed men continued to be shipped to Hokkaido from other parts of 
Japan to work as takobeya (literally “octopus pot”) labourers: contract 
workers who were kept confined in barracks on mining or construc-
tion sites, often working in very harsh conditions for minimal wages.
 As oral history collection and the physical excavation and restora-
tion of historical sites progressed, however, the spatial contours of the 
Okhotsk Group’s work began to change. Digging into the past, the 
group struck (as it were) underground veins or rivers connecting their 
local area not just to other parts of Japan but also across borders to 
other parts of Asia. Research on the takobeya labourers, for example, 
proved to flow into the story of the importation of labour from Korea 
and China.36 From the late 1930s onwards, with growing numbers 
of Japanese workers serving in the military, the Japanese government 
had passed the first of a series of increasingly coercive laws to con-
script Korean colonial subjects for work in mines and on construction 
sites in Japan. These workers were generally employed—alongside 
Japanese labourers recruited from the poorest strata of society—in the 
quasi-penal conditions of the takobeya system, and many were sent to 
labour sites in remote parts of Hokkaido.
 The cross-border spread of the Okhotsk Group’s research illus-
trates the workings of the dandelion clock principle. Several partici-
pants in the group, who came from the Sorachi region to the west 
of Kitami, soon decided to establish their own local Sorachi People’s 
History Study Group circle on similar lines.37 The Sorachi area, as 
they discovered, contained a number of mines and dams where many 
Korean and Chinese forced labourers had been employed during the 
war. One of the most important of their research sites was Shuma-
rinai, where a vast hydroelectric dam was constructed by Japanese and 
Korean labour conscripts during the war, and where many labourers 
who died in accidents and from harsh working conditions had been 
buried in unmarked graves. As the Sorachi group’s research on local 
history progressed, it evolved into a wider movement bringing to-
gether young people from Japan, Korea and elsewhere to excavate 
such sites, discuss issues of cross-border history, and (in some cases) 
also to return the remains of Japanese and Korean workers who died 
on labour sites in northern Hokkaido to their families. This was the 
start of the East Asia Collaborative Workshop, whose participants 
include Zainichi Koreans (members of the Korean ethnic minority in 
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Japan) and Ainu, as well as Japanese and young people from other 
parts of Asia and beyond. By 2010 more than 1,000 people had taken 
part in the workshops.38
 If Tsurumi Yoshiyuki sought to create new forms of engagement 
with Asia by “thinking while walking”, the East Asia Collaborative 
Workshop could be said to aim at a new sense of community created 
by “thinking while digging”. By engaging together in the manual 
labour of excavating the past, as well as by debate and discussion, 
participants in the workshop aim to transcend national boundaries 
and the divisions created by the violence of history. In the words 
of the Young People’s East Asia Declaration [Wakamonotachi no Higashi 
Ajia Sengen], written by one of the group’s key organizers, the Japa-
nese Buddhist priest Tonohira Yoshihiko, “our experience is that by 
labouring and sweating together, and through dialogue conducted 
while living together, we have been able to have human encounters 
of unexpected depth”.39
 The group offers no comprehensive macro vision of Asian soli-
darity but rather focuses specifically on East Asia (particularly on the 
Japan-Korea relationship) and on forging micro-level solidarity be-
tween individuals through shared experience. Its notion of regionalism 
is not of a natural community based on fixed or eternal values, but 
rather of a community of the future, to be imagined and created 
through the coming together of young people across national borders. 
As in so much late 20th century Japanese Asianism, Japan’s colonial-
ism and wartime aggression were seen as the greatest obstacle to “be-
coming Asian”; but at the same time, addressing this past is presented 
as the most meaningful way of creating a common Asian future:
Half a century has passed since the end of the Second World War, 
which claimed tens of millions of lives. Humanity has inherited the 
legacy of that war, and must face a present in which it has still only 
progressed half the way along the path to overcoming that legacy. 
Particularly in Asia, Japan, which was an active participant in colo-
nization and the fifteen years war, has allowed fifty years to pass 
without taking responsibility or making recompense to Asian vic-
tims of war. This fact has created a major obstacle preventing Asian 
countries and Japan from living as friends in the same Asia … From 
Shumarinai, which was once a cruel place of war and colonialism, 
we seek to make a place of reconciliation where we shall construct a 
new human relationship in Asia.40
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Weaving Asia: Kim Sun-yeoul and the Asian 
Women’s Association
Like the Okhotsk People’s History Study Group, Matsui Yayori’s Asian 
Women’s Association also acted as a seedbed for a range of small 
groups that sought to build both practical and conceptual links be-
tween Japan and other Asian countries. This process can be illustrated 
by considering the life and activism of the Zainichi Korean woman 
Kim Sun-yeoul, now in her late 70s and living in the northeastern 
Japanese city of Sendai. Kim’s father migrated to Japan from the 
southern Korean island of Jeju as a labourer in the pre-war period. 
She was born in Osaka in 1932, and as a teenager she participated in 
a left-wing study circle created in the city during the post-war occu-
pation period. Soon after, she and her family moved to Sendai, where 
Kim worked as a seamstress to support her brothers and sisters, and 
where she married a Japanese left-wing activist (despite intense oppo-
sition from her Korean family) and had two children.
 Kim Sun-yeoul’s husband had given up a job in the public service 
to devote himself full time to political activism for a peace movement 
with links to the Communist Party. His only income was the occa-
sional payment that he received for giving speeches at meetings. 
The couple had two children—a son and a daughter—and it was 
Sun-yeoul who not only looked after the children while her husband 
travelled the country on speaking tours, but also earned the family’s 
income with her needlework. The years passed; her children grew; 
and Kim Sun-yeoul’s life was taken up with an endless dawn-to-
midnight cycle of housework, childcare, sewing and an unrelenting 
struggle to make ends meet. Meanwhile, her father died, and her 
mother and five of her six siblings decided to join the mass “repatria-
tion” of ethnic Koreans from Japan to North Korea, leaving Sun-yeoul 
and one younger sister as the only family members still living in 
Japan. The family was now irrevocably divided by a Cold War that 
has not yet ended.41
 As Kim remembers, it was in the second half of the 1970s that 
she began to awake from what seemed like a long and troubled sleep. 
Her husband had promised when they were married that, “like Jean-
Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir”, they would have the right of 
divorce at any time. Sun-yeoul was convinced that as long as she re-
mained married, her life would never change, so, taking her husband 
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at his word, she sought a divorce and embarked on what she saw as 
her second chance at life.
 A key influence on this new life was her encounter with the re-
cently founded Asian Women’s Association. Kim Sun-yeoul first heard 
of the association through newspaper reports. She had never met any 
of its members, but she was so intrigued and excited by what she 
read that she telephoned their headquarters and was told that she 
was welcome to attend their meetings in Tokyo. When she joined the 
association, it was embarking on a new scheme to develop fair trade 
support for women textile workers in Bangladesh, and this seemed 
a perfect opportunity to link her skills with work to help women in 
some of the poorest parts of Asia. There were, however, serious prac-
tical obstacles to be overcome. As a Zainichi Korean with Chôsen 
registration,42 Kim Sun-yeoul had no passport and was unable to 
obtain a visa for Bangladesh. Undaunted, she set off for Thailand with 
nothing but a re-entry document for Japan, in the hope of being able 
to apply for a Bangladesh visa once she reached Bangkok. Her visa 
application was rejected, but during this first journey outside of Japan 
she travelled as far as the Thai-Malaysian border and grasped the pos-
sibility of creating a network connecting Thai women weavers directly 
to the Japanese market. The result was the creation of the Association 
for Linking with Thai Villagers through Handwoven Textiles (Teori-
mono o Tôshite Tai Nôson no Hitobito to Tsunagaru Kai, hereafter 
the Handwoven Textile Association), established in 1984 by Kim 
Sun-yeoul in cooperation with a Japanese volunteer whom she had 
met on her travels.
 Kim Sun-yeoul’s engagement with Asia reflects her own aware-
ness of her position both as a Korean living in Japan and as a person 
engaged in a form of craft production that linked her to other Asian 
women. Oguma Eiji highlights Japanese progressive intellectuals’ dis-
covery of the “other within”; but, by the 1980s, Zainichi Koreans, 
Ainu, Okinawans and others were becoming not merely the “other” 
with whom Japanese Asianists sought to interact, but also active parti-
cipants in the creation of grassroots links between Japan and other 
parts of Asia, able to bring their own distinct perspectives to the 
process. Kim’s position made it possible for her to engage with other 
Asian women on relatively (though not wholly) horizontal terms. Her 
explicit aim was not to be an activist or a volunteer, but rather to 
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form links with women in other parts of Asia in a way that was com-
patible with her own work. Indeed, her vision of Japan’s connection 
to Asia expresses a mistrust of the “volunteer” model, which she sees 
as symptomatic of a sense of Japanese superiority to its neighbours:
if you go outside [of Japan] you can clearly see how volunteer 
activism, with its pretentious notion of benevolently helping poor 
people, springs from the idea of belonging to the West not Asia 
[Datsu-A Nyû-Ô shisô] that Japanese society has unceasingly main-
tained ever since the Meiji era.43
Kim’s activism therefore resembled much grassroots engagement with 
the region in being a “micro-Asianism”, which deliberately sought to 
focus on practical, concrete connections rather than on grand narra-
tives of politics or culture. If she worked very hard at her dress-
making, she could save up the 100,000 yen (around $1,000) that she 
needed to make an annual visit to Thailand of up to one month.
When I went to the Northeast of Thailand I was really surprised. 
People there were dyeing and weaving fabric from artificial fibres like 
tetron and nylon, manufactured by Toray and other Japanese com-
panies, and selling it for more than the price of local silk fabrics. For 
example, silk fabric might cost 500 yen a metre and tetron fabric 
700 yen a metre. I was so astonished. It seemed all wrong that these 
companies were coming in, and people were being persuaded to use 
artificial products instead of the beautiful traditional materials. So I 
thought that if we could pay a bit more to buy their traditional silk 
fabric, the local village economies could benefit.44
Back in Japan, as the movement gathered support, Kim Sun-yeoul 
began to organize exhibitions to display the Thai woven fabrics to 
Japanese buyers. She also made clothes from the imported fabrics and 
sold them to Japanese customers, making sure to take pictures of the 
finished products back to the villages where the textiles originated. 
The problems were substantial. Kim spoke no Thai; she was some-
times assisted by an interpreter from a Bangkok university or by 
Japanese volunteers in Thailand, but sometimes she communicated by 
gesture and sign language. Exchanging money, she recalls, was parti-
cularly difficult, because she had no passport and was therefore viewed 
with much suspicion by local bank clerks. The problems of travel 
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without a passport, indeed, eventually persuaded her to change her 
alien registration from Chôsen to Kankoku, which enabled her to ob-
tain a South Korean passport.
 In this way she was also able to travel more widely in South and 
Southeast Asia and to extend her fair trade activities to Bangladesh. 
A distinctive part of the Bangladesh project was a literacy programme 
based on embroidery. In the villages that Kim Sun-yeoul visited, 
many of the men were absent, working in cities to earn money for 
their families. Since most of the women were illiterate, they were 
unable to write to their husbands. However, they were exceptionally 
skilled needlewomen, and Kim found that by encouraging them to 
incorporate the letters of Bengali script into their embroidery designs, 
she could help them to learn to read and write.45
 An underlying dilemma of grassroots activism in Japan is the 
question of organization and institutionalization. Kim Sun-yeoul 
shared with others of her generation a deep suspicion of large hierar-
chical political organizations such as the Communist Party and the 
large party-affiliated peace movements of the 1950s and 1960s. By 
the late 1990s, the textile fair trade network that she had helped to 
establish, although still relatively small in scale, had begun to receive 
financial support from a variety of Japanese grant-giving bodies and 
was becoming increasingly institutionalized.
When I went to one of the mountain areas of Thailand, there were 
villages where all the people would gather and make a kind of patch-
work together. I asked them about their equipment, and it turned 
out that they didn’t have any rulers or irons or patterns, and yet they 
could make the most amazingly beautiful patchwork. They told me 
that if you looked at the design from above, you just knew what 
needed to be done. In other words, these were real craftspeople. 
When I saw that, I thought, “coming from a developed country isn’t 
such a big deal. It’s not something to be conceited about.” The peo-
ple who made these patchwork fabrics weren’t recognized as being 
“artisans”, they were just village women, but for centuries they had 
absorbed the traditions of this craft. I though it was wonderful. And 
at the same time, I felt more and more strongly that it was a mistake 
for people from an economic giant like Japan to go to these villages 
and condescendingly say “We’ve come to help you.” So I thought 
that, once these village women had reached a certain level of finan-
cial independence, it was time for us to withdraw …46
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With divisions emerging within the Handwoven Textile Association 
about the best future strategies, Kim Sun-yeoul left the organization 
in 1996. Meanwhile, however, she had also been engaged with other 
Sendai-based women’s study groups, and in 1998 she embarked on a 
further border-crossing project: one that sought to cross the internal 
borders separating majority Japanese society from the “others within”. 
In 1988 she and others created a group in Sendai to increase knowl-
edge of the situation of the Korean community in Japan amongst the 
local community.47 Kim Sun-yeoul and her co-workers named this 
new group Param Sendai.
Tokyo is always seen as being the centre of things. But, from around 
the time when I got involved in the textiles movement, I started to 
dislike the idea that the flow of things was always from Tokyo to 
Sendai. Instead, I wanted it to be from Sendai to Tokyo. So that’s why 
we called this group Param Sendai. Param is the Korean for wind; so 
the meaning is “the wind that blows from Sendai”.48
Its members meet monthly, with each taking turns to organize a 
gathering on a topic related to the Zainichi Korean community. 
Members sometimes speak about their own experiences, organize 
readings of texts, invite speakers from other parts of Japan, issue an 
occasional newsletter, and have conducted oral history interviews with 
Zainichi Koreans living in the Sendai area. A characteristic of the 
group is its loose and flexible structure. It has no officer bearers, 
committee or formal leaders.49 Its membership, too, has been a rela-
tively floating one: though a handful of central members have been 
involved since the group’s founding, many are students or temporary 
residents in Sendai, who leave when they move elsewhere or find that 
their careers leave no time for participation in meetings.
 Flexibility has its costs. As time has passed, the number of parti-
cipants has fallen and the group has found it hard to keep its momen-
tum going. The massive impact of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami 
on the movement remains to be seen. Yet those who leave the group 
do not necessarily abandon its aims. Some move on elsewhere, to 
places where they in turn may initiate new actions of their own. 
The Param Sendai’s icon is the image of a young woman holding a 
dandelion clock up to catch the wind, which scatters its seeds across 
the landscape. As I suggested earlier, this seems to me an apt image 
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for Japan’s “invisible civil society” as a whole. Groups are small and 
dispersed, like dandelions, pushing their shoots up, often through 
unfertile terrain. Like dandelions, they too are often short-lived, but 
their disappearance should not necessarily be read as failure. When 
members scatter, they take ideas and experiences with them. Who 
knows where the seeds fall or how they will germinate.
Conclusion
Through a rather detailed examination of small-scale examples, this 
chapter has sought to shed light on Japan’s “invisible Asianisms”. We 
can trace tendencies of thought, emerging from around the 1970s 
onward, which sought to define new paths for Japanese engagement 
with Asia. These new Asianisms drew on earlier traditions, including 
the “circle” movement of the early post-war years, but developed 
them in the light of late 20th century notions of alternative develop-
ment, feminism and people’s history. A particularly important element 
of these Asianisms from below was that they were not confined to 
academic discourse but were, in various ways, put into practice by 
small grassroots movements, many of them based outside Japan’s 
major metropolitan areas.
 This exploration has suggested some of the factors that have kept 
grassroots Asianism invisible. The lack of large formal organizations 
has made sustained networking over prolonged periods difficult. 
Relying as they do on the commitment of individuals, grassroots 
groups are liable to dissolve when the central member or members 
have to withdraw due to age, ill health, work commitments, etc. 
Disagreements between core members also sometimes lead to fission 
or dispersal. The ability of grassroots groups to influence Japanese 
national politics is limited by their small-scale, local character and 
conscious wariness of centralized political organizations.
 New groups continue to form as old ones disappear. For histo-
rians, a particularly important task is to chart and record the paths 
taken by Japan’s “invisible Asianisms” to date. Exploring this history 
makes us conscious of the mass of fine threads that already binds 
Japanese society to surrounding countries. The experiences of these 
groups can also provide a fund of ideas for new activities that will 
emerge as younger generations take up the task of strengthening and 
expanding cross-border civil society in East Asia.
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Chapter  Eight
Coming to Terms with Asianism: 
Historical Reconciliation and 
Asianist History Politics in 
Contemporary China and Japan
Torsten Weber
Introduction
The politics of the past have become an omnipresent factor in vir-
tually every terrain of the public sphere in East Asia, particularly 
Sino-Japanese relations, including diplomacy, education, political and 
social discourse, and the economy. As could be observed on frequent 
occasions during the past decade, references to history serve as power-
ful arguments in political practices and debates that can stir up mas-
sive violent protests, halt bilateral exchanges, and severely damage 
business relations. Since the beginning of the new millennium the 
“history wars” have erupted practically on an annual basis. They 
reached extremes in the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in 
Beijing and other Chinese cities in spring 2005 (textbook dispute, 
Yasukuni visits) and again in autumn 2012 (territorial dispute). On 
these occasions the politicized usage of the past as an instrument to 
appeal to a certain segment of the public or to the wider public at 
large played a key role in stirring up fanatical sentiments that ren-
dered any critical debate over historical details, facts and nuanced 
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interpretations impossible. In 2005 the protests, which to smaller de-
grees also erupted in South Korea and among overseas Chinese com-
munities, reacted to the assumed whitewashing of Japanese war crimes 
in Japanese history textbooks. In part they were also fuelled by the 
regular visits of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō to the 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine war memorial in Tokyo during his pre-
miership (2001–06).1 In 2012, a different history clash between Japan 
and China (re-)emerged, namely over the ownership of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed also by Taiwan. Both major inci-
dents, regardless of their differences, highlight the significance of the 
past in today’s political practice and discourse between China and 
Japan. As the American historian Daqing Yang has observed in the 
context of the disputes over the Nanjing Massacre—arguably the 
most prominent and extensively researched site of Sino-Japanese his-
tory wars during the past decades2—in modern Sino-Japanese history 
there is little stable ground (“stable truth”) on which commonly ac-
cepted narratives of the past can be based.3 By “stable truth” Yang 
refers to a consensus among professional historians on facts and inter-
pretations of the past that may form the base of a shared under-
standing of history among a community that transcends the profession 
of historians and may also transcend one nation. Only when such 
a consensus has been reached can other, diverging, narratives be dis-
missed as denials of this “stable truth”.
 But the term “stable” can also refer to a functional dimension of 
history for contemporary society. The past, or more precisely certain 
narratives of the past, may contribute to stabilizing societies that have 
become unsteady due to traumatic historical experiences, be it as 
victims or as perpetrators. In the context of World War II in Europe 
and the Holocaust, the lasting, dominant, and often destabilizing 
influence of the past over the present has metaphorically been referred 
to, by Aleida Assmann and others, as the “long shadow” that the past 
casts on the present. Like a real shadow, it can be treated as a natural 
physical phenomenon that is negligible or controllable; but shadows 
can also bring with them darkening and obscuration, and they can 
haunt people and leave them traumatized, especially when they appear 
unexpectedly or are omnipresent. Coming to terms with the past, 
known in the field by its oft-quoted German term Vergangenheits-
bewältigung, is usually seen as the prescription written against collec-
tive traumatization as a result of the persistence of the past in the 
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present. But how do peoples and societies come to terms with the 
past when it serves as a forceful means of history politics in the 
public sphere?
 In this study of the politics of the past in the context of trans-
national Asianist discourse, I propose to supplement the intimidating 
and negative character of the “long and dark shadows of the past” 
with more positively connoted lighter shadows or shades of the past. 
By this I suggest understanding how the past is employed as a means 
of political partisanship for the end of historical reconciliation in 
East Asia. Similar to the way purposefully installed window blinds 
create shade that shelters from the heat, these lighter shades of the 
past are intended to cool off the heated disputes of the “history wars” 
and to provide a forum for relaxation and constructive conversations 
over the past. One explicit aim of this discourse is the search for 
commonalities, broadly defined as anything ranging from pragmatic to 
essentialist features such as shared interests (strategic, economic, etc.) 
or joint cultural heritage (script, spiritual and material culture, etc.). 
Interestingly, this search also includes the re-appreciation of various 
concepts (ab)used in the wartime past as propaganda by and for the 
Japanese empire, from its early expansion in the Meiji period (1868–
1912) through the creation of the quasi-puppet regime of Manchukuo 
in Northeast China (1932), and to the formation of the so-called 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (1940). Focusing on two 
conceptual pairs that have re-emerged centrally in East Asian political 
discourse during the past decade, the following sections examine the 
networks driving this debate and their strategies of political uses of 
the past (a) to promote historical reconciliation in contemporary East 
Asia and (b) to replace nationalist by regionalist politics of the past.
Governments, Think Tanks and Civil Society 
Networks
In reaction to the Sino-Japanese disputes of 2005 over the “correct” 
portrayal of the wartime past in the public domestic spheres (history 
textbooks, monuments, public commemorations, etc.) both govern-
ments agreed to set up a joint committee for history research in 2006. 
The committee’s main aims were, in the words of a Japanese parti-
cipant, “to depoliticize the issue of historical recognition [historical 
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consciousness], and to promote mutual understanding in the spirit of 
‘agree to disagree’”.4 Against the background of the diplomatic ice age 
in Sino-Japanese relations during Koizumi’s premiership, the imple-
mentation of this initiative may already be seen as a major success. 
The committee consisted of ten leading historians from each country 
and was subdivided into two groups, one each for ancient/medieval 
history and modern/contemporary history. The Japanese delegation 
was led by the conservative historian Kitaoka Shin’ichi, an expert on 
Japanese diplomatic history and former ambassador to the United 
Nations. It also included three historians from private universities. 
The Chinese delegation consisted of historians from the state-run 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Peking University. It was 
led by Bu Ping, director of the Institute of Modern History at the 
academy. Eventually, the committee failed to reach its main targets. 
First, due to severe conflicts of opinion between the Chinese and 
Japanese delegations, the final results could not be presented as sched-
uled during 2008, which coincided with the 30th anniversary of the 
Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Friendship. They were published only after 
a two-year delay. Second, far from reaching a consensus as a stable 
basis for a shared historical consciousness, the committee presented 
separate accounts that contained many diverging statements con-
cerning modern and contemporary history. The Japanese historian 
Kawashima Shin attributed this failure in part to the top-down nature 
of the project and called on non-governmental organizations and 
civil society actors to actively participate in projects of joint historical 
research and reconciliation:
New problems were created because of gaps in understanding be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese sides as well as communication 
problems at all three levels [historians, governments, media]. One 
conclusion is that intergovernmental joint research may harden the 
shells of both sides’ national histories in the end, making it neces-
sary to encourage private institutions to conduct research on histori-
cal recognition in the future.5
In fact, even before the joint intergovernmental committee was inau-
gurated, a number of groups had emerged that committed themselves 
to easing the tensions between both countries by addressing issues 
perceived as critical for a common understanding of the past. Their 
focus was particularly on the modern period of fierce and continuous 
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Sino-Japanese rivalry. On the semi-official level, these groups include 
think tanks such as the Japanese Council on East Asian Community, 
the Chinese Boao Forum, and the Korean Northeast Asian History 
Foundation; the transnational scholarly networks of the Inter-Asia 
Cultural Studies movement and the International Committee on East 
Asian Community; a tri-national civil society history textbook com-
mittee and political activists’ groups as the Japanese Asia New Epoch 
and Shitamachi group; and local and regional grassroots activists such 
as the People’s Plan Study Group and the Collaborative East Asian 
Workshop.6 With respect to sources of funding and access to political 
decision makers, groups on the semi-official level are relatively close 
to the official level. Often, they have been established as a result of 
strategic policy making on the national or regional level. On the other 
side, transnational civil society networks usually have less access to 
resources and influence on political decision making. Some of their 
work, however, has gained prominence in public debate, and some 
members have emerged as political opinion leaders. The main focus 
of these groups, however, is practical work on the grassroots com-
munity level or theoretical debate. Despite their heterogeneity, these 
networks largely share three major concerns. First, they recognize 
the overwhelmingly negative force of history politics in the bilateral 
relations and their damaging impact on the respective societies. As 
countermeasures, they seek new approaches to coming to terms with 
the past that may potentially contribute to overcoming the prevailing 
history problems. Second, although this varies considerably between 
the groups, they acknowledge that convincing the opposite side of 
one’s own “truth” is futile, and, as a result, that forging a shared his-
torical consciousness requires an exchange of opinions as a prerequi-
site to achieving a common understanding based on tolerance towards 
diverging foci and interpretations. As a consequence, most of these 
groups consist of transnational membership and actively seek coopera-
tion and exchange across national borders. Third, a common topic 
addressed in this discourse is the potential positive concept of “Asia”, 
which includes a critical re-evaluation of Asianist concepts from the 
past.7 In this way, during the past decade, the first steps have been 
taken towards the creation of a transnational public sphere in East 
Asia driven by micro-East Asian communities that share a principally 
positive stance towards Asianisms.
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Rehabilitating “Asia”, Coming to Terms with the Past
Importantly, these positive—that is, affirmative—attitudes towards 
themes of Asian commonality are based mainly on a functional, not 
an essentialist, understanding of “Asia”. As a consequence, Asia is 
not defined by assumed inherent or typical Asian characteristics that 
informed the so-called Asian values debate of the 1990s.8 Nor do its 
proponents subscribe to the booming idea of a coming “Asian cen-
tury” that celebrates the “rise of Asia”.9 Instead, the rehabilitation 
of Asia as a meaningful concept in political discourse rests on two 
basic assumptions: first, that Asianist concepts of the past can serve 
as positive models for the present and future; and, second, that in 
order to do so, their imperialist and hegemonic legacies need to be 
put into perspective. This, in turn, requires a complicated balancing 
act between the re-appreciation of Asianist conceptions and Asianist 
moments from the past, on the one hand, and acknowledging the 
complicity of Asianism with imperialism that created the history 
problems in the first place, on the other hand. While this bifurcated 
task has led to a revisionist revival that seeks to exonerate historical 
Asianism in toto from its propagandistic role in Japanese imperialism,10 
it has also encouraged others to critically address both roles in a 
larger historical perspective that draws attention to the potential and 
pitfalls of Asianist discourse, historically and today.11 In other words, 
coming to terms with the past has become both a prerequisite and 
a consequence of the rehabilitation of Asia as a means of historical 
reconciliation. In this way, not only can nationalist rivalries (and 
narratives reinforcing such rivalries) be put into perspective, but Asia 
may function as one key reference that can be shared, commonly dis-
cussed and defined by people in Asia across national borders; it is a 
vehicle for creating a common discourse and language and, as a pos-
sible consequence, a common historical consciousness.
 The development of a common discourse and consciousness is 
also deemed necessary in a second context within which affirmative 
stances towards Asianisms have re-emerged during the past decade: 
East Asian regionalism. Since the late 1990s, various mechanisms 
have been established to foster regional cooperation, particularly after 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997. These include the adoption of the 
ASEAN plus Three framework (1997), the East Asian Summit 
meetings (2005), and the Trilateral Summits of China, Japan and 
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South Korea (since 2008). Unsurprisingly, these processes too have 
triggered a political discourse that addresses issues of Asian common-
ality through legacies of historical Asianisms. In many ways, there-
fore, politicians and diplomats involved in proposing (or rejecting) 
steps towards further cooperation or even integration in East Asia 
speak the same language as the above-mentioned networks. This was 
epitomized in the proposal of a “New Asianism for the 21st Century” 
by the high-ranking Chinese diplomat Wang Yi in 2006 and in the 
debate that followed the proposal of an “East Asian Community” by 
Hatoyama Yukio on the eve of his becoming prime minister of Japan 
in 2009.12 Common themes include general aspects such as the role 
of the West as Asia’s Other and of Europe as a model of post-war 
integration and reconciliation. They also address precise motifs from 
modern history such as personal friendships between the Chinese 
revolutionary Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and his Japanese supporters, 
and, as will be studied in more detail below, the historical conceptual 
pairs of “Leaving Asia” vs. “Entering Asia” and the “Kingly Way” vs. 
the “Hegemonic Way”.
 Yet, the Asianist entanglement between regionalism and historical 
reconciliation has also disclosed some major differences between both 
discursive streams. As regionalism increasingly displays itself as a site 
of competition for national leadership and as an instrument of orga-
nizing and maximizing strategic, diplomatic and economic interests 
and benefits geopolitically, it has become viewed as an obstacle to—
rather than a means of—reconciliation. Referring to Asian regionalism 
as pursuing an “Asia for the rich”,13 Prasenjit Duara has warned of 
the neo-liberal agenda of Asianism as regionalism that aims at yielding 
state-led and corporate modes of connecting and coordinating. By 
contrast, Asianist discourse that is part of the historical reconciliation 
agenda proposes alternative visions of a global society that may over-
come hegemonic systems of social order and of consumption and 
production, including the hegemonic production and dissemination 
of knowledge. Asia, in this sense, represents rather the opposite of 
regionalist standardization and unification. It embraces the diversity 
and plurality of Asia’s (and of global) reality as sociocultural richness 
that deserves recognition and protection. This Asia, again, is above all 
a functional concept; “Asia is not one”,14 but ideas of a singular Asia 
are nevertheless meaningful, not least as a means of coming to terms 
with the past.
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Takeuchi Yoshimi’s Encouragement of Appreciating 
Asia
The major intellectual inspiration for the present-day re-appreciation 
of Asianism as a means of historical reconciliation stems from the 
writings of the Japanese Sinologist Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–77). Many 
scholars and public intellectuals throughout East Asia have adopted 
his view of Asia as a site, subject and means of knowledge produc-
tion, which he called “Asia as Method”. Similar to Takeuchi’s original 
proposal of the 1960s, in which he complained about the Japanese 
lack of interest in other Asian countries, cultures and languages,15 
today’s rediscovery of “Asia as Method” promotes a new, active, and 
self-reflective approach towards Asia. It encourages acquiring knowl-
edge about Asia by entering and experiencing Asia through cultural 
study and social encounters. In this way, Asia becomes an additional 
and alternative point of reference for the formation of one’s own 
world view; it puts the dominant national and Western-centric modes 
of knowing and self-definition into perspective. As the most fervent 
advocate of this approach, the Taiwanese scholar Chen Kuan-Hsing 
argues that this Asianist perspective allows one to confront the im-
perial Other within one’s own society and nation. As a means of 
“de-imperialization” (qu diguo), therefore, Asia also becomes an instru-
ment for fostering transnational cooperation in East Asia and for 
criticizing the re-emergence of Asianism as a top-down project pro-
moting economic regionalism only.16 Of course, the context within 
which Takeuchi originally proposed “Asia as Method” was quite dif-
ferent from today’s. Like many thinkers of his generation, Takeuchi 
was highly critical of Japan’s political and cultural reorientation to the 
United States after 1945. While in post-war Japan the US occupation 
of the country and the beginning of the Cold War left little room 
for alternatives to a leaning towards the West, Takeuchi called attention 
to the value of studying Asia because of and despite Japan’s compli-
cated wartime legacy there. Using himself as an example, Takeuchi 
explained how he freed himself from the dominant mode of Western-
centrism that had prevailed in his youth in the 1920s and 1930s as it 
did again in the post-war period.
I decided to study Chinese literature after graduation because of a 
trip to China I took while in college. I had really wanted to leave 
Japan at that time, and it was quite easy to travel to and from 
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China. No passport was necessary; one simply paid for one’s passage, 
embarked, and then arrived in either Shanghai or Tianjin. These 
cities were closer to Nagasaki than was Tokyo. I went to China 
during the summer vacation of my sophomore year. Although regis-
tered for Chinese literature, I really had no intention of studying it 
seriously. I travelled to Manchuria with a tour group and then went 
on to Beijing alone. Upon arriving there, however, I suddenly felt as 
if I had discovered the dream or vision that had all this time been 
lying dormant inside me, a longing within my heart. This was not 
simply a matter of my being taken with the city’s natural scenery; 
rather I felt extremely close to the people there. I was moved by 
the fact that these people seemed to have the same ideas as I did. 
Although my classmates and I were all registered for Chinese litera-
ture, not one of us had imagined that there were actually people on 
the Chinese mainland who resembled ourselves. In thinking about 
this afterward, I acutely realized that this was due to the kind of 
education we had received. This would be different in the case of 
other countries, particularly those in the West. If one went to Europe 
or the United States, there would be a sense that the people there 
are superior to or better than oneself. Why then didn’t we know that 
there are people in China like ourselves? When we study Asian his-
tory or geography at school, no one teaches that there are actually 
people there—or at least that is how I remember it.17
Takeuchi’s “discovery” of the human dimension of Asia to which he 
spontaneously felt highly sympathetic as a fellow Asian serves as an 
obvious encouragement to the present generation of Japanese and 
Chinese to look beyond the abstract character of “self ” versus “other” 
distinctions based on national borders and abstract textbook depic-
tions of Asian countries and peoples. The underlying, and at times 
explicit, anti-Western tone in Takeuchi’s project serves this agenda, 
too. Although he never suggests that the Japanese or Chinese must 
side with either the West or the East, his own Asianist tendencies 
are more than clear. As a means of discovering Asian commonality, 
Takeuchi proposes the study of Asian languages, which, as he de-
plores, were not held in high regard in post-war Japan:
Let me provide just one example of such an institutional difficulty. 
There are currently hundreds of colleges and universities in Japan, 
among which even a few teach Chinese—such as my own Tokyo 
Metropolitan University. However, there are no universities here that 
teach Korean. … Korean used to be taught in the prewar period at 
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Tokyo University, but that has changed since the war. We Japanese 
really don’t know anything about Korea, despite the fact that it is 
geographically closest to us. Indeed, we don’t even try to know it, as 
evidenced by the fact that there are no universities here that teach 
Korean. How strange this is! In fact, I would suspect that Japan is 
the only nation in the world whose universities do not teach the 
language of that country which is closest to it. Asian languages 
have been taught extensively in China of late, whereas in Japan 
there is not even any teaching of Korean. … However, English has 
spread to such an amazing degree since the war that it is now taught 
everywhere.18
To Takeuchi the Japanese policy of ignoring the cultural value of 
its vicinity represented a renewed Japanese escape from Asia that the 
famous Japanese thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901) had first 
postulated in the 1880s. Fukuzawa had referred to Japan’s Asian 
neighbours as “bad company of the East” that Japan needed to sepa-
rate from to avoid being mistaken as a backward and uncivilized 
country itself. Instead, he said that Japan should befriend the coun-
tries of the “West” and take the West as the civilizational standard to 
follow.19 Although the phrase was not widely known in Japan until 
the end of World War II, “leave Asia, enter the West” (Datsu A, 
Nyū Ō) has since then become the key concept to describe and ratio-
nalize Japan’s turn to the West after the Meiji Restoration (1868). 
To Takeuchi, this orientation was part of Japan’s major social illness, 
namely, its characteristic of being a “model student” or “honour stu-
dent” who blindly imitates his teacher (“the modern West”) without 
reflection.20 This trait prevented the Japanese from approaching Asia 
with respect and interest rather than with arrogance and egoism. 
Even worse, according to Takeuchi, the Japanese mental dissociation 
from Asia since the late 19th century, which resulted in the forceful 
physical penetration of Asia in the following decades, survived the 
war and was still the dominant mode of thought in the 1950s and 
1960s. Against this background, it was Takeuchi’s self-declared task to 
influence the younger generation in a pro-Asian way. Many of his 
writings, including his treatise on “Asia as Method” (which is based 
on a speech he delivered to Japanese university students in 1960), 
seek to combine a Japan-critical attitude with a positive evaluation of 
Asia. Takeuchi clearly intended to rehabilitate Asia and to encourage 
the younger generation of Japanese to study Asia, go out to Asia, 
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and befriend Asians. Physically, he felt that the Japanese should “enter 
Asia”; however, unlike their fathers, they should do this not as inimi-
cal soldiers equipped with guns but as benign students equipped with 
an attitude of respect and curiosity.
Leaving Asia, Entering Asia
Today, the Takeuchian reversal of Fukuzawa’s “leave Asia” (Datsu A) 
metaphor serves as a key phrase in attempts to rehabilitate Asianism 
in Japan and other parts of East Asia. But it does not inspire 
only Asian-minded public intellectuals. Sceptics of Japan’s possible 
pro-Asian turn today similarly find value in the historical concept, 
albeit as a reminder of the assumed macro-historical success story of 
Japan’s Westernization and the uncertainties of a rapprochement with 
Asia—regarding both regional integration and historical dialogue. This 
rationale underlies the Shin Datsu A Ron (New Leaving Asia Thesis), 
authored by the Japanese economist Watanabe Toshio.21 As a prolific 
writer of articles directed at a wider public, Watanabe has become 
the main propagator of Japan’s assumed need to learn once again 
from Fukuzawa Yukichi’s historical advice, which Watanabe takes as 
his gospel:
… my country does not have time to wait for the enlightenment of 
our neighbours so that we can together revive Asia (Ajia o okosu). 
On the contrary, we must leave their company and proceed together 
with the civilized nations of the West, without treating China and 
Korea in a special way because they are our neighbours but only 
approach them in the same way as the Westerners do. Because those 
who are intimate with bad friends are also regarded as bad I will 
from my heart decline the bad friends of East Asia (Ajia Tōhō no 
akuyū).22
Watanabe sells his new “Leaving Asia” thesis by drawing an analogy 
between the political situation when Fukuzawa wrote his treatise 
(around 1885) and today; as then—before Japan fought and won 
wars against China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05)—Japan’s inde-
pendence and even existence were at stake. According to Watanabe, 
Meiji Japan’s leadership made the right foreign policy choice of allying 
with “the civilized nations of the West” (Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
1902) and rejecting pan-Asian plans of allying with Japan’s East Asian 
Chap8 (181-208).indd   191 10/8/15   11:59:18 AM
192 Torsten Weber
neighbours, the “bad company”. Only when Japan’s relationship with 
the United States deteriorated, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was aban-
doned (1923), and Japan directed its political attention to Asia rather 
than the West did the country’s international isolation start and lead 
to its disastrous defeat in World War II. Of course, Watanabe’s narra-
tive glosses over Japan’s long-term strategy of expanding its sphere of 
influence and of exploiting natural resources on the Asian mainland, 
which ran parallel to its pro-Western orientation from the earliest days 
of the Meiji period. Still, Fukuzawa’s dichotomous paradigm of with 
or against Asia and with or against the West serves Watanabe’s parti-
san use of history well. Today, he argues, in the light of the “suicidal 
behaviour” of North Korea and China’s “despise Japan policy”, Japan’s 
choice must once again be opting for realist power politics, not senti-
mental geopolitics.23 In other words, Japan must not seek its allies 
on the Asian mainland but reaffirm its cooperation with the United 
States and form a “Transpacific Alliance”. This alliance is explicitly 
meant as a counter-proposal to the idea of an East Asian Community 
that may grow out of mechanisms of increased cooperation between 
East Asian countries, most notably the ASEAN plus Three meetings. 
At the same time, Watanabe also sees his proposal of a “Transpacific 
Alliance” as a countermeasure against Chinese ambitions of “regional 
hegemonism”. As he writes, “the biggest obstacle in the way of China 
securing regional hegemony is the Japanese-US Alliance”.24 While 
there is probably a wide consensus on this last assessment, Watanabe’s 
assumed analogies are far less convincing. As mentioned above, Japan 
has historically never pursued just one direction of strategic alliances 
with either Asian or Western countries; similarly, many Japanese (and 
others) would not agree with Watanabe’s view that an East Asian 
Community would facilitate Chinese regional hegemonism. On the 
contrary, Japan, South Korea and most Southeast Asian countries 
share an awareness of using increased regional cooperation, e.g., within 
the ASEAN plus Three framework, to jointly check China’s influence 
in East Asia. At any rate, Watanabe’s reappraisal of Fukuzawa and 
of his sceptical view of Asia has become an omnipresent point of 
reference in the present-day debate about the problems of historical 
consciousness and the future of regional cooperation. It is important 
to mention here that although Watanabe’s view does not necessarily 
represent the majority opinion in Japan, it does appeal to a majority 
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of those who prefer a “better the devil you know” stance towards 
foreign policy. This position prefers maintaining a pro-United States 
policy over pro-Asianist change that may harbour risks. While not 
all Japanese may know the historical Datsu A Ron, the memory of its 
author is well alive. Not only is Fukuzawa known as the founder of 
the prestigious private Keiō University, a leading Japanese university 
located in central Tokyo, but he is also the only one who survived the 
2004 reshuffle of portraits on Japanese banknotes. Fukuzawa’s face is 
still on the highest-denomination note (10,000 yen), and overall he 
enjoys a positive reputation as a pioneering modernizer and educator.25
 However, voices of dissent in Japan have been growing in the 
past few years. Watanabe’s apologetic view of Japanese imperialism 
and his simplistic rejection of pro-Asian attitudes has provoked oppo-
sition mainly from two camps: those who see Fukuzawa’s thesis as the 
core idea behind Japanese imperialism, and those who are distrustful 
of Japan’s post-war pro-United States leaning. One Japanese voice of 
opposition that combines both streams of criticism is the Shitamachi 
Ningen Sōgō Kenkyūjo (Shitamachi People’s Comprehensive Research 
Institute), a civil society organization named after its meeting place 
in the heart of Old Tokyo (Shitamachi). It is devoted to discussing 
current political issues from a pacifist perspective and tries to provide 
a forum that enables exchange between ordinary citizens and scholars/
intellectuals. From 2006 to 2008, the Shitamachi group supported 
the lawsuit against the dispatch of the Japanese Army (so-called Self-
Defense Forces) to Iraq. Led by the historian Yamaguchi Yoshio, it 
had amongst its most prominent members the Communist politician 
Yoshioka Yoshinori (d. 2009), a former member of the Upper House 
of parliament. The contemporary revival of anti-Asianism, as in 
Watanabe Toshio’s proposal for a new “Leaving Asia” thesis, is dis-
missed by the group as a distortion of history that neglects the links 
of Datsu A with Japan’s wartime atrocities in Asia.26 Therefore, neither 
the Datsu A concept nor its author, Fukuzawa Yukichi, should be 
viewed as representing ideals from the assumed “glorious times” of 
the Meiji period that could be used as guidance for today.27 Instead 
of cultivating nostalgic sentiments that associate the success of pro-
gress and modernization, civilization and enlightenment, and inde-
pendence with the Meiji years, the Japanese need to awaken to the 
historical reality of their turn to militarism and imperialism and their 
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betrayal of the hopes of their Asian neighbours. As one step towards 
correcting their historical consciousness, the Japanese need to grasp 
the role played by Datsu A as a political concept (or more precisely 
of the mindset expressed by that concept) in justifying Japan’s history 
of invasion and aggression. “Leave Asia, enter the West” expressed 
and rationalized the two-fold policy of “worshipping the West and 
despising Asia”, Yoshioka maintains.28
At that time, although it never became very powerful, there was 
also an Asian solidarity thesis being discussed, in particular between 
Japan, China, and Korea. But the path chosen by the Meiji govern-
ment was that of striving to become a “Great Power” by “invading 
Asia and befriending Euro-American imperialism”, just as Fukuzawa 
Yukichi had proposed. … Japan’s invasion of Asia has planted, also 
among the ordinary people, a worship of the West and simulta-
neously a mistaken feeling of superiority, hegemonism, and con-
tempt towards Asia. These were further promoted by successive 
victories in warfare and have not been overcome today but are the 
underlying reasons why Japan is continuing to make the wrong 
choices. [However,] Japan does not only have this history which it 
must not continue to take as a model but also a history that it 
should take as a model.29
What is this model? Yoshioka suggests that the “Asian solidarity thesis” 
mentioned above should serve as the rationale for approaching today’s 
issues of historical consciousness and regional cooperation. As one 
step in this direction, Fukuzawa Yukichi should be replaced by a more 
appropriate symbol from history for present-day and future Japan 
and Asia: Katsu Kaishū (1823–99), a statesman famous for his role as 
mediator between old and new Japan on the eve of the Meiji Restora-
tion. By referring to Katsu’s negotiation over the peaceful surrender 
of Edo Castle, on the one hand, and to his criticism of Japanese 
arrogance towards Korea and China, on the other, Katsu is portrayed 
as both a pacifist in domestic affairs and a representative of the Asian 
solidarity thesis in diplomacy. In this sense, Katsu provides the link 
to the contemporary project of community building in East Asia 
that must be based on solidarity and peace, as the Shitamachi group 
argues, not on neo-imperialist hegemonism. Yoshioka suggests that the 
Japanese need to overcome their limited understanding of the past 
based on the perspective of national history as taught in school and 
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reaffirmed in the public sphere—from public memorials and com-
memorations to portraits on banknotes. In this way, they can emanci-
pate themselves from the inherent feeling of contempt for “other 
Asians”, which has continuously been nurtured—although more 
implicitly and indirectly—throughout the post-war period. For the 
Shitamachi group, the issue of historical reconciliation is closely linked 
to Japan’s present-day diplomatic orientation. In its view, Koizumi’s 
decision to support the US-led war against Iraq has revealed that 
Japan’s alliance with the West has once again led to Japan’s collabora-
tion with militarism and hegemonism. This decision not only violates 
the peace commitment of Japan’s post-war constitution (Article Nine) 30 
but also poses an obstacle in the way of coming to terms with Japan’s 
own atrocities of the past as it rationalizes aggression as a means of 
politics. The group, therefore, strongly criticizes Japan’s pro-United 
States foreign policy and instead promotes Japan’s integration into a 
future East Asian Community.
Chinese Views on “Leaving Asia”
The controversy over the legacy of Datsu A and its potential contem-
porary usefulness is a matter largely limited to Japan. In China and 
Korea, both victims of Japanese imperialism, there was little dispute 
about the meaning of Fukuzawa’s Datsu A thesis. Revisiting the his-
torical concept and discussing it in a contextualizing manner therefore 
often functions as a means to push politico-intellectual debate about 
historical reconciliation in East Asia towards a pro-Asianist stance. 
Interestingly, recent Chinese studies of Datsu A take a rather concili-
atory position that discloses a more nuanced understanding of Japa-
nese historical Asia consciousness.31
 The Chinese intellectual historian Wang Hui explains Fukuzawa’s 
negative view of “Asia” by his epistemological indebtedness to Western 
conceptions of Asia as part of the Western binary that distinguishes 
between a despotic Asia and a civilized West. To be sure, Wang is not 
interested in exculpating Japanese historical abuse of Asia or Japanese 
war guilt. Nevertheless, his way of re-appreciating Asia as a meaning-
ful and positive concept heavily relies on linking Japan’s historical 
Asia consciousness to that of the West. Wang thereby implies that 
the Japanese despising of Asia was not original to Japan but was due 
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to the Japanese imitation of Western thinking and Western attitudes. 
Relying on Takeuchi Yoshimi’s famous statement that “Asia is Asia by 
dint of its European context”, Wang explains why Datsu A Nyū Ō 
“became a recurring theme of modern Japanese thought”.32 In Wang’s 
view, Datsu A contained the interrelated double task of emancipating 
Japan from the Chinese order and finding its place in the Western 
order, intellectually as well as politically and socially. Therefore, “the 
political meaning of ‘shedding Confucianism’ was dissociation from 
China-centred imperial relations and construction of a European-style 
nation-state oriented towards ‘freedom,’ ‘human rights,’ ‘national 
sovereignty,’ ‘civilization,’ and ‘independent spirit’”.33 However, be-
cause of the European origin of “Asia”, “‘shedding Asia’ was a way 
of forming self-consciousness through differentiating Japan from Asia”.34 
It is no surprise, therefore, that eventually “the theory of ‘shedding 
Asia’” led to “the reality of ‘invading Asia’ ”.35 In order to avoid a 
similar shift in the contemporary theory and practice of Asia dis-
course, Wang Hui suggests that epistemological self-determination—
that is, the definition and creation of East Asia, including the defini-
tion of its identity—from within is a precondition to regional commu-
nity building beyond the establishment of mechanisms for strategic 
and economic cooperation. In this way, Wang not only adds to the 
rehabilitation of Japan’s mistaken attitude towards Asia in the past 
but also encourages the formation of an Asian self-affirmative stance 
towards Asia in the present and future.
 In a more explicitly Asianist way, Sun Ge, China’s pre-eminent 
Japanologist, draws on Fukuzawa’s Datsu A thesis. In her view, the 
re-collection and re-appreciation of historical moments and historical 
motifs from national history may function as starting points of “East 
Asia narratives”.36 In her search for “adhesive forces” and “integrating 
power” within Asia that may develop into common narratives, Sun 
Ge emphasizes the importance of grasping Datsu A not as a vicious 
Japanese strategy for invading Asia but in the context of Japan’s desire 
“to position Japan vis-à-vis Western civilization in modern Japanese 
history”.37 Japanese Datsu A thought, Sun Ge argues, evolved against 
this background “of the international political configuration among 
Europe, America and East Asia”.38 In other words, Datsu A was only 
to a lesser extent indicative of Japan’s contempt of Asia but to a much 
greater extent representative of its striving to become “Western”; 
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“enter the West”, therefore, was the key message while “leaving Asia” 
only constituted the unavoidable flip side of the same coin. Sun Ge’s 
approach to Fukuzawa stops short of complete exculpation. Different 
from the Shitamachi group’s fundamental critique, Sun Ge discovers 
many positive elements in Fukuzawa’s political thought:
Before writing Datsu-A ron, Fukuzawa, in fact, advocated “The 
solidarity of East Asia”. For him, this idea had a double structure, 
i.e. it stresses that each East Asian country must push for revolu-
tionary reform of the old regime and overthrow the power of the 
conservatives within the country, and only then can it be rid of the 
pressure from the Western powers. In other words, Fukuzawa’s con-
ception of “solidarity” does not regard national boundaries as its pre-
condition, but rather predicates upon the criterion of “civilization”. 
He does not believe that the coloured races can join hands to resist 
the Western powers simply because they are coloured. He also, 
therefore, advocates that actual support should be given to the 
progressives of neighbouring countries in helping them with their 
coup to overthrow their own conservative regimes, so as to export 
“civilization”.39
The key difference, according to Sun Ge, between Fukuzawa’s anti-
Asianism and the Asianism of his contemporaries lay in his rejection 
of racialist commonality in favour of civilizational standards. As a 
consequence, in his world view Japan was closer to the West than 
to Asia and moving towards the West rather than Asia was the only 
appropriate policy to follow. In Sun Ge’s words, Datsu A does not 
primarily express Fukuzawa’s contempt of Asia but merely “his dis-
appointment with the immediate East Asian neighbours”.40 Not as his 
first but as his inevitable choice, he therefore “urged Japan to break off 
with its neighbours in the East, for he thought they were doomed to 
fall”.41 Sun Ge continues:
Fukuzawa’s greatest fear was that the West would regard Japan as a 
barbaric country, like its doomed neighbours. What is primarily con-
veyed in Datsu A ron is Fukuzawa’s sense of doom for the survival 
of the Japanese nation; his disappointment with the neighbouring 
Asian countries; and, as a consequence of this disappointment, his 
evaluation of Asia as barbaric. There may be different interpreta-
tions of his “breakoff statement”, but the undeniable fact is that 
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Fukuzawa, Japan’s most remarkable modern thinker, is completely 
committed to the “Survival of the Fittest” way of thinking in his 
reflection on Asia’s value. Fukuzawa has even gone to the extreme of 
ignoring Japan’s geographical location in order to ideologically cut 
Japan off from Asia.42
Similar to Wang Hui’s strategy of rehabilitating Japanese Asia discourse 
by linking it to its indebtedness to Western disdain of Asia, Sun Ge 
traces the intellectual heritage of Datsu A to the assumed superiority 
of Western concepts, which historically was taken for granted. In this 
way, Sun Ge even manages to dissolve today’s Asianist views from 
their—undesirable—conflation with culturalist essentialism. Unlike 
the prominence of race and culture in most Asianists’ conceptions 
of the past, today’s “adhesive forces” and “integrating power” in Asia 
need to be based on solidarity. Sun Ge’s objection against Fukuzawa’s 
Datsu A lies precisely in the latter’s lack of a sense of solidarity; 
today, in place of the historical rationale of the survival of the fittest, 
benevolent support of the poor, the weak and the less privileged 
should inform present Asianist agendas—as they should have in-
formed Japan’s approach to Asia historically. According to Sun Ge, it 
was exactly this agenda that the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen 
had in mind when he proposed “Greater Asianism” to the Japanese 
in 1924.43 While Fukuzawa and his Datsu A thesis are particularly 
prominent concepts among Japanese debaters, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism 
serves as the most frequently employed historical concept in debates 
about Asian commonality in present-day China.
Solidarity and the Kingly Way
In Chinese public political discourse, here defined as the mesh of 
political opinions published in widely accessible media such as news-
papers, journals and the Internet, the undisputed blueprint for 
present-day Asianism is Sun Yat-sen’s conception of Asianism in gen-
eral and of the Kingly Way or benevolent rule of right (wangdao) 
versus the Despotic Way or hegemonic rule of might (badao) in parti-
cular. This dichotomous conceptual pair stems from Confucianism and 
was particularly emphasized in Mencius’ (c. 372–289 BC) political 
thought. In brief, it signifies that a true ruler must resort to virtue and 
benevolence to promote the well-being of his people (Kingly Way) 
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and must not use force and violence as a means of rule (Despotic 
Way). Those who employ badao rather than wangdao lose their legiti-
mization and may rightfully be overthrown as unrighteous rulers. 
This was also one of the key messages of Sun Yat-sen’s famous speech 
on “Greater Asianism”, which he delivered in November 1924 in 
Kobe, on the occasion of his last visit to Japan before his death.44 It 
was Japan’s choice, Sun Yat-sen argued, to either adopt a hegemonic 
attitude towards Asia, as the West had done, or to select benevolence 
as the guiding principle of its relations with the peoples of Asia. Of 
course, Sun Yat-sen urged Japan to adhere to the latter. In many 
ways, this binary option resembles Fukuzawa’s thesis 40 years earlier. 
Japan, as the most powerful or “advanced” country in Asia, was re-
quired to choose between being with or against the West, and being 
with or against Asia. For Sun Ge, the main difference in these his-
torical approaches lies in the sense of solidarity that could be found 
in Sun Yat-sen’s but not in Fukuzawa’s view of Asia.
For Asians, the Asia question is primarily a question of the sense 
of solidarity, a sense that arises in the midst of the aggression and 
expansion perpetrated by the West. Thus, the sense of solidarity is 
articulated with a sense of national crisis, which distinguishes the 
question of Asia from the Orientalism and even the criticism of 
Orientalism in the West. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen made a speech in 
Japan on “pan-Asianism”, focusing on the question of race. In refer-
ence to the Russo-Japanese War, Sun stressed that the coloured races 
were excited by this war for “it was the first time in the recent 
several centuries that the Asians had beaten the Europeans”. By 
“Asia”, Sun meant to include all the coloured races of the Asian re-
gion. He further argued from the above assertion that the culture of 
the Rule by Benevolence in Asia would necessarily win out over the 
European rule by Force, and went on to warn Japan to make a pru-
dent choice between the two positions. Sun Yat-sen did his utmost 
to stress the necessity of a sense of solidarity for Asia. “In treating 
pan-Asianism, what sort of problems do we want to solve with the 
fruits of our study? It is none other than finding out how the suf-
fering peoples of Asia can resist the European powers. In a word, 
it is to defend the oppressed peoples against injustices perpetrated 
on them.” Sun Yat-sen’s view of Asia contains something that is 
lacking in Japanese views of Asia—a fundamental concern for weaker 
peoples.45
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Importantly, Sun Ge—like Sun Yat-sen—reduces “aggression and ex-
pansion” to the typical means of Western rule by force. The fact that 
Japan had, long before Sun Yat-sen’s speech of 1924, employed the 
same methods to build its own empire in Asia is omitted. It is for 
this reason that many Koreans still find it much more difficult than 
Chinese involved in this discourse to approve of Sun Yat-sen’s con-
ception of Asianism.46 How could Sun Yat-sen appeal to Asian soli-
darity but forget to mention the annexation of Korea? And why 
did Sun Yat-sen portray the historical tributary relations between the 
Chinese empire and the Asian tribute states as examples of friendship, 
solidarity and benevolence when in fact they were hegemonic and 
coerced? Sun Ge, however, builds her own vision of East Asian com-
monality on Sun Yat-sen’s assumed message of solidarity; by remem-
bering and adopting Sun Yat-sen’s conception of “Asia”, the debate on 
integration and identity formation can be moved away from cultural-
ism, racialism and self-congratulatory “Asia as Number One” rhetoric 
towards solidarity and concern for the oppressed. For Sun Ge, as for 
most public intellectuals involved in this debate, hegemonic rule no 
longer refers—as it did historically—to the dominance of one country 
over another but to economic, social and epistemological hegemony 
of the ruling elites that cuts across nations. As Duara and many trans-
national civil society activists criticize, establishing this new kind of 
hegemony is the hidden but real agenda behind top-down affirma-
tions of Asianism as regionalism in present-day East Asia.47
 In his re-appreciation of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism, Wang Hui em-
phasizes a different aspect and points to a different meaning of Asia 
and Asianism today. According to Wang, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism was 
above all premised on cultural and national plurality: “a multicultural 
Asia” whose unity “was based on the independence of sovereign 
states”. 48 To Wang, Sun Yat-sen’s wangdao versus badao binary has two 
main functions: first, as a vehicle to appeal to Asian commonality, 
it allows for a fundamental distinction between Asia and the West, 
despite the significant internal differences within Asian societies; 
second, it legitimizes resistance against those who apply hegemonism 
and despotism. In Wang’s words:
Sun insisted that Asia had its own culture and principles—what he 
called “the culture of the kingly way” (wangdao) as opposed to “the 
culture of the hegemonic way” (badao) of European nation states. 
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He titled his speech “Great Asianism” partly because he connected 
the idea of Asia with the notion of “the kingly way”. If we compare 
his speech with the imperialist idea of Asia, it becomes clear that al-
though it preserves its association with Confucian ideas such as “the 
kingly way” or “virtue and morality” (ren yi dao de), Sun’s notion 
of Asia is not an Asia with a core of cultural homogeneity. … His 
vision of Asia consisted of Japan in the East, Turkey in the West, 
and nation-states founded on Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confu-
cianism, and other cultures in the inner areas. He said, “We must 
insist on Great Asianism and recover the status of Asian nations. If 
we use only virtue and morality as the basis to unite all nations, all 
nations of Asia, [when united,] will become powerful”. According 
to Sun, the culture of the kingly way defends the oppressed nations, 
rebels against the hegemonic way, and pursues the equality and 
liberation of all peoples.49
In this way, Sun Yat-sen’s wangdao legacy may also be employed as 
the rationale for today’s project of embracing Asian diversity in unity
—and certainly also serves the official political rhetoric of the Chinese 
Communist Party, which emphasizes social harmony and peaceful co-
existence between different races and cultures within China. As men-
tioned above, the creation of a transnational consciousness and the 
re-appreciation of Asia in parts have kept their anti-Western compo-
nents. This is mainly because despite notable successes of decentring 
political, economic and intellectual discourses, non-Western voices in 
general and Asian voices in particular still belong to the less spoken, 
less heard, less influential in the global public sphere. At the same 
time, and probably as important as the first step, wangdao as a cen-
tral idea of Sun Yat-sen’s affirmation of Asianism allows for an identi-
fication with today’s Asianist project without directly engaging with 
the problematic legacy of Japanese Asianism. In other words, Sun Yat-
sen’s Asianism as an affirmation of non-hegemonic multiculturalism 
and diversity may appeal to a large number of people throughout 
East Asia and elsewhere, even if this means ignoring Sun Yat-sen’s 
real message and intention. In addition, the commemoration of Sun 
Yat-sen’s Asianism provides hope in the present-day Asianist struggle 
against “new imperial dominance” of a capitalist-driven regionalism in 
the guise of Asianism because similar attempts made by the Japanese 
at dressing hegemonism and forced homogenization in Asianist clothes 
had failed.50
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 Naturally maybe, Japanese interest in Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism and 
the wangdao metaphor is less refined compared to that in the role 
played by Fukuzawa and his Datsu A thesis. However, Sun Yat-sen 
is of course well known in Japan too and has been portrayed as a 
pioneer of Sino-Japanese friendship there.51 This positive official view 
towards Sun Yat-sen rests on his Japanophilism and his support by 
Japanese collaborators in his revolutionary activities.52 Shindō Eiichi, 
political scientist and leader of the Japan-based academic think tank 
International Academic Society for Asian Community, promotes Sun 
Yat-sen and his friendship with Japanese as examples of “Japanese-
Chinese civil diplomacy” (Nitchū minkan gaikō).53 Sun Yat-sen and 
his Japanese supporters, as opposed to Japanese expansionists, are 
characterized by Shindō as “good Asianists” who aimed at establishing 
a new order of equality and reforms from below. In order to push 
East Asia further together, Asians needed to embrace a “New Asian-
ism” in a globalized world, centring on civil society activities and 
common culture in East Asia. Japanese Asianism and, more generally, 
Japanese Asia policy, he argues, had failed to make the right choice 
when Sun Yat-sen had confronted Japan with following either badao 
or wangdao. Japanese today, Shindō argues, are again confronted with 
a very similar choice: either demonize the Asian mainland as a place 
of threat or seek relations of cooperation and harmony with the peo-
ples of Asia. In this way, the relevance of Sun Yat-sen’s wangdao and 
the critique of Fukuzawa’s Datsu A merge as the politico-intellectual 
credo of transnational Asianism that seeks to promote historical reco-
nciliation and regional integration on a civil society level.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the discursive re-apprecia-
tion of Asianisms as a tool in civil-society-driven efforts at historical 
reconciliation in East Asia. On the level of agency, the focus is on 
political activists and thinkers who take a critical stance towards top-
down initiatives promoting regionalism. Many of these activists and 
thinkers are part of transnational networks and—to some extent at 
least—live the political agenda they are proposing; their key political 
positions include the critique of hegemonic relationships in all spheres 
of society and the fostering of de-nationalized thinking and practice. 
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One of the main means of achieving these aims is the rehabilitation 
of “Asia”, including the creation of a self-affirmative Asia conscious-
ness of commonality among people living throughout East Asia. In 
light of the ongoing and, in fact, increasing political, economic and 
strategic rivalry in this region, the prospects for historical reconcilia-
tion may appear grim. As a deliberate countermeasure against the 
divisions resulting from the negative legacy of the past and its fre-
quent political instrumentalization, the authors and networks studied 
above have established a discursive framework within which key 
motifs from historical Asia discourse are reinterpreted to serve as posi-
tive and common references for interactions between societies in con-
temporary East Asia. The revision of Fukuzawa’s Datsu A thesis and 
Sun Yat-sen’s solidarity-based conception of Asianism as wangdao is 
particularly important for this purpose, as both concepts emerged 
from a context of hegemonic relations. Both refer mainly to Japanese 
imperialism in Asia but secondarily also address (a) the negative im-
pact of Western imperialism on Asian societies and (b) problems of 
the traditional and a possible future Sinocentric order in East Asia. 
As the case studies reveal, civil society discourse today undertakes 
great efforts to simultaneously de-nationalize and Asianize the histori-
cal articulations of both concepts.
 At the beginning of the 21st century, Asia once again constitutes 
a contested concept in political discourse in East Asia. Be it in the 
context of visions of East Asian integration, of other foreign policy 
strategies, of projects aiming at historical reconciliation, or of episte-
mological self-determination, Asianisms have re-emerged as sites of 
fierce political and intellectual debate. The affirmative re-emergence of 
Asianist motifs from the past in the context of historical reconciliation 
efforts throughout present-day East Asia may be most logical, but is 
surprising at the same time. It is logical because of the complicity of 
Asianisms in the historical events that inform today’s “history wars”. 
Yet it is also surprising, since the concept “Asia” was long believed to 
be a taboo in the light of its problematic past. Today, references to 
Asia as a concept containing positive, or at least useful, connotations 
are no longer seen as evidence of historical revisionism. On the con-
trary, the idea of Asian commonality has become a driving force in 
the search for “adhesive forces” (Sun Ge) that may help overcome the 
negative legacies of the past. This re-appreciation of historical Asianist 
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motifs is, of course, highly selective and, as we have seen above, filled 
with a range of different political messages. The key strategy of trans-
forming the long and dark shadows of the past into lighter shades of 
relief seems to rely on combining a critical perspective on the failure 
of Asianism in the past with an Asianist perspective on the present 
and future. In this sense, dealing with “Asia” has taken on the func-
tion of a proxy. If a transnational agreement can be reached on the 
positive potential of Asianisms, isolated episodes from the modern 
history of Sino-Japanese rivalry may be addressed in a more construc-
tive manner. It can be assumed that the networks involved in these 
“positive” politics of the past are aware of their partisan use of history. 
This problematic, however, is not at the heart of their enterprise. 
Their activities approach the creation of a “stable truth” from the per-
sonal rather than political, historical or historiographical level: stable 
networks of human relationship and common interests and under-
standing as the first step towards stable narratives as a basis of a com-
mon historical consciousness. In this process, Asia serves as a vehicle 
or method of creating a common discursive space in East Asia below 
the level of official inter-governmental diplomacy. The re-adoption of 
Asia by these thinkers and activists also serves to counterbalance the 
hegemony of top-down discourse on “Neo-Asianism” as economic 
and strategic regionalism. It has led to a self-empowerment of civil 
society groups through their attempts at overcoming nationalist his-
tory politics by “taking a step forward out of the pattern of thinking 
in national units”.54 “Entering Asia” with a commitment to solidarity 
and non-hegemonic interactions, in this sense, not only represents an 
“intellectual experiment” 55 but also characterizes a different approach 
to dealing with oneself, one’s neighbours, and society at large—from 
the micro-level of communal neighbourhood to global society. It shares 
with historical conceptions of a solidarity-based Asia its idealism and 
vulnerability to despotic abuse.
Notes
1. For an overview of the historical development of the history textbook 
controversy, including the Yasukuni and territorial disputes, see Yoshiko 
Nozaki and Mark Selden, “Japanese Textbook Controversies, National-
 ism, and Historical Memory: Intra- and Inter-national Conflicts”, Asia-
Pacific Journal, Vol. 24-05-09, 15 June 2009, http:www.japanfocus.org/
 -Yoshiko-Nozaki/3173/article.html, accessed 7 August 2015.
Chap8 (181-208).indd   204 10/8/15   11:59:22 AM
 Coming to Terms with Asianism 205
 2. For the continuing political and historiographical disputes over the Nan-
 jing Massacre see Joshua Fogel, ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and 
Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Takashi 
Yoshida, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in 
Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: 
 Complicating the Picture (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).
 3. Daqing Yang, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on 
the Rape of Nanjing”, American Historical Review 104/3 (1999), http://
connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/1981269/convergence-divergence-
recent-historical-writings-rape-nanjing, accessed 6 Dec. 2014.
 4. Kawashima Shin, “The Three Phases of Japan-China Joint-History Re-
 search: What Was the Challenge?”, Asian Perspective 34, 4 (2010): 19–43. 
See this article also for details on this bi-national joint research project.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Many of these groups have not yet been studied academically. For the 
Japanese Council on East Asian Community and the Korean Northeast 
Asian History Foundation, see Torsten Weber, “Remembering or Over-
 coming the Past? ‘History Politics’, Asian Identity, and Visions of an East 
Asian Community”, Asian Regional Integration Review (2011a): 39–55. 
For political activist groups, see the chapter by Tessa Morris-Suzuki in 
 this volume.
 7. On historical Asianism, a concept that from the late 19th to the mid-
20th centuries referred mainly to an affirmative Japanese position towards 
the existence and significance of a unity called “Asia” (however defined), 
see Sven Saaler and C.W.A. Szpilman, “Introduction”, in Pan-Asianism: 
A Documentary History 1860–2010, Vol. 1: 1850–1920, ed. Sven Saaler 
and C.W.A. Szpilman (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), pp. 1–41.
 8. For this debate, see Leigh Jenco, “Revisiting Asian Values”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 74, 2 (2013): 237–58.
 9. See Nicola Spakowski’s chapter in this volume.
10. See, for example, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Asia Is One: Visions of Asian 
Community in Twenty First Century Japan”, Okakura Tenshin and 
Pan-Asianism. Shadows of the Past, ed. Brij Tankha (Folkestone: Global 
 Oriental, 2009), pp. 158–70.
11. This is the basic rationale of scholars affiliated with the Inter-Asia Cul-
 tural Studies movement. Many of their publications are available in 
English, for example in The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Kuan-
 Hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat (London: Routledge, 2007).
12. See my articles: Torsten Weber, “Wang Yi: ‘Neo-Asianism’ in 21st Cen-
 tury China”, in Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History 1860–2010, ed. 
Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman, 2 vols (Boulder: Rowman 
Chap8 (181-208).indd   205 10/8/15   11:59:23 AM
206 Torsten Weber
& Littlefield, 2011b), pp. 359–70; and Weber, “Remembering or Over-
 coming the Past?”.
13. Duara, “Asia Redux”: 963–83.
14. Amitav Acharya, “Asia Is Not One”, Journal of Asian Studies 69, 4 (2010): 
1001–13.
15. See Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Hōhō toshite no Ajia” [Asia as Method], in 
Nihon to Ajia [Japan and Asia] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1993), pp. 
442–70. An English translation of this classical text is available in What 
Is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi, ed. Richard F. Calichman 
 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 149–65.
16. See Chen Kuan-Hsing, Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization 
 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
17. Quoted after Calichman, What Is Modernity?, p. 150.
18. Ibid., p. 157.
19. Fukuzawa’s original essay “Datsu A Ron” is reprinted in Fukuzawa 
Yukichi Zenshū, Vol. 10 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1960), pp. 238–40. 
An English version is available in David Lu, ed., Japan: A Documentary 
History (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 351–3. On Fukuzawa’s thesis, 
see Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Blowing Up a Double Portrait in Black 
and White: The Concept of Asia in the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi 
and Okakura Tenshin”, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 15, 2 (2007): 
 345–68.
20. See Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Chūgoku no Kindai to Nihon no Kindai” 
[China’s Modernity and Japan’s Modernity], in Nihon to Ajia [Japan and 
Asia] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1993), pp. 11–57; and for an English 
 translation, see Calichman, What Is Modernity ?, pp. 53–81.
21. See for the following references Watanabe Toshio, Shin Datsu A Ron 
[New Leaving Asia Thesis] (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2008); and publica-
 tions by the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), ed., “Policy 
Report ‘The State of the Concept of East Asian Community and Japan’s 
Strategic Response Thereto’” (CEAC: Tokyo, 2005), p. 3 and “Higashi 
Ajia towa: Rekishi no Naka kara Wakugumi Taidō” [What Is East Asia? 
 Indications of a Framework from History], in Tenbō: Higashi Ajia 
Kyōdōtai [Outlook: East Asian Community], ed. CEAC, No. 2 (2004), 
 http://www.ceac.jp/j/survey/survey002.html, accessed 6 Dec. 2014.
22. This excerpt is taken from Fukuzawa’s original essay (cf. footnote 19) and 
is quoted in Watanabe Toshio, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Datsu A Ron ni 
manabe” [We Must Learn from Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Leave Asia Thesis], 
 Shokun 4 (2007): 24–35, and Shin Datsu A Ron (2008), p. 13.
23. Watanabe, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Datsu A Ron ni manabe”, p. 35.
24. Ibid.
Chap8 (181-208).indd   206 10/8/15   11:59:23 AM
 Coming to Terms with Asianism 207
25. Fukuzawa’s portrait has appeared on that note since 1984. For a critical 
discussion of the general positive portrayal of Fukuzawa among the Japa-
 nese public, see Junosuke Yasukawa, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no bunmeikan 
to Ajia ninshiki” [Fukuzawa Yukichi’s View of Civilization and Asia Con-
 sciousness], in Nihon no Ajia shinryaku to Kenpō Kyūjō [Japan’s Invasion 
of Asia and Article Nine], ed. Shitamachi Ningen Sōgō Kenkyūjo (Tokyo: 
Shitamachi Sōken, 2006), pp. 10–41.
26. For the following quotes and references, see Yoshinori Yoshioka, “Katsu 
Kaishū, Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai to Nihonkoku kenpō” [Katsu Kaishū, 
East Asian Community and the Japanese Constitution], in Higashi Ajia 
Kyōdōtai to Katsu Kaishū [East Asian Community and Katsu Kaishū], ed. 
Shitamachi Ningen, Tengukō kyūjō no kai (Tokyo: Shitamachi Sōken, 
 2009), pp. 6–33.
27. Yoshioka, “Katsu Kaishū, Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai to Nihonkoku kenpō”, 
 p. 16.
28. Ibid., p. 18.
29. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
30. On the continuing debate about the so-called peace clause in Japan’s 
post-war constitution, see Ken Takada, “Article 9 and the Peace Move-
 ment”, in Another Japan Is Possible: New Social Movements and Global 
Citizenship Education (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 
 158–61.
31. In addition to the cases studied below (Wang Hui, Sun Ge), see my 
articles “Wang Yi: ‘Neo-Asianism’”, pp. 359–70; and “Remembering or 
 Overcoming the Past?”: 39–55.
32. Wang Hui, “The Politics of Imagining Asia: A Genealogical Analysis”, in 
The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen and Chua 
Beng Huat (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 66–102.
33. Ibid., p. 67.
34. Ibid., p. 68.
35. Ibid., p. 73.
36. See Sun Ge, “The Predicament of Compiling Textbooks on the History 
of East Asia”, in Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics 
and Transnational Aspirations, ed. Gotelind Müller (London: Routledge, 
 2011), pp. 9–31.
37. Sun Ge, “How Does Asia Mean?”, in The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 
Reader, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat (London: Routledge, 
 2007), pp. 9–65.
38. Ibid., p. 11.
39. Ibid., p. 12.
40. Ibid., p. 13.




43. Despite occasional earlier affirmations of Asianism by Sun Yat-sen and 
other Chinese, Sun’s Greater Asianism speech of 1924 is usually seen as 
the most original Chinese contribution to historical Asianism discourse. 
It simultaneously adopts and criticizes Japanese conceptions of Asianism. 
In consequence, Chinese Asianism is usually treated as a—negating or 
affirmative—reaction to Japanese Asianism.
44. On this speech, see Chin Tokujin and Yasui Sankichi, ed., Son Bun Kōen 
‘Dai Ajiashugi’ shiryōshū [Collection of Materials of Sun Yat-sen’s “Greater 
 Asianism” Speech] (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 1989); and Prasenjit 
Duara, “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 
 1900–1945”, AHR 102 (1997): 1030–51.
45. Sun Ge, “How Does Asia Mean?”, p. 23.
46. See, for example, Baik Young-seo, “Conceptualizing ‘Asia’ in Modern 
Chinese Mind: A Korean Perspective”, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 3, 2 
 (2002): 277–86.
47. See Sun Ge, Baik Young-Seo and Chen Kuan-Hsing, “Posuto ‘Higashi 
Ajia’ to iu Shiza” [A Post-“East Asia” Viewpoint], in Posuto ‘Higashi Ajia’ 
to iu Shiza [Post-“East Asia” Viewpoint], ed. Sun Ge, Baik Young-Seo 
 and Chen Kuan-Hsing (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2006), pp. 1–4.
48. Wang Hui, “The Politics of Imagining Asia”, p. 78.
49. Ibid., pp. 78–9.
50. Ibid., p. 67.
51. See Kan Naoto, “Rekishi no bunsuirei ni tatsu Nihon Gaikō” [Japanese 
Diplomacy at a Historic Watershed], 20 Jan. 2011, http://www.kantei.
 go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201101/20speech.html, accessed 6 Dec. 2014.
52. Sun had taken refuge in Japan three times during his revolutionary career 
and built friendships with leading Japanese public figures, such as Inukai 
Tsuyoshi, later the Japanese prime minister, and the Asianist writer-
 activist Miyazaki Tōten. See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-
 sen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954).
53. See Shindō Eiichi, “Ajia haken ka kyōchō ka” [Asian Despotism or 
Harmony?], Asahi Shinbun, 14 Oct. 2010, p. 8. Shindō refers to Umeya 
 Shōkichi, a Japanese entrepreneur who had supported Sun financially.
54. Sun Ge et al., “Posuto ‘Higashi Ajia’ to iu shiza”, p. 2.
55. Ibid.
Chap8 (181-208).indd   208 10/8/15   11:59:24 AM
 Asia as Future 209
209
Chapter  Nine
Asia as Future: The Claims and 
Rhetoric of an Asian Century1
Nicola Spakowski
In the history of Asianisms, Western discourse of an Asian Century is 
one of the more recent, yet quite powerful manifestations of addres-
sing Asia as an entity. Its roots lie in the 1980s and the economic 
success of Japan. Since then, it has become increasingly broadly ap-
plied, from the economies of the “four little tigers/dragons” in the 
1980s and 1990s to the big ones of China and India in the 2000s. 
This shift in geographical specification notwithstanding, “Asia” has 
assumed unprecedented attention in Western discourse and the Asian 
Century has become a signal phrase for fundamental shifts in the 
economic and political order of the world.
 The “Asian Century” is a vague term that usually lacks definition.2 
It is related to similar denominations of centuries (Pacific, Asia-Pacific, 
Chinese) and also to terms such as the “East Asian miracle”, “Asia’s 
rise”, “Chindia” or “China’s rise”, all of which reflect the general Asia 
hype of the last three decades.3 At the same time, the Asian Century 
is more specific than the above-mentioned terms in that it evokes a 
historical narrative of shifting centres of world power (from Great 
Britain in the 19th century to the United States in the 20th century 
and Asia in the 21st). Furthermore, the Asian Century discourse is 
future-oriented and makes use of particular claims and rhetoric to 
substantiate visions of an Asia-dominated future. In this essay, I will 
dissect the Asia as future discourse by asking the following questions: 
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What are the substance and promises of the Asian Century? What is 
the nature of the region addressed as “Asian” in the Asian Century? 
What kind of world view does it reflect? Who are the producers and 
beneficiaries of this discourse? Which arguments, rhetorical tools and 
media do they use?
 While I will try to answer all the above-mentioned questions in 
order to outline the basic features and the ideology of the Asian Cen-
tury discourse, at the most fundamental level my curiosity lies with 
the temporality it reflects and its futuristic nature. While Asianisms 
in general are discourses of region and thus space, the idea of an 
Asian Century introduces a time perspective into Asia and opens up 
a macro historical view that spans past, present and future. As I will 
demonstrate over the course of this essay, the Asian Century dis-
course, while making claims on the future, resorts to the “big picture” 
of world history to substantiate these claims. It is a history-cum-
future discourse that uses the (allegedly) known—the past—to give 
shape to the unknown—the future. More specifically, the Asian 
Century represents a positive vision of the future of global capitalism 
and profit-oriented business. At the level of the “big picture”, it de-
picts the evolution and future prospects of global capitalism, namely: 
capitalism’s centre is shifting East, but its rules of operation will re-
main unchanged. In the slightly narrower and more selective vision of 
business, the Asian Century discourse reflects the search for economic 
policies that guarantee vantage in future market situations and for 
business strategies that promise the highest yields for investment. The 
particular “Asian” and “future” element in these business calculations 
is the notion of the “emergence” of Asia’s markets. As “emerging” 
markets they are not yet fully developed, or just starting to develop, 
and thus bear the potential of even bigger or more enduring yields of 
investments in the region.
 The essay is structured in five parts. In Part 1 I will show that 
the idea of an Asian Century, at a very general level, is related to 
ideologies of globalism and economism, which make Asia a site of 
growth. Part 2 will trace the development of the Asian Century (and 
related “centuries”) discourse since the 1980s. It will be argued that 
the cycles of this discourse and shifts in geographical specification 
reflect the business cycles of the world economy and geographical 
shifts in the dynamic of Asian economies. In Part 3 I will outline the 
actors, tools and media of the Asia hype that is the breeding ground 
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for the idea of an Asian Century. In particular, I will show how his-
tory is mobilized to present the current situation of high-speed growth 
as normal and thus sustainable. I will further demonstrate how the 
investment world, the business press and international institutions 
share growth as their fetish and collaborate in constructing Asia as a 
site of growth. Part 4 will review three recently published and quite 
influential monographs of the rise/decline genre and show how they 
provide the “big picture” of world history and world affairs. Within 
this “big picture”, Asia represents shifts within—but not fundamental 
challenges to—global capitalism. In the conclusion (Part 5) I will 
summarize my findings and point out the flaws of these visions of 
an Asian Century. As will become clear over the course of the essay, 
voices that feed into the idea of an Asian Century as it is reflected in 
Western media are predominantly of Western origin and reflect the 
anxieties and interests of Western actors and audiences. The ques-
tion of whether the Asian Century is also of interest in Asian socie-
ties and how it is discussed in native language contexts is reserved for 
future research.4
Different Asias: Globalism or Realism, Market 
Opportunities or Security Threats?
Visions of an Asian Century are part of a broader Asia hype, which is 
full of ambiguities. These ambiguities start at the level of reactions to 
a rising Asia. One commentator speaks of a “language of awe” when 
it comes to books on the economic emergence of China and India: 
“… China and India provoke, in equal measure, so much fear and 
anticipation.” 5 Fear and anticipation—or “threats” and “promises”—
are the two poles of affection that are evoked in future discourse in 
order “to justify and enable action in the present”.6 Why can Asia 
evoke both ends of the pole? At the conceptual level, this ambiguity 
reflects shifting and extending notions of power, in particular the in-
clusion of an economic dimension into definitions of power. In addi-
tion, it is expressive of the double orientation of governments in the 
formulation of national interests, either in the form of an inclusion of 
economics in strategic reasoning or as an acknowledgement of both 
the “opportunities” and “challenges” that come with the global power 
shift to the East.7 When it comes to the more particular notion of an 
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Asian Century, however, “anticipation”, “promise” and a general opti-
mism prevail. This becomes particularly clear when we discern the 
opposing world views that feed into the ambiguity of “awe”, namely, 
realism, which tends to stress the political challenges and the military 
threat emanating from Asia,8 and globalism, which tends to praise 
the economic opportunities of the Asian market. Pekka Korhonen em-
ploys different terms but gives a very useful summary of what these 
two options entail:
Classical economic categories direct thinking toward positive-sum-
game situations, where everybody can win at the same time, while 
military and territorial conceptions tend to force discussants toward 
a zero-sum-game type of argumentation, where every actor is evalu-
ated as a winner or loser. In other words, economic rhetoric depicts 
a world of potential increasing abundance, while military rhetoric 
tends to view a world of scarcity.9
In a realist perspective, the nation state is the dominant actor in 
world affairs and competes with other nations over scarce resources.10 
These other nations are perceived as competitors or rivals in a zero-
sum game of power politics. In this view, the rise of one actor means 
the decline of another. The threat posed by rivals may be military 
(arms build-up) or economic (“floods” of goods and workers); it 
might also be, as is the case with China, systemic. The vision of Asia 
as a source of threat has historically been evoked by the catchword 
of the “yellow peril”.11 Even though this term is no longer in use, 
militarist and protectionist discourses continue to exist (e.g., warnings 
of China’s military build-up, calls on China to appreciate the yuan). 
Realism tends to be futuristic in pointing at future threats and future 
wars as legitimation for military build-up and strategic decisions. 
Good examples that are related to the Asian Century are Robert D. 
Kaplan’s essay “How We Would Fight China” 12 and the Obama ad-
ministration’s recent strategic turn to “America’s Pacific Century”.13 
While notions of threat and rivalry might be invoked in some expres-
sions of the Asian Century,14 it is important to note that realist dis-
course privileges the nation and not the region as a political unit. 
It is true that realists might address “Asia” as a trouble spot within 
international relations, but in their argument they have to assess 
the threat posed by individual  nations and the potential for conflict 
between the various states of Asia. Logically, the catchphrase of the 
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Asian Century will rarely be found in realist rhetoric. Rather, realists 
would lower expectations of Asian societies’ uninterrupted growth 
and thus also unlimited business opportunities in Asia. One major 
example of this trend is the former Economist editor Bill Emmott’s 
monograph Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and 
Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade (2009):
Asia is divided, and the process of rapid economic development is 
going to divide it still further, in political terms. The rise of Asia is 
not just, or even mainly, going to pit Asia against the West, shifting 
power from the latter to the former. It is going to pit Asians against 
Asians.15
Emmott particularly warns against the naïve extrapolation of past eco-
nomic success into the future, which is common among the prophets 
of an Asian Century.16 Critics of the notion of an Asian Century 
typically point out the structural impediments to further growth.17 
Or they envision totally different global power constellations (e.g., 
multipolarity,18 the rise of “emerging powers” in different parts of the 
world,19 and many more).
 Globalists, on the other hand, focus on the opportunities pro-
vided by free trade, which is claimed to be a win-win situation for 
all participants in the global economy. The globalist world is one of 
interdependence, cooperation and integration, with open borders as 
a necessary condition. Competition does occur in this world, but 
rather in the form of “positive competition”,20 which further fosters 
the improvement of economic performance and thus promises even 
higher profits. As has been demonstrated by Pekka Korhonen with 
regard to the Pacific Century, a related term, high tides of economic 
optimism (the 1880s, 1920s, 1960s, 1980s–90s) were also high tides 
of the Pacific Century.21 A typical statement from the globalist Asia 
as future discourse is this one:
As long as China and India support free trade, they present an op-
portunity for business to expand into countries with a rich resource
—at a very cheap rate—which accounted for around 45% of the 
world’s growth last year.22
What is the nature of Asia in the globalist vision? It is a region exclu-
sively determined by economic factors—globalism and economism go 
hand in hand here. Furthermore, “Asia” in this view does not reflect 
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the notion of region in a politico-economic sense but in the sense 
of a rather loose geography of growth.23 Here lies also the futuristic 
aspect of the Asian Century discourse: promises of profit from ever 
growing markets and the potentials of “not yet” fully developed eco-
nomies. This geography of growth does not mean that particular 
Asian nations or sub-regions become invisible. They might still be 
present as units of economic accounting, in the form of culturally 
bounded sub-regions (“Confucian capitalism”), in a discourse of size 
(“Chindia”) or in a distinct position on the ladder of development 
(“emerging” or “developing Asia”). Typically, however, a number of 
nations are added up to form a country group of growth. While the 
precise composition of this group varies according to shifting econo-
mic dynamics and differences in the explanations for growth,24 “Asia” 
is the rough geographical direction where growth is taking place. It is 
this globalist Asia that is at the heart of the investigation of the Asian 
Century that follows.
Shifting Geographies of Growth: From the “East Asian 
Miracle” to “Chindia” to China
Ambiguities can also be found when it comes to concrete century de-
nominations. The Asian Century is related to similar denominations 
such as the Pacific, the Asia-Pacific or the Chinese Century; and one 
denomination might easily be transformed into another. The views of 
centuries appear and disappear from public debate according to the 
openness or closeness of global markets; they are as volatile as the 
business cycles of the world economy.25 Still, the Asia-related century 
denominations are not totally interchangeable. While the Pacific Cen-
tury includes America (and in particular the United States) but ex-
cludes mainland Asia, the Asian Century excludes America but allows 
for the inclusion of the entirety of China plus India.26 The shift from 
Pacific to Asia and again from East Asia to China and India and, 
finally, to China is the rough trend based on shifting geographies of 
attention that reflect shifting identifications of “power engines” in the 
world economy and changing explanations for Asian economic suc-
cess. More specifically, three phases can be distinguished.
 The first phase, which comprises roughly the 1980s and 1990s, 
was dominated by the success story of post-war Japan and, subse-
quently, the “four Asian tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
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and Taiwan). This phase culminated in the notion of an “East Asian 
miracle”.27 Typically, many explanations for this first chapter of Asian 
economic success were culturalist, combining Western sociological 
theories of a “Confucian capitalism” and Asian discourse of “Asian 
values”. The former view was a response to the new Asian realities of 
growth that had disproved Max Weber’s culturalist argument of the 
incompatibility of capitalism and the Confucian ethic.28 The latter 
was cherished by authoritarian governments within the region who 
took growth as proof of the beneficial role of authoritarian political 
structures rooted in an allegedly different Asian culture.29 A second 
type of explanation was economic and oscillated between industrial 
policy/state intervention and economic liberalization as explanations 
for East Asia’s success.30 The occurrence of these new theories, be 
they cultural or economic, reflects the fact that Asian success came as 
a surprise to Western theorists and forced them to review the basics 
of economic and sociological theory. This first phase of discussions 
removed the theoretical obstacles to a more inclusive master narrative 
of capitalism. Discussions concerning an Asian model, Asian values, 
an (Asia-)Pacific Century or Confucian capitalism were all related to 
this effort.
 The Asian financial crisis of 1997 tempered enthusiasm about 
Asia, but only temporarily.31 From the early years of the 21st century, 
Asia resumed currency, now with China and India at the centre of 
attention.32 China and India were trumpeted as part of the so-called 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) “emerging economies” group—
a concept that had been proposed by Goldman Sachs in 2001.33 
“Chindia”, a term coined in 2005 by the Indian politician Jairam 
Ramesh 34 and related publications,35 on the other hand, singled out 
China and India as the two “giants” of Asia and new “power houses” 
of the global economy. The Chindia vision is one of sheer size and 
global share (population, GDP growth).36 Still, China is given more 
attention, and from around 2000 the Chinese Century joined the 
century denominations.37
 From the early years of the 21st century, the notion of an Asian 
Century was reinforced through claims of increasing American weak-
ness and potential decline; realist zero-sum-game notions started to 
sneak themselves into the Asia discourse. Since then, the old rhetoric 
of the rise and decline of empires or states (and also of US decline 
in particular) has become more and more influential.38 It appears in 
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either a hemispheric/regional form (rise of the East, decline of the 
West) or a national one (rise of China, decline of the United States), 
with notions of competition being evident in both forms. Various 
institutions offer predictions for the date when China will have over-
taken the United States as the biggest economic power (for Goldman 
Sachs it is 2027, for the Economist it is 2019, for the International 
Monetary Fund it is 2016).39 The elevation of China (against the 
backdrop of US decline) found its expression also in the discussions 
of a Beijing Consensus, a Chinese model or state capitalism—terms 
that all reflect systemic rivalry between the two powers.40 It was fur-
ther boosted after the beginning of the global financial crisis. Asia, 
and in particular China, were credited with quick recovery from the 
financial crisis.41 The world started to pin its hopes on Asia as the 
“power engine” that would lead the way out of crisis. With the out-
break of the European debt crisis in 2010 and China’s offer to help, 
China for a moment came to be perceived as the potential saviour of 
an ailing West.42 However, since early 2012, declining Chinese growth 
figures and warnings that these might signal systemic problems gave 
the China discourse a more pessimistic twist.43 The future fate of 
the Asian Century probably will continue to depend on the ups and 
downs of the national economies in Asia, the economic performance 
of the region (and the world) at large, and the course of international 
conflicts that typically draw attention away from economic issues and 
attenuate the prospects for free trade on a global scale.
The Production of the Asia Hype: Actors, Tools, Media
As has been argued, the Asia as future discourse is part of an ideology 
of globalism and economism. As such, and as will be shown in this 
part of the essay, it is supported by particular actors and concentrated 
in particular media. These actors and media make use of a selection 
of rhetorical tools that are particularly suited to sustain the claims of 
an Asian Century.
The Rhetorical Tools of the Asian Century Discourse: 
Quantification, Abstraction and Comparison
The Asian Century is a topic of mainly non-academic genres. Respec-
tive texts lack method and theory, a consistent argument, and, for 
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most information, also sources. Rather, authors tend to give anecdotal 
evidence and piecemeal information.44 Still, an obvious lack of 
methodological rigidity can be combined with the appropriation of a 
quasi-academic style. Arvind Subramanian, an important proponent 
of the vision of China’s rise, for instance, plans to “look at some 
numbers from the past and for the future, which form the core of 
the case presented here, leavened by historical narrative”.45 In fact, 
quantification and historical reasoning are central for visions of an 
Asian Century: The Asian Century is a discourse of size that uses 
numbers to illustrate growth; it is a discourse of the future that needs 
history to make up for the uncertainties of the future (see below). 
Furthermore, as a macro discourse it is necessarily selective (“some 
numbers”) and has to resort to reductions and abstractions to distill 
infinite information into a graspable argument, or, more specifically, 
to reduce the internal complexities of Asia (or a single Asian country) 
to a site of growth. Subramanian quotes Einstein—“Everything should 
be made as simple as possible, but no simpler”—and William of 
Ockham—“plurality should not be posited without necessity” 46—to 
make simplicity a virtue of (pseudo-)scientific reasoning. The most 
common tools of simplification in the Asian Century discourse are 
catchphrases (Asian Century),47 acronyms for country groups (BRIC, 
Chindia, RODA,48 etc.), metaphors (rise and decline), stereotyped 
country symbols (tiger, dragon, elephant, etc.), and photographic 
icons of growth (the Shanghai Pudong skyline). The most powerful 
rhetoric device, however, is visualization. Articles on the rise of Asia 
are filled with tables, charts and graphs, most of which deliver one 
basic message: past, present and future growth.49 Bruno Latour, in his 
essay “Drawing Things Together”, has argued that visualization is an 
important factor in the persuasiveness of a text in that it presents all 
the “absent things” needed as evidence in one single instance: “The 
effect on the construction of facts is sizeable if a writer is able to pro-
vide a reader with a text which presents a large number of the things 
it is talking about in one place.” 50 And: “A more powerful theory, 
we submit, is one that with fewer elements and fewer and simpler 
transformations makes it possible to get at every other theory (past 
and future).” 51 In the Asia as future discourse, the graph of an up-
ward line of GDP growth has become the equivalent of the Pudong 
skyline in the field of macroeconomic accounting.
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 Finally, since the dominance of Asia can only be demonstrated 
in relation to its competitors, comparison is a necessary tool for sub-
stantiating Asia as future; its most common and authoritative abstrac-
tion is gross national product (GDP). Daniel Speich has demonstrated 
how the development and employment of GDP as a tool of econo-
mic comparison since the 1930s, from the very beginning, was met 
with the objections of individual economists who pointed out the 
methodological problems and simplifications of national income ac-
counting. In Speich’s words, “(m)acroeconomic abstractions radically 
reduced the complexity of the human world and tended to replace the 
manifold economic relationships within it with simple dichotomies.” 52 
Once categories, concepts and procedures of assessing economic per-
formance are standardized and reduced to one single indicator—
GDP—the global share or the global rank of nations in the world 
economy can be assessed. GDP, GDP growth, share of global GDP 
and nation rankings based on GDP accounting are the fetishes among 
partisans of the Asian Century.
History for the Future: Asia’s Success from “Miracle” to 
“Historical Norm”
Interestingly, history is a central element in the Asia as future dis-
course. This seems paradoxical at first glance, but in fact historical 
arguments are not uncommon in future discourse. They reflect a 
modernist view of the world as controlled by historical laws that 
bridge past, present and future. Informed by the “grand narrative” of 
historical development, the futurologist pretends to be able to predict 
or at least prognosticate the future.53 This is also true for the Asian 
Century where the (alleged) certainties of the past are used to tame 
the uncertainties of the future.
 Asia’s rise as a topic of academic attention started in the field of 
world history, where the East was rehabilitated historically and the 
role of the West thus became relativized from the other end of the 
time scale. This tide had its roots in Edward Said’s deconstruction 
of orientalism 54 and gained substance through the books of Andre 
Gunder Frank (ReOrient, 1998), Kenneth Pomeranz (The Great Diver-
gence, 2000) and Roy Bin Wong (China Transformed, 2000). Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse, an authority in the field of global studies, dis-
cussed these influential books on Asia (or, rather, China) in world 
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history under the title of “oriental globalization” and summarized: 
“Arguably, this body of literature converges on a major thesis: the 
Orient came first and the Occident was a latecomer.”55 While all 
these works have certainly contributed to a correction of earlier, ob-
viously Eurocentric narratives of world history, the “global” that is 
constructed through this genre of comparative world history is, as has 
been argued by Rebecca Karl, an ahistorical, neutral space, which, 
through (retrospectively) being opened up to new entrants, is only re-
confirmed in its capitalist nature and economics as the overall norm.56
 On the purely quantitative side, projections of GDP back into 
the past play an important role for projections forth into the future. 
Here, the authority is the world historian Angus Maddison, who 
reconstructed world GDP for the last two millennia.57 In a quasi-
obituary in the Economist, the essence of Maddison’s findings with 
regard to Asia is given as follows:
Maddison’s figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of 
world output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the 
world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.58
While the academic historian Gregory Clark holds that Maddison’s 
numbers are “fictions, as real as the relics peddled around Europe in 
the Middle Ages”,59 the business press happily grasps at Maddison’s 
numbers.60 Maddison’s figures, fictitious as they may be, are an im-
portant element in claims that Asia’s recent “rise” is not a simple 
“emergence” but a “re-emergence”,61 “restoration”,62 “renaissance” 63 or 
“return to historical norm”.64 The projection of Asia’s importance back 
into history obviously further substantiates claims of Asia’s economic 
capabilities and potentials in the present and future. Past figures mat-
ter, because in the light of history, current growth figures no longer 
appear as mere (short-term) booms but represent stable and long-term 
trends of positive economic performance. The “miracle” of the 1980s 
and 1990s thus became naturalized and turned into a historical norm.
“Invest in the Future”: 65 The Asian Century of the 
Investment World and the Business Press
While world history writing, as a master narrative or as a basis of 
numerical projections back and forth in time, is a major source for 
the construction of an Asian Century, the investment world is its 
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main actor and the business press the central platform for heating up 
the Asia hype. Some investment companies and funds bear the Asian 
Century in their titles (e.g., the Asian Century Fund created by Asian 
Century Capital,66 Asian Century Quest,67 The Asian Century and 
TAC by asia 21 gmbh 68); and their websites and newsletters abound 
with commitments to the Asian Century. Here is a typical quote from 
the “investment approach” page of Asian Century Capital:
We believe this century will be the “Asian Century”: the most im-
portant secular trend this century is the return of Asia to the centre 
of the global economy. During this century, Asia will be the region 
where wealth creation will be the highest. If history is any guide, in-
vesting in the “Asian Century” will yield high returns in the future.69
Arguments for Asia as a site of “wealth creation” and “high returns” 
are, as is apparent in this quote, backed up with both future projec-
tions and historical evidence. Medium- to long-term GDP projections 
are typically created by investment banks, investment consultants or 
related papers.70 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), one of the world’s 
largest services companies, in 2011 even dared to provide predictions 
up to the year 2050.71 A datablog in the Guardian (7 Jan. 2011) fur-
ther processed PwC’s data.72 Both the PwC website and the Guardian 
block use charts to make the Asian Century visible. Admittedly, in-
vestment consulting cannot be accused of an undifferentiated hyping 
of Asia as a whole. Still, PwC’s growth projections for country groups 
or single countries and the praise of investment opportunities and 
expected profit in these places are important elements in the myth of 
an Asian Century.
 History is the second source of arguments for wealth creation in 
Asia. Here the consultancy firm KPMG73 and its magazine Agenda: 
Insights into Growth, Performance and Governance are telling examples. 
The cover of the September 2008 issue of Agenda tries to attract 
readers’ attention with a photo of the investment guru George Soros 
and the headline “George Soros Believes that the 21st Century 
Belongs to Asia. Is He Right?” 74 On the second page of Agenda, 
Bernd Schmid, head of Advisory at KPMG Europe LLP, resorts to 
history and the “normalization” thesis:
If you take the long view, the last 250 years—when the West’s GDP 
per capita has far exceeded the East’s—are an historical oddity. This 
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anomaly is now being corrected. China and India are re-emerging as 
economic superpowers.75
The same issue includes a one-page portrait of the Ming admiral 
Zheng He (1371–1433), which is claimed to offer “clues to China’s 
relationship with the rest of the world, its struggle to innovate and its 
attitude to science and technology”. The article titled “Lessons from 
a Eunuch: What the Story of China’s Greatest Explorer Can Tell Us 
about This Economic Giant” gives a perfect impression of how busi-
ness speak is imposed on Asian (here: Chinese) history, or, in other 
words, how Chinese history is manipulated for legitimizing invest-
ment advice. Zheng He is portrayed under the rubrics of “scientific 
edge”, “exceptional innovation”, “global horizon” (and, finally, “Con-
fucian wisdom”, the story of how China returned to Confucianism) 76
—one more example of crass ahistoricity.
 The Asia hype is not restricted to investment magazines; it figures 
also in the business pages of daily papers, in monographs written by 
business journalists,77 and in the special journals on Asia that have 
mushroomed since the beginning of the Asia boom. Speculative funds, 
investment consulting and the business press all contribute to what 
Walden Bello called a “psychology of permanent boom”.78 The eco-
nomic boom in Asia that started in the 1980s was paralleled by an 
expansion of press coverage of the region: “With foreign capital came 
the demand by investors at home to track their new Asian portfolio 
more closely.”79 New Asia-related journals were founded, and older 
ones expanded circulation or were bought up by dominant Western 
media who all wanted to have their share in the Asia boom.80 Busi-
ness journalism and investment consulting were closely intertwined, 
with investment advisers and strategists becoming the major infor-
mants for journalists.81
International Institutions and the Ideology of Growth
International institutions, particularly the World Bank, the IMF and 
the Asian Development Bank, are the third pillar in the production 
of the Asian Century. These institutions provide global-scale economic 
data that are used in various journalistic and popular publications on 
Asia, and they produce influential reports on the economic prospects 
of the region. A publication by the Asian Development Bank even 
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explicitly takes on the Asian Century theme: Asia 2050: Realizing the 
Asian Century (2011a).82 The IMF Regional Economic Outlook for 
Asia of 2011 is titled Asia and Pacific: Managing the Next Phase of 
Growth.83
 Among the various publications by these institutions, the World 
Bank’s two reports on East Asia have become particularly famous: 
The East Asian Miracle (1993) and An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for 
Economic Growth (2007).84 A third publication, Dancing with Giants: 
China, India, and the Global Economy (2007), moved attention to 
China and India.85 A more recent one, co-published by the World 
Bank and the Development Research Center of the PRC’s State 
Council and titled China 2030 (2012), on the other hand, dampened 
optimism about future growth in China and pointed out the risks 
China was facing.86 These reports certainly deserve further and sys-
tematic analysis, particularly regarding the explanations for Asian 
economic success and the policy advice given to guarantee further 
growth. While The East Asian Miracle, a study financed by the Japa-
nese government, reflects a compromise between market and state 
intervention as explanations for the “East Asian miracle”,87 An East 
Asian Renaissance moved to economies of scale as a source of growth.88 
China 2030, finally, dwells on the so-called middle-income trap as a 
potential impediment to China’s further growth. What all of them 
have in common is growth as the central category, value and also 
explanandum. The ethically dubious side of this genre can best be 
demonstrated by taking a closer look at the 2007 publication, which 
elevates the city of Dongguan in China’s Guangdong Province as an 
example of the benefit of economies of scale:
Dongguan has grown by 22 percent per year for the last 25 years. 
Cumulatively, the city’s economy now is 144 times as big as it was 
in 1980, all thanks to its ability to exploit economies of scale and 
avoid social diseconomies through good public policy.89
Alleged “good public policy”, however, does not seem to have an im-
pact on the well-being of Dongguan workers. In the very year of the 
publication of the World Bank report, Dongguan became famous in 
Chinese media for its high suicide rates among migrant workers:
According to statistics from the Dongguan 120 medical emergency 
center, 552 people attempted suicide in Dongguan from April to 
September 10. Seventy percent of them were migrants.90
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More recently, Dongguan became the site of massive labour protests.91 
The century prediction, as Alexander Woodside has critically remarked 
with regard to the Pacific Century, is devoid of any “common social 
conscience” or ethical concern. Asia is reduced to its markets.92
The “Big Picture”: Asia/The Rest and the West, 
from Past to Future
While the former section spelled out important arguments, rhetoric 
tools and supporting institutions in the Asian Century discourse, this 
last section turns to monographs that try to provide—in the historian 
Niall Ferguson’s words—the “big picture”.93 This means that they 
combine the elements we have encountered so far in a more encom-
passing narrative that, by covering large stretches of time and space 
(Asia/the rest and the West; past, present and future), pretends to 
be comprehensive—while, of course, being no less selective than the 
examples cited above. The space of a monograph permits inclusion of 
more evidence, demonstration of the historical “laws” one needs to 
predict or prognosticate the future, and relationality, i.e., the juxta-
position of Asia/the rest/China and the West/the United States. Rela-
tionality on the one hand reflects the rise/decline logic of realism. On 
the other hand, it is also a tool in the globalist discourse of an Asian 
Century. Here, through relationality the (allegedly) known (the West, 
past and present) sheds light on the unknown (Asia, the future).
 The book market is flooded with catchy titles on Asia as chal-
lenge or opportunity and on Asian rise and Western decline. Due to 
the “awe” that these themes evoke and the authoritative claim of their 
comprehensiveness, these books are highly marketable. Three examples 
are reviewed here to illustrate the directions of the genre.
 One of the most boisterous prophets of Asia’s rise is Kishore 
Mahbubani, a former Singaporean diplomat and academic whose 
occasionally anti-Western rhetoric seems to make him even more suc-
cessful in the Western book market.94 His monograph The New Asian 
Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (2008) is 
only one in a series of publications on Asia’s rise.95 Mahbubani’s main 
interest is in contemporary politics, which, however, are placed in the 
long-term perspective of Western decline and Asian rise: “The rise of 
the West transformed the world. The rise of Asia will bring about an 
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equally significant transformation.” 96 Mahbubani is also one of the 
main sources of the “return to the historical norm” claim:
Curiously, even though the world is returning to the historical norm 
in terms of the natural place of Asian societies in the hierarchy of 
societies and civilizations around the globe, Asian societies are not 
succeeding because of a rediscovery of some hidden or forgotten 
strength of Asian civilizations. Instead they are rising now because 
through a very slow and painful process they have finally discovered 
the pillars of Western wisdom that underpinned Western progress 
and enabled the West to outperform Asian societies for the past two 
centuries.97
Mahbubani claims to present a truly Asian perspective,98 but in fact 
his book abounds in universalism. The narrative he presents is the 
“great Asian March to Modernity” 99 based on seven “pillars of Western 
wisdom”. These include free-market economics, science and tech-
nology, meritocracy, pragmatism, culture of peace, rule of law, and 
education.100 This universalist thrust is abandoned only when it comes 
to the West’s “iconization of democracy” and the aggressive export of 
democracy to societies around the world.101 Mahbubani warns against 
continuing Western dominance and arrogance and supports a liberal 
world order where Asia has to be granted the place it deserves.102
 In The Post-American World (2008), the influential American jour-
nalist Fareed Zakaria addresses the “rise of the rest” in more general 
terms. As a matter of fact, however, it is only the United States, 
China and India that receive detailed treatment in chapters of their 
own. The book is directed against US blindness towards the global 
transformations that are taking place and the danger of isolation from 
the rest of the world. According to Zakaria, the “rise of the rest” and 
the dissolution of the post-Cold War unipolar world order have to be 
acknowledged. The United States has to be open and more willing 
to make compromises vis-à-vis the outside world. Internally, it has to 
become more efficient. Zakaria embraces globalization as the current 
trend and a liberal world order that comprises free markets, trade and 
immigration. The China and India chapters are made up of pieces of 
conventional wisdom. Similar to Mahbubani, the “rise of the rest” for 
Zakaria is a matter of emulating the West:
We have urged peoples in distant lands to take up the challenge 
of competing in the global economy, freeing up their currencies, 
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and developing new industries. We counseled them to be unafraid 
of change and learn the secrets of our success. And it worked: the 
natives have gotten good at capitalism.103
The British historian Ferguson’s Civilization: The West and the Rest 
(2011a) is the most historical among the works discussed here. 
Ferguson is a specialist in financial and economic history with a 
conspicuous interest in macro history. From interviews and the fore-
word to his book we know that Ferguson wants to provide the “big 
picture” 104 or “a big story—a metanarrative of why one civilization 
transcended the constraints that had bound all previous ones—and 
a great many smaller tales or micro-histories within it”.105 His focus 
is on the rise of the West since around 1500 without, however, ex-
cluding “the rest”:
For they [other civilizations] are equally important members of 
the drama’s cast. This is not a history of the West but a history of 
the world, in which Western dominance is the phenomenon to be 
explained.106
The explanation Ferguson gives are the six “killer apps” that supported 
the rise of the West: competition, science, property, medicine, con-
sumption and work ethic. According to Ferguson, however, “… we 
are living through the end of 500 years of Western ascendancy”.107 
Starting with Japan in the 19th century, the “rest” “downloaded” these 
killer apps and took Western civilization as a template for their own 
rise.108 Ferguson’s “big picture” is best expressed in a graph that shows 
the estimated shares of Europe, the United States, China and India in 
global GDP for the years 1500 to 2008.109 While the development 
of China and India form the upper lines for almost 400 years, these 
two lines drop in the 18th century—only to get back to the top in 
the late 20th century. Obviously, the West and the rest are changing 
roles. This is particularly true for the rise of China covered in a dif-
ferent text by Ferguson.110
 Ferguson also points out the close relation between futurism, 
history and investment advice. As a speaker at an investment con-
ference organized by the Swiss private bank Julius Bär on 31 January 
2011, he gave a presentation titled “The World Is Changing”.111 This 
presentation consisted almost exclusively of graphs that delivered a 
clear message about rise and decline. According to a report on the 
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conference, Ferguson did not even refrain from giving explicit invest-
ment advice: “Ferguson thinks that China’s rise simply is the biggest 
change in history since the West started its era of dominance around 
1500. ‘Those who bet against it will lose’, says Ferguson.” 112
 Even though the three books differ in emphasis, they share a 
Eurocentric master narrative of Asia’s rise as a result of employing 
Western “wisdom”. They use the known (the West) to delineate the 
unknown (the rest/Asia). These books, inclusive as they might be, are 
universalist and not too different from Fukuyama’s “end of history” 
view. Even though their claimed intentions might be the reverse, they 
present themselves as triumphalists, albeit of a different shade and 
with a geographically broader horizon than Fukuyama.113
Conclusion
The Asian Century is a macro discourse that combines notions of 
space (Asia and the West) and time (past, present and future) with a 
narrative of shifting centres of power and opportunities in the world. 
It traces and further predicts the move of Western capitalist modernity 
to the East, a relocation of a Eurocentric modernity—but not the 
formation of a new, Asian modernity. Differing from other Asianisms 
discussed in this volume, the territorial delineations of Asia, “member-
ship” in this vision of Asian growth and intra-Asian interactions are 
not of major concern to the prophets of an Asian Century. Asia is 
not a concrete place but the rough direction capitalism has to take in 
order to rejuvenate and regain momentum.
 More specifically, the Asian Century is a region-centred vision of 
growth and business opportunities related to an ideology of globalism 
and economism. Its messages are: invest, cooperate, adjust. As an 
economist vision, the Asian Century belongs to financial capital that 
seeks a haven for investment, to market radicals and to free traders. 
As a vision of an unknown place and time, the Asian Century dis-
course employs rhetorical tools and narrative configurations that help 
to make the unknown known. One tool is the employment of history 
and the evocation of past economic capability that translates current 
growth figures into a historical norm. The other is the projection 
of “Western wisdom” onto the story of Asia’s rise. The flaws of this 
vision of an Asian Century are obvious. First of all, it is devoid of 
any ethical concerns. Growth is its fetish, and the fate of the workers 
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who produce this growth is concealed. Second, it abounds with crass 
ahistoricisms. In the vision of an Asian Century (and Asia’s impre-
sive past), temporally and spatially diverse historical experience is 
flattened and perceptions of Asia are confined to the notions of GDP 
and growth. Third, it is abstract. It leaves out the people living on 
Asian soil and the human agency involved in shaping a century. As 
the future studies scholar Richard Slaughter sees the fundamental 
problem of his own field: “the understandable desire to predict the 
future is in direct conflict with the view of people as agents and 
makers of history.” 114
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